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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Kimberley Dianne Phillips Parzuchowski 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Philosophy 
 
December 2015 
 
Title: The Enchantment of Ethics: Empathy, Character, and the Art of Moral Living 
 
 
My dissertation explores the role of narrative in the cultivation of empathy for 
ethical attitudes and behaviors.  I begin by exploring an uncommon view of human 
nature, concluding that we are not autonomously individualistic rational deciders but 
ultrasocial moral intuitionists.  Intersubjective relations run deep and provide the basis by 
which we shape the meaning of our lives as individuals in communities.  It is because of 
this that we need to reconsider and redesign our moral cultivation programs both for the 
child-rearing years and throughout adult life.  I look at empathy, the means of our mutual 
understanding, care, and help, as a key site for moral cultivation.  I explicate the 
neurophysiological bases of empathy, both conscious and unconscious.  Empathy is on 
the continuum with very primitive, automatic mirroring systems, which through varying 
levels of mimicry facilitate social cognition and moral insight and action.   
Empathy enables us to enter into the worlds and feelings of others in rich and full-
bodied ways and can reveal their full subjectivity.  Such experiences can incite empathic 
regard and compassionate action, but empathy, like all of our psycho-social capacities, 
requires cultivation to develop its skillfulness in practice.  Narrative is an obvious means 
of cultivating empathy because it is humanity’s primary meaning-making structure, 
utilizing the empathic imagination to seduce us into the inner worlds of others.  Through 
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narrative dramatizations of experience, we learn to see and feel from another’s point of 
view, sensitizing us to their inner states and outward behavior.  Such sensitivity can 
facilitate improving our moral attitudes and action by dislodging preoccupation with self-
concern and instigating higher regard for others.  In narratives we can imaginatively 
practice various moral actions, witnessing possible results.   
Reflective engagement can then bring the moral insights of these imaginative 
experiences to life in our practical worlds by attuning us to what is morally salient.  
Narrative engagement is thus a natural and vital part of shaping empathic moral 
perception for compassionate action.  By reading and feeling with others reflectively, we 
can expand empathy for the pluralistic communities in which we live, make meaning, and 
grow. 
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CHAPTER I 
HUMANS ARE ULTRASOCIAL MORAL INTUITIONISTS 
From the time we are born, the narrative cradle of story rocks us to the 
collective heartbeat of our species, ushering us across the threshold of 
consciousness and into the domain of humanity. 
~Marshall Gregory 
 
If I were God, I’d work on the reach of empathy. 
~Franz de Waal 
 
Praise belongs to virtue for from this people become apt  
at performing beautiful actions. 
~Aristotle 
Introduction 
Human beings are social animals.  We know this to be generally true, but we may 
not fully appreciate how social we are or the import of that sociality on how we think and 
behave.  Recent research in the cognitive and social sciences reveals that we learn how to 
be human by mimicking our parents and care givers throughout our formative years.  
This mimicry is hard-wired in our neurophysiology and is an important means of 
apprehending the meaning of gestures, events, and situations, as well as intuiting our role 
as these events increasingly invite and implicate us in their unfolding.  With proper care 
and attentiveness to our personal, cognitive, and physiological needs in infancy and 
childhood, we will mature into reasonably well-adapted and socialized adults.  That being 
said, the challenges of moral living are sometimes such that general child-rearing 
practices are not sufficient to aid us in attending or responding appropriately to complex 
moral situations.   
We may resist what we believe we ought to do when we are inconvenienced by 
someone else’s need, or when the wellbeing of me or mine is pitted against the wellbeing 
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of others.  As we examine what tips the balances in favor of self-interest or concern for 
the other in the psychology of ethics, feelings emerge as having a strong motive force.  
We have historically believed that reason was an important force for morality, for self-
overcoming, but empirical literature suggests that emotions have more power for ethics 
than we have previously appreciated.  Whether we experience feelings of concern, guilt, 
or other social emotions, we seem to be driven to act by feelings more than by rational 
commitments.   
When we are compelled by regard for the other, we often employ the term 
empathy.  We empathize with our suffering friends and even with strangers.  Empathy 
allows us to feel feelings that resonate with other people’s feelings and situations.  
Sometimes empathy makes us cry with them, and sometimes we turn away from their 
suffering because it is too much for us.  Empathy has become an important area of 
research and insight to aid ethical theorists.  I define empathy as a neurophysiological 
process that facilitates our social cognition and relationality by provoking in us 
cognitive-affective responses that are resonant with the perceived
1
 feelings, experiences, 
and/or situations of others.  Understanding how empathy works in social cognition can 
help us to construct more apt moral theories and cultivation practices.  Empathy is able to 
be shaped morally, suggesting that it is a useful site for moral cultivation to strengthen, 
expand, and deepen our capacity for humane regard and benevolent action for others. 
David Hume (1751) argues that it is by virtue of such a developed moral concern 
that we are bound more closely to the lives of others, actually deepening our own 
flourishing (43).  Because we are extremely social, we thrive in and through our 
                                                          
1
 By “perceived,” I include non-conscious perceptions. 
3 
 
relationships, even when they demand much of us.  We seek affiliation and meaning in 
community.  Empathy facilitates this by enabling us to synchronize and sympathize with 
others such that we can fluidly and automatically understand people and situations and 
act well within them.  This enables us to assume our appropriate roles social situations.  
As social life gets exponentially more complicated in adolescent and particularly adult 
life, the demands on moral perception and receptivity require increasingly more 
sophisticated skills.   
Life experience can teach us a lot about social situations and meanings, aiding us 
is identifying and applying patterns.  And yet, as Marshall Gregory (2009) points out, 
experience alone is no teacher (20-21).  In order to successfully navigate social situations 
and relations, we need interpretive guidance throughout our childhood and youth, which 
includes instruction in the skills of intuiting, reflecting, analyzing, and correcting with a 
complexity that matches our developmental stages.  Gregory claims that our passion for 
stories leads us over and over again through the very structures that will show us 
ourselves, our own lives interpreted, giving meaning to what could otherwise be a loose 
and disjointed string of events.  Stories offer us insight into the experiences of others 
from which we can build our understanding of the meanings and standards of social life.  
Stories are important for self-understanding, for understanding the other, and for grasping 
the roles that we are to play in the creative spaces of relational life, in short, for making 
our lives intelligible and meaningful.  This is why Jonathan Gottchall describes us as 
storytelling animals (2).  The power of stories for human living is that they can affect 
how we feel, how we think, how we see and how we behave in the world.  In this work, I 
am investigating empathy’s role for ethics and the role of narratives in shaping our 
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empathic moral perception and sensitivity.  It seems to me that through our engagement 
with certain types of stories we develop our capacity for empathic engagement with 
others, and this provokes us to act more often, and with better insight, in helping others.  I 
will show how the enticement of stories invites us into the pleasure and meaning of 
interpersonal empathic regard, facilitating stronger communal relations. 
In the present chapter, I will explain our profound sociality and how our 
emotional cognition is essential to social cognition.  These insights contradict or at least 
strongly challenge still-dominant Western views about humans as rationally autonomous 
individuals.  This fuller account of our anthropology, lays the groundwork for 
understanding our empathic responsivity in ethics in Chapters II-IV.  In these chapters, I 
will explicate the process of empathy in three interrelated areas: neurophysiology, 
aesthetics, and morality.  The fourth chapter explicates how empathy is cultivated for 
moral responsivity.  In Chapter V, I will look at narrativity as the most general way in 
which humans structure experience and examine how empathy takes us into narratives, 
shaping the moral feelings that influence behavior.  Chapters VI and VII look at narrative 
empathy, the qualities of moral fiction, and the parallels of reading as a practice and the 
moral life.  I argue that immersion in narratives, along with interpretive guidance and 
critical reflection, provides practice for the moral imagination to experiment in ethical 
situations.  Such practice can enable one to grow in moral skillfulness and moral 
character.  This, then, is a project aimed at developing moral cultivation projects that 
result in the growth of our humaneness, moral sensitivity, and motivation to act for the 
good of others. 
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Improving our Self-Understanding as Humans 
The first task of improving our philosophical anthropology, or our view of human 
nature, is to turn to the research in the cognitive and social sciences, because our self-
understanding as a species has been substantially assisted by the insights found there.  
We have traditionally understood ourselves as rational decision makers who are 
autonomous in our thinking and behaving, but the science seems to show that it is rather 
the case that we are deeply interdependent and that our social cognition is utterly 
dependent on emotional intelligence.  As highly social animals, we rely on the 
immediacy of reading and responding to behavioral cues which are mostly apprehended 
through the intuitions, or automatic cognitive processes, including the emotions.  The 
automatic processes can accomplish necessary tasks much more efficiently than 
controlled conscious processes.  For example, when walking, and the sidewalk changes, 
we effortlessly adjust our footfall to accommodate, often requiring no conscious thought 
whatsoever.  Similarly, we can adjust socially when the social footing changes, without 
necessarily having to slow down and cogitate on the right shift.  Psychologist Jonathan 
Haidt refers to these automatic processors as intuitions. 
In much of Western thought, we have denigrated the automatic processes 
(emotions, intuitions, perceptions) as lower orders of human intelligence.  Additionally, 
many have had great faith in the power of the controlled processes (such as reason) to 
control behavior.  Following Plato, many have believed that if we understood what is 
good, important, or necessary to good living, we would make better choices and fix our 
moral errors, health problems, etc.  Subsequently, human behaviors could be altered by 
good arguments and persuasive evidence.  If behavior were controlled by the conscious 
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mind, then this method ought to work.  Learn the right conditions conducive to the 
character we desire, and implement them.  To lose weight, for example, one should eat 
less and exercise more.  Yet, in the U.S., where we abound in health knowledge, obesity 
is on the rise.  Problems like this indicate that a more complex psychology is at work in 
cognition and behavior.  In this chapter, I explore two aspects of our complex psychology 
that are relevant to moral cognition and behavior: 1) the dependent relation of controlled 
consciousness on automatic consciousness, and 2) the profundity of our intersubjectivity. 
Psychologist Jonathan Haidt, author of The Happiness Hypothesis (2006) claims 
that the discrepancy between what we want to do (i.e., lose weight) and what we end up 
doing (overeating and being sedentary) is due to the fact that our reason (or what he calls 
controlled consciousness) does not control our actions most of the time (14).  It is more 
like David Hume’s (1739) claim that reason is enslaved to our passions (295).  Haidt 
states that it is not necessarily enslavement, since reason and passion (or automatic 
consciousness) can work together to achieve the ends that the controlled consciousness 
wants, but we must dislodge the unfounded faith that we have had in reason as the driver 
of our behavior.  We are neither autonomously independent, nor rationally in control of 
our behavior according to both Haidt and Hume (Ibid. 354).  Haidt (2006) compares 
human sociality to that of bees, calling us ultra-social (2006 48).  In this next section, we 
will look at the dominant view of humans as rational deciders through its strongest voice, 
and then survey some of the science that challenges this dominant view.   
Not Rational Deciders 
There are a number of Western philosophical traditions in which the problems of 
moral philosophy have been considered largely as rational problems, problems to be 
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solved via abstract reasoning and logic.  Thus there is an emphasis on rational derivations 
of moral principles and rational methods of persuasion and analysis to address moral 
problems.  Immanuel Kant would be the paradigmatic representative of this view.  Kant’s 
moral theory is generally understood as rationalist, meaning that reason is the only 
reliable guide for moral living.  The rationalist view has dominated much of Western 
thought within and beyond philosophical discourses, and generally relies on what Mark 
Johnson (1993) calls the Moral Law folk theory.  This theory claims that “morality must 
be grounded in Universal Reason” (22), so, the principles of morality are universal and 
discovered by rational processes.  This Moral Law Folk Theory undergirds any  
theological or humanistic ethical system in which “reason can discern the appropriate 
moral laws for a given [ethical problem]” (22).  Most versions of the Moral Law view 
claim absolute universality of principles, assume a mind-body dualism, and a reason-
emotion dualism (13-14, 16-17).  According to the theory, these dualisms pose the bulk 
of our moral problems, insofar as the body and the emotions, driven by appetites which 
enslave and deprave us, overwhelm our rational capacities and will. 
As Johnson points out, the Moral Law folk theory entails the following: a faculty 
psychology, our dual nature, the problem of morality as a problem of free will, the 
existence of universal moral laws, and faith in reason as the human faculty which guides 
and hopefully controls will.  Johnson states, “According to the Moral Law folk theory, 
then, morality is a massive, ongoing power struggle between the forces of reason and the 
forces of passion” (1993, 17).  This profoundly influential view is operative today in 
popular and academic ethical and political thought and discourse.  So, I will briefly 
explicate the view through its most influential proponent, Immanuel Kant.   
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Kantian Rationalist Moral Theory 
I look at Kant as the exemplar of this view because his account is the most 
consistent and influential.  For Kant, morality is impossible without reason.  Reason 
compels all of us as rational creatures absolutely to fulfill our duties; if we fail, we fail in 
an important way to fulfill our potential as humans.  In his Grounding for the 
Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Kant asserts that the moral law commands 
unconditionally and universally, and that “Everyone must admit that if a law is to be 
morally valid, i.e., is to be valid as a ground of obligation, then it must carry with it 
absolute necessity,” (389).  Kant insists that this universality must be grounded in what 
he calls a “pure” practical reason, and cannot be grounded in experience.  He asserts that, 
“all moral concepts have their seat and origin completely in a priori reason…” (411).   
Experience is not a help to morality because it is merely a “groping about with the 
help of examples.”  Experience can issue in generalizations, but it cannot guarantee 
universality.  Pure practical reason motivates our moral duty through respect for the 
moral law.  “Duty is the necessity of an action done out of respect for the law” (400).  For 
Kant, reason is what manifests our humanity: “The will is nothing but practical 
reason…the will is a faculty of choosing only that which reason, independently of 
inclination, recognizes as being practically necessary, i.e., as good” (412).  Kant alleges 
that experience and inclinations cannot provide reliable insight for morality because they 
are subject to whims and bodily incentives which are bound up with corrupting self-
interest. 
Reason for Kant is both the means of discerning obligation, and the faculty which, 
as practical, gives rise to action.  Any individual, insofar as they are rational, is bound by 
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unconditionally valid a priori principles that necessitate certain acts and prohibit others.  
Kant summarizes: “Every practical law represents a possible action as good and hence as 
necessary for a subject who is practically determinable by reason; therefore all 
imperatives are formulas for determining an action which is necessary according to the 
principle of a will that is good in some way” (414).  Kant argued that practical 
imperatives are of two sorts, hypothetical and categorical.  Hypothetical imperatives 
command conditionally, insofar as they specify an action as necessary for achieving a 
contingent, conditional end.  For example, if you are a physician, you are ethically bound 
to administer medical aid, but this cannot be universal since many of us do not have 
medical training.  Categorical imperatives, by contrast, compel unconditionally, requiring 
or forbidding certain actions regardless of our contingent ends.  Moral laws bind 
universally, with absolute necessity. 
Categorical imperatives compel absolute obligation regardless of outcomes or 
personal feelings.  If we are acting counter to our feelings, it may indicate the categorical 
quality of reason’s command (425).  Kant claims that a rational morality cannot rely 
merely on principles of human nature, because morality applies to all rational creatures, 
and not just to humans.  Any such peculiarities of human nature manifesting as an 
imperative could only be “a maxim valid for us, but not a law” (425).  It would seem 
then, that for Kant, the moral cultivation project consists in developing the discipline to 
conform to the dictates of pure practical reason.  In so doing, one may make oneself fully 
attentive to and compliant with the moral law.  
A key difficulty for Kantian rationalism is its refusal to give emotions a key role 
in moral cognition.  As we will see in subsequent sections, because morality is social, and 
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the emotions are essential for sociality, the emotions play an indispensable role in moral 
cognition.  So this omission of the emotions in Kant’s account of morality is a serious 
problem.  Additionally, Kantian rationalism only holds if we are autonomous rational 
deciders as it claims, and the recent research in moral cognition has called this view into 
question.  Also, this view is missing the imaginative dimension of morality.  As John 
Dewey (1922) points out, we often deliberate through “dramatic rehearsal” which is an 
imaginative envisioning of what the implications and outcomes of a particular action 
might be.  According to Dewey, this is an effective way of ruling out actions that could 
lead to unpleasant outcomes, and further, that we do this all the time (190-192).  Mark 
Johnson (1993) agrees, stating that the Moral Law folk theory “overlooks imaginative 
cognitive resources that are the very means by which we are able to make morally 
sensitive and humane judgments” (18).  This limit does not reduce its influence in the 
West.  According to Johnson, such rationalist moral systems express “the dominant folk 
theory of morality in our culture.”   As we will see, recent cognitive science and 
psychological literature do not support the rationalist view of morality because there is 
increasing evidence for the importance of the role of the emotions in moral cognizing. 
Alternatively, I suggest that David Hume’s view, called the sentimentalist view, is 
more aligned with recent findings in cognitive-science literature.  Reason’s role in moral 
judgment is not insignificant, but it must share the stage with emotion because moral 
cognizing is incomplete without it. 
Hume’s Theory of Moral Sentiments 
Hume famously argued that moral feeling is for social doing.  His ethics are 
referred to as sentimentalist because of his emphasis on the moral emotions over abstract 
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moral reasoning.  His view accords well with recent ideas in the social sciences.  In this 
section, I will look at David Hume’s emphasis on the role of the emotions for morality 
and how moral feelings are attuned to meeting the needs of our dynamic and profound 
sociality.   Hume claims that to meet our social demands, even for the formation of laws, 
“we must be acquainted with the nature and situation of man…” (1751, 28).  The 
meaning of morality, the point of it, is to facilitate social living.  According to Hume, 
humans are naturally dependent on social relations both for a sense of wellbeing and for 
moral direction.  That sociality relies on our passions to intuitively navigate our social 
relations through its social sympathies and fellow feeling.  In his intellectual climate 
which celebrated rationality and independence, Hume (1739) states, “Nothing is more 
usual in philosophy, and even in common life than to talk of the combat of passion and 
reason, to give the preference to reason, and to assert that men are only so far virtuous as 
they conform themselves to its dictates.  Every rational creature, ‘tis said, is obliged to 
regulate his actions by reason” (294). Hume disagrees with this view based on empirical 
observations of humans in action.   
Hume’s (1739) anthropology raises the role of the moral sentiments to the 
primary source of insight.  Reason provides a supporting role.  He famously claims that 
“reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions,” a bit of hyperbole alerting the reader 
to the vital importance of the feelings (295).  Our moral activity is more a matter of habits 
and sentiments than of rational reflection and conscious decision and our moral feelings 
are imbibed from our communal ethos.  “No satisfactory answer can be given to any of 
these [moral] questions, upon the abstract hypothesis of morals; and we must at last 
acknowledge, that the crime of immorality is no particular fact or relation, which can be 
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the object of our understanding: But arises entirely from the sentiment of disapprobation, 
which by the structure of human nature, we unavoidably feel on the apprehension of 
barbarity or treachery” (1751, 87).  
Rather than an abstract ideal of rational goodness, morality is focused on the 
practical necessity of belonging to and having standing within our social group: “Human 
nature cannot, by any means, subsist, without the association of individuals…and the 
moral obligation holds proportion with the usefulness [to others]” (1751, 35).  As social 
beings, our need to belong causes us to seek out ways to be of use and of value to our 
group.  What is good and just is what is practically useful between an individual and her 
social relations.  “The social virtues are never regarded without their beneficial 
tendencies…The happiness of mankind, the order of society, the harmony of families, the 
mutual support of friends, are always considered as the result of [the social virtues’] 
gentle dominion over the breasts of men” (1751, 20).  This “gentle dominion” of the 
social virtues keeps us in line by appealing to our fellow-feelings.    
Contrary to the assumptions in debates over human nature as being primarily 
selfish or altruistic, Hume claims that self and group interest are not mutually exclusive.  
What we humans deem to be good is so because it is useful, beneficial or even sweet to 
our fellow humans (Ibid. 34-5, 43ff).   In fact, such interests are very often either 
overlapping or in accord (Ibid. 40-42).  Even when we receive no direct benefit, we feel 
pleasure in helping others, in their esteem, in the nobility of others and in their wellbeing 
(Ibid. 43).   
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Sentiments, or intuitions, are the primary means by which we discern the actions 
appropriate for such ends, so our moral feelings provide much of the information for 
social cognition.  The root sentiment for morality is human sympathy, or fellow-feeling, 
by which we feel our kinship and need for others (Ibid. 43, N19).  We need each other 
not just for survival, but for happiness.  “Reduce a person to solitude, and he loses all 
enjoyment…because the movements of his heart are not forwarded by correspondent 
movements in his fellow creatures” (Ibid. 43).   
Reason’s role has more to do with calculation on Hume’s view; it is the means of 
analyzing the utility of our attitudes and actions (Ibid. 83).  Reason is not only 
calculative, however, because it can perform qualitative evaluations for possible 
outcomes, as well.  For example, when I am parallel parking, reason helps me to discern 
how accurately I am steering, and how I need to correct so as to improve my car’s 
alignment and nearness to the curb.  Reason and passion have been theoretically pitted 
against each other since perhaps before Plato, and certainly Plato was an eloquent voice 
in support of this view.  Hume, however, sees the roles of reason and passion as being 
much more complex than many theorists have allowed.  Both reason and passion have 
useful and important functions; our job is to accurately identify their respective uses.  
“We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of 
reason.  Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions and can never pretend to 
any other office than to serve and obey them” (1739, 295).  Part of the trouble is that 
reason is incapable of moving us.  “But though reason, when fully assisted and improved, 
be sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and actions; it 
is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation” (1751, 83).  Reason is 
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impotent because it is only a reflection of experience, whereas sentiments are a living 
response to experience.  Reason assists the sentiments by abstracting details from 
experience and analyzing them so that the sentiments can then attach value and meaning 
(Ibid. 295). 
The mistake of believing that it is reason alone that rightly guides morality comes 
from a misunderstanding about the emotions themselves, according to Hume.  We 
misinterpret what he calls the “calm” passions for non-emotional reasoning.  “When any 
of these passions are calm, and cause no disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken 
for the determinations of reason, and are suppos’d to proceed from the same faculty, with 
that, which judges of truth and falsehood…because their sensations are not evidently 
different” (297).  These quieter feelings like equanimity, satisfaction, or concentration do 
not disturb us like the “violent” sentiments of anger, jealousy, etc., but they are emotions 
and intuitions nevertheless.  This “common error of metaphysicians” of confounding 
reason with passion is a serious mistake that keeps us from comprehending how moral 
cognition is actually motivated (297).  
Reason’s role, as an assessor, notes patterns and paths to fulfill passion’s desire.  
Passion is what attaches value to the end toward which reason is charting the path (1751, 
83).  Without passion all ends are equal.  “Extinguish all the warm feelings and 
prepossessions in favor of virtue, and all disgust or aversion to vice: Render men totally 
indifferent towards these distinctions; and morality is no longer a practical study, nor has 
any tendency to regulate our lives and actions” (1751, 15).  So, without feeling, there is 
no activating force to execute action, and no judgment, which means no morality.  
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Thus, emotion moves us and reason calculates the probable effects of certain 
actions, and assesses the best means to achieve the ends that the passions desire.  “’Tis 
from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any 
object: And these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as 
they are pointed out to us by reason and experience” (1739, 295).  Reason does not feel 
concern about the meaning of the patterns or outcomes.  Reason simply interprets the 
patterns and probabilities of experiences.  It is the emotions that relate the patterns to our 
sympathies with our fellow humans.  We feel emotionally compelled to help a man 
drowning, and reason looks for the means (rope, life-saver) to achieve passion’s desire.  
Moral feelings desire moral wellbeing, and reason lays out the various means of reaching 
that goal, critiquing one’s progress, positive or negative, and correcting one’s execution 
for improved success. 
It is the cooperative roles of reason and emotions that facilitate our moral 
successes and failures, and for them to function accurately, they require the input of our 
social context.  We have instincts for these ends, but also reason and custom to guide us 
(1751, 32).  Our individual needs and wants generally coordinate with society’s 
expectations.  We may not always be aware of this however, “…we are not, in every 
instance conscious of any immediate reflection on the pernicious consequences of 
[education and habit].  The views the most familiar to us are apt, for that very reason, to 
escape us; and what we have very frequently performed from certain motives, we are apt 
likewise to continue mechanically, without recalling, on every occasion, the reflections, 
which first determined us” (Ibid. 33-34).  We may be thus unaware of the social 
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influences in our moral sentiments and behavior because they have been part of the air 
that we breathe since infancy. 
The flavor of our social context infuses our thoughts, feelings and actions, 
defining the nature of our character as a part of that context.   Our sensitivity to context 
expresses the depth of our innate sociality, our humanity, as Hume calls it.  We rely on 
others for valuation of our conduct and character; social approbation is a key motivator 
for morality (1739, 354-5).  Hume claims that this initial motivation is a natural law, 
operative in our human sympathies.  By this law we cannot help caring for the opinion of 
our fellows, and the sentiments born of that regard are then the cultivated judgments of 
attraction and aversion (for taste or pleasure and pain).  We ascertain and respond to 
social expectations expressed through the group’s approval or disapproval (1739, 416-
418).  We are pleased when the group is happy with us and unhappy when it is not.   
With guidance and training, we develop a moral aesthetic in which moral actions 
can be deemed beautiful.  We are naturally drawn to the beautiful.  In nature, we take 
pleasure in flowers, in landscapes, sunrises over the hilltops, etc.  So it is with the socially 
beautiful.  We love a kind gesture, smile at a generous act, and feel elevated and inspired 
by personal sacrifice for others.  Such innate attractions are then cultivated by our social 
circles to express their values.  “The social virtues must, therefore, be allowed to have a 
natural beauty and amiableness, which, at first, antecedent to all precept or education 
recommends them to the esteem of uninstructed mankind and engages their affections.  
And as public utility of these virtues is the chief circumstance, whence they derive their 
merit, it follows that the end, which they have a tendency to promote, must be some way 
agreeable to us and take hold of some natural affection” (1751, 40 emphasis mine).  For 
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Hume then, we are naturally driven to accord with the moral feelings of our social milieu 
and we find actions in accordance with those moral feelings to be beautiful.   
This drive is a primary motivator for moral behavior both curbing our egoistic 
inclinations and promoting our concern for others.  Because we are so deeply social, we 
rely on our sympathetic sentiments to facilitate our wellbeing.  As I quoted above, 
“Reduce a person to solitude, and he loses all enjoyment…because the movements of his 
heart are not forwarded by correspondent movements in his fellow-creatures” (1751, 43).  
These correspondent movements, which for Hume express our mutual sympathy, provide 
the intuitions for what we should do and how we should do it.  In this way the intuitions 
can aid us in our choreography toward harmony with our social groups.  In time, such 
performances become the habits of our conduct and the content of our character.   
By our continual and earnest pursuit of a character, a name, a reputation in 
the world, we bring our own deportment and conduct frequently in review, 
and consider how they appear in the eyes of those who approach and 
regard us.  This constant habit of surveying ourselves, as it were, in 
reflection, keeps alive all the sentiments of right and wrong, and begets, in 
noble natures, a certain reverence for themselves as well as others; which 
is the surest guardian of every virtue…Here is the most perfect morality 
with which we are acquainted: Here is displayed the force of many 
sympathies…we find it necessary to prop our tottering judgment on the 
correspondent approbation of mankind (Ibid. 77). 
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So it is that like an adept musician, we learn to harmoniously play our part in a 
social symphony.  And we desire to harmonize; we do not generally find pleasure in 
going against the social grain.  Self-interest overlaps with group-interest according to 
Hume, which he defends by noting the pleasure and pain we feel in social approbation 
and disapprobation (1739, 368-9).  This overlap between our self-interest and group-
interest is due to our inescapable sociality.  Morality is in service to that sociality.  We 
depend on sentiments (emotions, impressions and perceptions) to motivate and assess 
moral action, and on reason to identify the efficacious paths in accord with passion’s 
desire.  Hume refers to the sentiments as being based in a kind of moral taste: “The 
approbation of moral qualities most certainly is not deriv’d from reason, or any 
comparison of ideas; but proceeds entirely from a moral taste…” (Ibid. 414).   He further 
states that such taste is not subject to reason since, “Truth is disputable, but not taste” 
(1751, 14).  And like aesthetic taste, moral taste is malleable, moved by sympathy.  At 
the heart of his moral argument is the claim that sympathy is our most basic moral 
emotion, grounding our social feelings and relations.  Sympathy is responsive to 
imaginative engagements that shape and refine our characters toward ever more astute 
and attentive moral perceptions and actions (1739, 418ff). 
While in Hume the roles of reason and passion are altered from the views in 
which reason ought to reign supreme, giving passion a leading role, the role of reason is 
still crucial to morality.  Reason and passion can work as moral teammates because 
passion cares for the ends which reason is able to calculate.  Hume’s view offers a viable 
alternative to the dominant view of rationalist morality, one that more satisfyingly 
accounts for how we humans experience our own morality.  And, as it turns out, the 
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literature in the social sciences lends empirical authority to Hume’s view as I will show 
below. 
I have thus briefly illustrated an exemplar representation of what I’m calling the 
rationalist moral perspective (which Johnson claims is based on the moral law folk 
theory) to give a sense of its compelling character (indicated by its pervasive presence in 
much of academic and popular moral thinking).  I have subsequently summarized 
Hume’s radically alternative view of morality as rooted in sentiments.  Hume’s 
understanding of human nature seems to be more accurate and efficacious for moral 
practice than the rationalist view.  I now turn to recent thinking in the cognitive and 
social sciences that accords well with Hume’s view of human morality as emotionally 
motivated and socially dependent.  Below, we will see how social psychologist Jonathan 
Haidt takes up Hume’s view in an effort to develop a more accurate account of moral 
cognition and practice than the rationalist view. 
Scientific Views of Moral Cognition 
Many of Hume’s claims about our moral sentiments as being socially and 
emotionally based are defensible on today’s findings in cognitive science and social 
psychology.  In this section, I will look at some notable views regarding our moral 
cognition as intuitionist and ultrasocial.  What follows are views from these sciences that 
support Hume, but also nuance his claims.  Beginning with psychologist Jonathan Haidt 
and other moral intuitionists, who follow and build on Hume, we will see how morality is 
social and intuitionist.  I then turn to neuroscientist Antonio Damasio whose account of 
the emotions and consciousness flesh out our understanding of how the emotions operate 
in cognition. 
20 
 
Intuitionist and Ultrasocial Moral Cognition 
What Hume calls the moral sentiments, Haidt (2006) calls the moral intuitions 
and he claims that they are instrumental in all moral cognizing.  Haidt refers to moral 
intuition as gut feelings to describe the way neural messages are felt throughout the body.  
He states that we should doubt the primacy of reason in moral judgment, because in 
moral cognition, intuition is more automatic and efficient, and thus is stronger.  
Additionally, as Hume claimed, as our intuitions form judgments, they are interpenetrated 
by our sociality and our social context.  That is, our moral judgments are rooted in our 
preconscious processes which are infused with the social values in which we live and 
breathe.  Haidt explains the intuition part of this morality thus: 
Intuitionism in philosophy refers to the view that there are moral truths and that 
when people grasp these truths they do so not by a process of ratiocination and 
reflection but rather by a process more akin to perception, in which one "just sees 
without argument that they are and must be true" (Harrison, 1967, p. 72). Thomas 
Jefferson's declaration that certain truths are "self-evident" is an example of 
ethical intuitionism. Intuitionist approaches in moral psychology, by extension, 
say that moral intuitions (including 
moral emotions) come first and directly cause moral judgments (Haidt, in press; 
Kagan, 1984; Shweder and Haidt, 1993; J. Q.Wilson, 1993). Moral intuition is a 
kind of cognition, but it is not a kind of reasoning (2001, 814). 
He thus refers to moral cognizing as “social intuitional.”  And he explains that 
this form of cognizing works more like a lawyer than a judge. 
The social part of the social intuitionist model proposes that moral judgment 
should be studied as an interpersonal process.  Moral reasoning is usually an ex 
post facto process used to influence the intuitions (and hence judgments) of other 
people. In the social intuitionist model, one feels a quick flash of revulsion at the 
thought of incest and one knows intuitively that something is wrong. Then, when 
faced with a social demand for a verbal justification, one becomes a lawyer trying 
to build a case rather than a judge searching for the truth (Ibid.). 
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Like Hume, Haidt views reason’s role mostly as supporting the intuitions.  He 
specifies the meaning of intuition by breaking down consciousness itself into what he 
calls automatic and controlled processes.  The automatic processes include all of the 
activity of the human person that either do not rely on consciousness to do its job (e.g., 
heart pumping blood, digestion, breathing) or which may not be apparent to 
consciousness (like attraction to an idea, or a feeling, or judgment).  The automatic 
processes work without our conscious awareness and influence our behavior and thought.  
The controlled processes are the ones that rely on conscious attention to execute, such as 
novel activities, intellectual engagements, learning a new skill, making plans, 
deliberating, contemplation, and moral reflection.  These activities require the controlled 
processes of the prefrontal cortex (2001, 815).     
Haidt (2006) utilizes a helpful metaphor to represent the forces of these divisions.  
He considers Plato’s metaphor of the horses and charioteer, which Plato used to represent 
reason and the passions, but Haidt opts instead for the metaphor of an elephant and rider.  
The elephant represents the power and strength of our automatic processes, as over and 
against a relatively small rider for the controlled processes which do not actually have 
much control.  He claims that these processes are not in unison.  “To understand most 
important ideas in psychology, you need to understand how the mind is divided into parts 
that sometimes conflict.  We assume that there is one person in each body, but in some 
ways we are each more like a committee whose members have been thrown together to 
do a job, but who often find themselves working at cross purposes (5).  Neuroscientist 
David Eagleman (2011) refers to this committee as  “team of rivals” and concurs with 
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Haidt that consciousness operates at different levels of automaticity and control (109-
110; 204-208). 
The rider is the forethinking, clunky, conscious mind, or controlled processes, and 
it does not control the elephant, but was a later evolutionary development, adapted to 
serve the needs of the elephant.  Haidt seeks to “dispel the Promethean myth” that the 
evolution of reason (like the fire that Prometheus stole from Zeus) saved humans from 
their previous life as slaves to their animal drives.  “[The myth] assumes that reason was 
installed in the frontal cortex but that emotion stayed behind in the limbic system.  In 
fact, the frontal cortex enabled a great expansion of emotionality in humans” (11 
emphasis mine). The Promethean myth promotes the idea that the controlled processes 
can and ought to direct all of our thoughts and actions (2006, 10-11).  The reality, 
however, is that all of cognition has become more sophisticated, emotion as well as 
reason. 
This distinction between of conscious powers and the strength and efficiency of 
the automatic processes (elephant) explains why we are mostly not rational deciders.  The 
predominance of the intuitive is not a disaster to be lamented.  Morality is safe because 
intuition is actually more effective than we have believed.   Haidt joins Selin Kesebir 
(2010), in claiming that intuition has been doing a tremendous amount of work and very 
well.  Intuition is our primary means of motivating moral action.  Moral thinking is for 
social doing, and that morality binds and builds relationships (809, 814-821).  Morality is 
largely preconscious, often not requiring our conscious attention, save when we need to 
justify our views or actions to others, or when we are faced with dilemmas which require 
analytic engagement. “In moral arguments, the rider goes beyond being just an advisor to 
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the elephant; he becomes a lawyer, fighting the court of public opinion to persuade others 
of the elephant’s point of view,” according to Haidt (2006, 22).   
The largely preconscious nature of moral judgments is why, as Hume pointed out, 
moral sentiments respond in ways similar to aesthetic tastes: “Morals and criticism are 
not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment.  Beauty, whether 
moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived” (Hume 1748, 120 my emphasis).  
Haidt agrees with Hume.  Our moral feelings are based in our automatic processes and as 
such respond quickly with aversion or attraction to the given situation.  “Reason and 
emotion must both work together to create intelligent behavior, but emotion (a major part 
of the elephant) does most of the work” (Haidt 2006, 13).   Cognition is a function of 
both the automatic and controlled processes, with the emphasis on the automatic.  The 
affective character and basis of moral intuition requires a deeper understanding of the 
nature and workings of emotions in order to fully appreciate their influence on moral 
judgment and action, as well as how they may be shaped for improved moral character. 
Cognition: Emotional and Embodied  
As social animals, the emotions are particularly useful for intuiting social 
situations and expectations, as well as moods and relationships of people.  Because 
emotions work quickly in cognition, they are more efficient perceivers, readers, and 
messengers of the emotional import of a given situation.  Emotions inform us of our own 
internal states, broadcasting those states through our physiology and facial expressions so 
that we can read the feelings of one another.  Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (1999) 
explicates the role of the emotions for our very complex conscious and preconscious 
processes.  The basic processes of what he calls core consciousness are necessary for 
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much of bodily and cognitive functioning, both of which depend on the emotions.  The 
emotions report bodily states.  “The biological function of emotions is [in part] the 
production of a specific reaction to the inducing situation” (53).  The reactions for most 
animals include running, freezing, fighting, etc., but for humans these impulses are 
tempered by higher cognitions.  The second biological function is regulation of inner 
states for wellbeing.  Emotions are extremely useful as various stimuli in the world will 
provoke emotions relevant to survival and wellbeing.  “Emotions are curious adaptations 
that are part and parcel of the machinery with which organisms regulate survival” (54).  
They are particularly focused on homeostatic regulation, avoiding threats (like mortal 
danger) and advancing toward potentially positive objects (energy, shelter, sex) 
Damasio distinguishes between two levels of consciousness: 1) core 
consciousness which is the collection of processes concerned with systems necessary for 
basic existence, providing a point-of-view protoself in the present time and place only.   
The higher level he calls 2) extended consciousness “of which there are many levels and 
grades, provides the organism with an elaborate sense of self—an identity and a person, 
you or me, no less—and places that person at a point in individual historical time, richly 
aware of the lived past and of the anticipated future, and keenly cognizant of the world 
beside it” (16).  The increased complexity of extended consciousness facilitates actions 
we associate with agency such as conscious memory, empathy, a sense of self, etc.  See 
Table 1 (from Damasio 1999, 55) below for a basic description of the levels which show 
the role of the emotions for basic and complex conscious engagements. 
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Table 1. Levels of Life Regulation 
High Reason Complex, flexible, and customized plans of response are 
formulated in conscious images and may be executed as 
behavior. 
 
↑↓ *Consciousness* 
 
Feelings Sensory patterns signaling pain, pleasure, and emotions 
become images. 
↑↓ 
Emotions Complex, stereotyped patterns of response, which include 
secondary emotions, primary emotions, and background 
emotions. 
↑↓ 
Basic Life Regulation Relatively simple, stereotyped patterns of response, which 
include metabolic regulation, reflexes, the biological 
machinery behind what will become pain and pleasure, 
drives and motivations 
 
What we should note here is that at the lower levels of consciousness, the 
automatic processes are monitoring the systems from basic biological states, to the 
emotions, to the feelings and then higher reason and back down.  When something is 
important or striking enough, the emotions stimulate conscious awareness, at which 
point, Damasio designates them feelings.  Note that the arrows go up and down, 
indicating how the messaging travels up and down the levels of consciousness, and how 
the messaging loops are mutually informing each other.  “Emotions are at a higher, more 
complex level [than basic life regulation].  The dual arrows indicate upward or downward 
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causation.  For instance, pain can induce emotions, and some emotions can include a state 
of pain” (Ibid.). 
What is important about this information about the emotions and feelings is that it 
helps us to understand how emotions can inform our moral cognition.  By describing the 
preconscious emotional experience, Damasio draws attention to the important work of the 
emotions prior to and apart from our conscious awareness of them, helping us to see the 
ways in which they are operative in preconscious “thinking.”  The bodily expressions of 
the emotions, such as sweaty palms, increased heart rate, etc., influence our automatic 
thinking and behaving.  It appears that it may actually be impossible to act morally apart 
from our emotions.  Bodily expressions provide preverbal forms of knowing, which 
Damasio calls “wordless knowledge.”  Many of us recognize this kind of knowledge as 
intuitions or gut feelings (Haidt 2006, 5-6).  Damasio claims that this preverbal form of 
knowing “…emerges mentally [as] the feeling of knowing—the feeling of what happens 
when an organism is engaged with the processing of an object—that only thereafter can 
inferences and interpretation begin to occur regarding the feeling of knowing…from its 
most humble beginnings, consciousness is knowledge, knowledge consciousness, no less 
interconnected than truth and beauty were for Keats” (1999, 26).  So the emotions and 
feelings inform cognition.  As preverbal forms of knowing, these seem to be the basis for 
our intuitions that Haidt claims guide our behavior in moral situations.  Our emotions 
monitor our inner states, and our inner states respond to our inner thoughts, as well as our 
external world.  The emotions then are a necessary tool for navigating our social world. 
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The Moral Emotions and Profound Intersubjectivity 
As discussed above, Haidt claims that the data overwhelmingly indicate that we 
are more persuaded by emotions and automatic processes than reason.  Moreover, our 
moral emotions are the primary means by which we apprehend social expectations and 
roles, which is why morality is for sociality.  Both Hume and Haidt claim that reputation 
is of paramount concern in morality.  Contrary to Plato’s view that we are happier being 
virtuous even if we have a disreputable reputation , Haidt argues that Socrates’ 
interlocutor Glaucon had it right that we are more concerned with looking good than 
being good (Haidt 2012, 258).  And yet, we may not be satisfied with merely looking 
good, either.  According to Adam Smith (1759) there is a higher pleasure in being 
virtuous than in merely being thought so: 
Nature, accordingly has endowed [a person], not only with a desire of being what 
ought to be approved of; or of being what he himself approves of in other men.  
The first desire could only have made him wish to appear to be fit for society.  
The second was necessary in order to render him anxious to be really fit.  The first 
could only have promoted him to the affectation of virtue, and to the concealment 
of vice.  The second was necessary in order to inspire him with the real love of 
virtue, and with the real abhorrence of vice. In every well-informed mind this 
second desire seems to be the strongest of the two… To desire, or even to accept 
of praise, where no praise is due, can be the effect only of the most contemptible 
vanity (170-171). 
 
The rewards, then, for genuine virtue, are personal as well as social.  How is it 
that creatures who are purportedly only self-interested, according to recent views of 
human nature, find internal rewards for being moral and not just looking moral?   The 
answer to this question lies in deeper truths about human primates that have not been 
fully appreciated since Darwin’s theories emerged.  Our sociality is more profound than 
we believed.  Understanding our moral cognition in relation to our social needs will have 
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important implications for our moral cultivation endeavors.  We have to take the moral 
emotions, as means of nurturing our profound sociality, into account as we construct the 
cultivation program toward whom and how we want to be.  As we shall see, we are not 
just social, but profoundly social and as such need extreme acuity in our cognitive 
processes that facilitate the navigation of our social milieu. 
As I said in the beginning of this chapter, humans are social animals.  This drive 
to be in good standing appears to be more primordially motivated by the need to belong.  
As Roy Baumeister and Mark Leary (1995) explain, our moral life is infused by our 
profound social needs.  It may be the most fundamental need that we have.  And this need 
is not merely to belong in some general way to a group, but rather  
the belongingness hypothesis is that human beings have a pervasive drive to form 
and maintain at least a minimum quantity of lasting, positive, and significant 
interpersonal relationships. Satisfying this drive involves two criteria: First, there 
is a need for frequent, affectively pleasant interactions with a few other people, 
and, second, these interactions must take place in the context of a temporally 
stable and enduring framework of affective concern for each other's welfare 
(1995, 498). 
 
We are not merely social, that is, motivated by a need to be liked and included.  
We are profoundly social, having deep needs to belong over time, to be cared for and 
loved.  These needs, according to Baumeister and Leary, motivate even the drives for 
power and achievement, since they are more satisfying when accompanied by esteem and 
the regard of others than when achieved alone (497).  They claim that while we have 
been aware of our sociality in psychology for some time, we have not fully appreciated 
either the depth of its importance or its influence on our many personal motivations.  
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They argue that, “the need to belong shapes emotion and cognition” (505), and it drives 
much of our behavior. 
[A] need to belong, that is, a need to form and maintain at least a minimum 
quantity of interpersonal relationships, is innately prepared (and hence nearly 
universal) among human beings. Thus, unlike the Freudian (1930) view that 
regarded sexuality and aggression as the major driving psychological forces, and 
unlike the most ambitious behaviorist views that considered each newborn a 
tabula rasa, our view depicts the human being as naturally driven toward 
establishing and sustaining belongingness (1995, 499). 
 
Belonging undergirds a sense of well-being and other positive emotions.  Feeling 
that one does not belong produces negative emotions, physical health problems, and 
behavioral pathologies.  People spend vast amounts of time thinking about relationships, 
real or desired.  Baumeister and Leary found two aspects of the need to belong: 
“affectively pleasant or positive interactions” and “long-term, stable [relations of] caring 
and concern” (505-6).   
Haidt (2006) claims that our “ultrasociality” means that we humans have more 
complex social units than other primates.  He suggests that humans have more hive-like, 
or bee-like qualities.  We are inclined to cooperate and do not approve of ungroupish 
behavior, which means that we have altruistic tendencies with kith and kin, and we 
punish exploiters.  We do this through a variety of means but one of the key ways we 
monitor and correct behavior is through language.  In the book section titled “You Stab 
His Back, I’ll Stab Yours,” Haidt claims that it is language that facilitates our ability to 
live within groups of about 100-150.  One of the uses of language is to create bonds with 
and correct one another.  “Language allows small groups to bond quickly and to learn 
from each other about the bonds of others…language evolved because it enabled gossip” 
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(53).  Gossip is how we broadcast sentiments and concerns about group members (or 
outsiders) to other group members and it is primarily why we are concerned about our 
reputation—to ensure that the gossip about ourselves is what we want it to be.  We want 
to have good standing in the group and in order to do so, we must practice reciprocity.  
Gratitude and vengefulness are important moral emotions for navigating such complex 
social relations (56-7).  This is why, as Haidt says, morality binds us together. 
Moral style is unique for different primate groups.  Primatologist Franz De Waal 
(2009) claims that all primates are very social, living in communities and never alone, but 
the cultural styles of different species of primates are expressed in their group 
orientations.  According to de Waal, we humans have a dual nature, which is crucial to 
our environmental and social success.  We are like our two nearest primate cousins, the 
bonobos and chimpanzees.  The bonobos are egalitarian, loving, non-aggressive, 
matriarchal in many ways, while the chimpanzees are aggressive, ambitious and 
hierarchical.  These two sides of ourselves enable us to be both assertive and cooperative 
in solving problems (178-181).  However, as human primates, our group organization is 
much more complex and therefore, we must be more sophisticated in our social aptitude.  
Haidt characterizes our duality as homo duplex claiming that we have both self-interested 
(90% ape-like) and altruistic/groupish (10% bee-like) traits.  He claims that evolutionary 
biology has failed to account for our groupish qualities through which we subordinate our 
self-interest to the needs of the group.  This tendency may indicate plausibility of the 
once-rejected idea of group-selection as operative in our genes (2006, 232-33).   He 
further claims that religious practices may have developed to strengthen this potential 
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because religious groups tended to fare better than others, perhaps due to the bonding that 
occurs in collective practices and rituals (235-37, 259-260). 
It is not clear that de Waal would agree with Haidt’s characterization of our 
apelike traits as self-interested
2
, but, however we describe our self and group orientations, 
numbers in human groups compared with our primate cousins indicate that we are quite 
cooperative.  Recent neuroscience of the moral emotions suggests that we have big brains 
to enable our emotional moral cognition to navigate our extensive networks of sociality 
(Haidt 2006, 53).  Because morality is the primary means of fulfilling our need to belong 
to and sustain and support our group, our wellbeing as individuals depends on us having 
genuinely effective ways of improving our moral sophistication and skillfulness.  
Morality is the means of fulfilling social needs. 
Training for Moral Skillfulness 
So we are social animals, and as such, we rely on moral intuitions to guide us in 
navigating the complexities of social life.  Our adept neurophysiology allows us to learn 
the patterns of interactions so as to extrapolate from learned patterns, and to insight 
insightfully adapt in novel or more challenging situations.  We grow in moral skills 
through practice.  But, as Marshall Gregory points out, experience on its own is not 
sufficient to actually provide instructive insight into the import and implications of moral 
situations.  We require the opportunities to step back and reflect, and to experiment with 
possible responses.  The process of moral self-cultivation (or the moral cultivation of 
those under one’s care or governance, i.e., parents and teachers) provides opportunity to 
be taught good, effective moral behaviors and attitudes, to imaginatively rehearse and 
                                                          
2
 See de Waal’s (2009) discussion of ape (and other mammalian) cooperation pp. 176-200. 
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practically employ those behaviors and attitudes, then to evaluate for success, and to 
correct toward better fulfilling one’s values.  This cycle is repeated incessantly toward 
improving moral skillfulness.  
Moral cultivation is not something we can sufficiently do alone, however, because 
we do not create values in a vacuum.  Rather, we act, reflect and alter our behavior within 
and through the communities of which we have a primal urge to belong.  Long after 
Hume and long before Haidt, John Dewey (1922) pointed out our dependence on others 
for morality.  “Our conduct is socially conditioned whether we perceive the fact or 
not…All of the actions of an individual bear the stamp of his community as assuredly as 
does the language he speaks” (316-17).  In order to navigate the expectations and our 
roles in society, we need an adept and skillful moral cognition.  Knowing the power of 
gossip, reputation, and even the perception that others have of us, we use our moral 
intuitions to figure out what we need to do to ensure good standing and find deep 
pleasure and meaning in the regard of our respective communities.  
The imagination seems to be the key means by which we must craft a moral 
cultivation project.  Since the automatic processes follow habits and the quickest courses 
to satisfaction, it will be the job of our foresight to acquire the right practices and learn 
the deeper satisfaction of hard-earned satisfactions.  If we are to woo the elephant 
(automatic processes) into more practices of group-interest and regard for the needs and 
feelings of others (so that we can have the possibility of thriving in community), we (the 
rider or controlled processes) will have to reach beyond rational argumentation to the 
moral imagination for persuasion.  Aristotle understood the indirect process of acquiring 
moral skill and indicates the aesthetic aspect of moral skillfulness in his Nichomachean 
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Ethics: “Praise belongs to virtue for from this people become apt at performing beautiful 
actions” (2002, 19).  Perhaps that is why the meaning of the Greek word for the good 
includes the beautiful, which Aristotle invokes repeatedly (205).
3
   
Aristotle also situates ethics within a social framework insofar as the condition for 
the possibility for a good character depends on having been reared well and having good 
friends who make you a better person (17).  Virtue is the work of a lifetime, and he 
articulates its dynamic quality as a process by comparing it to the practice of maintaining 
health.  He claims that the good is the being-at-work-of-the-soul-in-accordance-with-
virtue/arête (20).  A skillful person “who is truly good and sensible will bear all fortunes 
gracefully and will always act in the most beautiful way…” (17).  Like an archer seeking 
to improve his aim to hit the bullseye, we must practice the art/skill of virtue to hit what 
Aristotle identifies as the mean between excess and deficiency (29).  The ability to 
develop a good character (ethos) is built upon habits (22).  Such habits follow from 
repetition of moral skill.  Intelligent (practiced) moral skill is phronesis, which Joe Sachs 
translates as practical judgment (116).  Phronesis as judgment and execution is “a 
rightness that results from what is beneficial in the end for which, the means by which, 
and the time in which it ought to occur” or as others have translated phronesis is the 
ability to apply virtue in the right place, at the right time, and with the right measure 
(112).  Practicing the moral arts, for Aristotle, is an important contribution to a life of 
flourishing.   
                                                          
3
 Kalon is the Greek word for “beautiful,” and Aristotle uses philokalon as well. “Philo” means “love of” as 
in love of wisdom in “philo-sophia.” 
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The nature of flourishing is being studied by Positive Psychologists like Jonathan 
Haidt, but began with psychologists such as Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi.  Csikszentmihalyi 
offers insight into how we humans flourish and what that might mean for the moral 
imagination.  Pleasure is an enormous attraction for behavior, as we have seen.  In his 
book, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (1990), he explains that pleasure in 
the process and experience of practicing a skill at which one is competent or even excels 
indicates that such activity is a source of flourishing.  Pleasure, however, has different 
flavors as Hume, Smith and Haidt have already pointed out.  Csikszentmihalyi agrees, 
“Pleasure is an important component of the quality of life, but by itself it does not bring 
happiness” (46).  Merely self-indulgent pleasures “do not produce psychological 
growth…[or] add complexity to the self” (Ibid.)   A fuller, and more psychologically 
enriching pleasure is found in the experience of the phenomenon which he calls flow.   
Flow happens when we become skillful enough at an activity that we enjoy, that 
we become absorbed in it, forgetting self, becoming one with the activity itself or the 
objects entailed in the action (like a piano or a baseball bat and a pitched ball).  Engaging 
in flow activities brings flourishing because we enjoy learning, growing, and doing things 
that we excel at.  “The self becomes more differentiated as a result of flow because 
overcoming a challenge inevitably leaves a person feeling more capable, more skilled” 
(41).  The pleasure we find in growing in and excelling at, for example, rock climbing, or 
musicianship also offers us a richer sense of self.  Pursuing excellence appears to afford 
us pleasure.  What about the excellence of virtue?  Is Aristotle right that we find 
happiness and fulfillment in that also?   
35 
 
Haidt makes a related point regarding admiration, claiming that we are more 
emotionally elevated by witnessing moral goodness than when we simply admire athletic 
excellence, for example.  “People really do respond emotionally to acts of moral beauty, 
and these emotional reactions involve warm or pleasant feelings in the chest and 
conscious desires to help others or become a better person oneself” (2006, 196).  So, 
while we can experience flow in any skillful engagement that we enjoy, it seems 
reasonable to say that, as Hume and Smith claim, there is a meaningful pleasure, an 
ennobling pleasure in moral skillfulness.  When we observe it, we feel elevated and want 
to emulate it. 
Much of our discussion in this chapter has looked at the various ways in which 
the non-conscious processes are active in daily life.  And if propositional argumentation 
is not the means by which one can persuade oneself to behave more morally, what ought 
we to do?  I think that neuroscientist David Eagleman (2011) offers a clue in his 
description of the trainability of nonconscious cognitive processes, claiming that 
unconscious learning accounts for a great deal of how we function every moment of the 
day.  He draws on research that looks more closely at emotional expressions to explain 
what is happening in unconscious cognition, because our conscious self-assessments are 
not very reliable.  Anterograde amnesiacs (people who cannot form new memories) can 
learn to play Tetris, and play competently day after day, while having no conscious 
memory of learning or knowing the game.  Eagleman states that activities like driving and 
making judgments, as well as sensations like taste, and even political values are rooted in 
unconscious “thinking” (2011, 110-111).  There is a kind of cooperative interplay among 
the various parts of mind, both conscious and unconscious, which leads Eagleman to 
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characterize the mind as a “team of rivals.”  This is why Eagleman compares cognition to 
an improvisational performance among multiple musicians who attune to one another, 
allowing solos, but sustaining the tensions toward a kind of harmony (2011, 125).   
Empathy, it seems to me, is the key to the process of training the moral feelings.  
Engaging the moral imagination and teaching us to empathize with others looks to be an 
important way to aid in the expansion of empathy that de Waal aspires to.  If moral life is 
an aesthetic practice, then whatever our methods are, we will need to entice, to enchant, 
the moral imagination. The goal of virtuosity in the dance of communal relations will 
have to be, as Aristotle points out, pursued indirectly.  Beautiful encounters with sages 
and moral exemplars like Socrates, the Buddha, and Gandhi cannot help but evoke our 
eulogies because of their moral grace and generosity of spirit.  How can we learn to be 
like them? 
Moral exemplars in ancient Confucian thought are so practiced that they perform 
their skill with seeming effortlessness.  For the Confucians, following rigorous and 
prolonged discipline, which allows the self and the effort to fall away, one can achieve a 
kind of poetry in motion, which they call wu-wei, or effortless action.  Wu–wei is not 
doing nothing, but the performer does not appear to be striving.  His action looks so easy, 
natural, and effortless.  Confucians celebrate this achievement as a kind of virtue.  The 
height of moral achievement is the virtue of jen/ren, which means humaneness or 
benevolence.  Study of ancient histories, practice in the arts such as calligraphy, and 
performance of the ancient rituals are the means by which one develops one’s character, 
the goal of which is to be able to perform them with wu-wei.  Aesthetics play an 
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important role in Confucian moral self-cultivation.  This may be because these ancients 
understood that aesthetics move the emotions. 
Social scientist Dacher Keltner (2009) draws on this ancient tradition to explore 
the moral emotions in relation to the goal of benevolence.  He discusses the evolutionary 
roots of many of our emotions, and claims that our deeply social tendencies are borne out 
in the simplest of facial expressions.  A smile, for example appears to correlate to other 
primates’ signal of submission and cooperative attitude (102-103).  Keltner turns to the 
Confucians for their devotion to the subtle social art of harmony.  Keltner claims that 
emotions are the center of our sociality and utilizes the Confucian term jen
4
 to express 
what he regards as the height of human meaning, morality, and fulfillment in harmonious 
interpersonal relationships (4-5).  He agrees with the other thinkers in this chapter in 
stating that without emotions, we are incapable of creating or sustaining any enduring 
institutions because we cannot make commitments.  He regards commitments as the 
foundation for a working society and thus essential to morality.  Commitments are based 
in the felt importance of resisting the fleeting, self-interested impulses.  He uses the smile 
as an example because it is the window to the inner sentiments.  An astute observer can 
see the feeling inside the smile.  It indicates character, mood, and amenability, and can be 
a clue to trustworthiness (2009, 89).  Our emotions are deeply social and can be shaped to 
facilitate improved social relations.   
By imaginatively engaging cultivation practices, we can shape the moral 
emotions.  We can also shape the perceptions to be more astute readers of those 
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 Keltner uses “jen” as the Romanization for the virtue of benevolence or humaneness.  “Ren” is commonly 
utilized as the Romanization also.  They designate the same Chinese character. 
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emotions.  With practice, one can develop what Buddhism calls moral skillfulness, such 
that for most ordinary social situations, one can effortlessly improvise with grace and 
ease.  Empathy seems to be the key to cultivating the moral emotions, so any cultivation 
practice will need to move empathy toward greater sensitivity, interpretive skill, and a 
broader inclusion.  Stories, as universally employed imaginative engagements that bring 
to life the inner worlds of others, may be an ideal site for exploration. 
In Sum 
I have suggested in this chapter that the moral agent’s task is not to overcome 
self-interested desires with reason, but to guide and direct the moral sentiments toward 
the practices which reason has identified as the means to one’s valued end.  This work is 
a process of slowly growing and refining moral aptitudes, including improving the moral 
perception which attends to and judges moral situations, and motivating prosocial action 
through the moral emotion of empathy.  Both Hume and Haidt identify the two aspects of 
moral cognition that require a change in our thinking and approach to moral cultivation, 
1) the strong influence of our intuitions, including our feelings and perceptions, on our 
moral attitudes and behavior, and 2) how deeply social we are.
5
  Relying on the insights 
of Hume and the scientific literature of Haidt, Damasio and others, I have shown how 
reason alone is insufficient for our moral cognizing because it does not have the power to 
move us when the automatic, affective processes press us toward a more immediately 
gratifying end.  This means that we need to cultivate the automatic, affective processes 
toward the goals that we prefer, habituating them to our values: values which are 
interdependent with the values of our larger culture.  I have discussed our profound 
                                                          
5
 Both of these points were made previously in Haidt 2006, but in 2012, Haidt includes Hume’s important 
contribution to these ideas. 
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dependence on one another for material and psychological wellbeing, which is why our 
emotions are so important for moral cognition.  My hope is that this chapter has clarified 
why we need to look at other methodologies beyond propositional argumentation and 
reflection alone to do the work of cultivating ourselves for a serious program of ethics.  
To woo our elephantine processes into the habits we prefer, we need to be creative.  In 
my view such a cultivation project in which we plan and practice is geared not toward 
rational morality, but moral skillfulness, and as such seeks to stimulate the moral 
imagination toward that end.  Empathy is the primary means by which the moral 
cognition will be sensitized and activated.  It is therefore the topic of the next three 
chapters as I seek to articulate, 1) what empathy is and how it interacts with and 
motivates moral sentiments and actions, 2) how it enables our meaningful experience and 
understanding of others, and 3) how we can train it to greater responsivity and accuracy.  
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CHAPTER II 
 EMPATHY EXPLAINED 
No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its 
consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, 
and to receive by communication their inclination and sentiments, 
however different from, or even contrary to our own. 
~ David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature 
Human Intersubjectivity and Moral Cognition 
In Chapter I, I tried to show how it is that we Westerners have misunderstood 
ourselves in some fundamental ways, and this misunderstanding, I argue, has undermined 
our ability to theorize sufficiently and satisfactorily about the ways and means of moral 
life.  Viewing ourselves as autonomous individuals consciously controlling our behavior, 
has misled our approach to morality by insisting on counterintuitive standards that 
depend on the slower cognitive functions of the controlled processes, or consciousness.  
In my view this has impeded more effective moral impulses and practices.   
I also laid out recent empirical insights that indicate good reasons for altering our 
understanding of human nature in two important ways:  1)  Resonant with British moral 
philosophers David Hume and Adam Smith, empirical research suggests that we need to 
understand that moral cognition relies heavily on emotions, perceptions, and experiences 
rather than primarily or exclusively being driven by reason and the application of rational 
moral principles.  2)  Rather than humans being radically independent autonomous 
agents, human beings are profoundly social, depending on that intersubjectivity not only 
for psychological wellbeing, but also for personal intelligibility, apprehending the social 
milieu, and for cues for, and giving an account of, our behavior in the world.  The 
automaticity of our cognition serves the crucial function of enabling us to judge and act 
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expediently to meet the demands of social and practical life efficiently and effectively.  
Slower, controlled processes justify behavior after the fact, post-hoc, and correct for 
future improvement.
6
  In real moral living, we rely on intuitions and habits to guide us, 
which is why I will argue that we need moral cultivation projects that shape the intuitions 
and habits in directions we desire so that we can develop the character that we want.  
Empathy is the site that I focus on in this work, as a key neurophysiological process to 
cultivate.  Empathy is our moral eyes and ears, as it were, motivating our regard for, and 
action on behalf of, others.  This powerful aspect of our moral cognition operates on both 
automatic and conscious levels.   
I want to briefly explain how our intersubjectivity ought to inform our moral 
theorizing.  Then I will lay out the cognitive science literature that explains empathy as a 
neurophysiological process.  The process of moral cultivation that I will recommend 
builds on our natural social inclinations and moral emotions.  Hume claims that, while we 
cannot make universal rules, we can inculcate universal sentiments (Hume 1751/1983, 
87).  Accepting the reality of the automaticity of much of our cognizing, we can learn 
how to shape these intuitive, spontaneous impulses.  As Jonathan Haidt (2006) points out, 
if there is a tug of war between the elephant (automatic processes) and the rider 
(controlled processes), the elephant will win (21).  The way to move the elephant is 
through moral intuition, but this does not preclude principles.  An improved 
understanding of our anthropology as morally intuitive, ultrasocial animals suggests the 
need for a shift in our approach to rational principles.  In order to prescribe and 
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 As Hume points out, calculative thinking measures and judges accuracy.  So, when we socially misstep 
calculative thinking can show us how we have misstepped and possible correctives, while sentiments are 
what make us care enough to do so, make amends, etc. (Hume 1739/2003, pp. 295-6). 
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implement an effective moral cultivation program, we need to be informed by an apt 
anthropology.  The goals, activities, and habits we wish to cultivate will have to respond 
to the way we actually work as human primates. 
Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) suggests that moral theories in recent decades falter 
because in the modern era, metaphysics have ceased be compelling, and as such, we lack 
the foundations that historical thinkers relied on (55ff).  Moral theories seem to need a 
telos, but might not a telos be general, like John Dewey’s (1922) growth for individual 
and social flourishing?  A telos suggests that we are in movement, process, and 
progression toward a goal/goals.  Could it be that an adept sociality as evidenced by a 
skillful moral life might be such a goal or at least help us to discern such a goal?  Moral 
skillfulness, as I define it, is the well-practiced performance of attuning and responding 
adroitly to a myriad of social situations, such that one has an adept improvisational 
repertoire of intuition and response, and uses this skill for the good of others.  Such a 
repertoire ought to be well-suited to facilitate one’s own wellbeing as a relational being in 
a social web of other relational beings.  A role-playing repertoire is developed through 
extensive practice in the art of moral improvisation, through a propaedeutic of life 
experience and the guidance and correction of the adults and peers in one’s community. 
Empathy is the site in which I propose such a program of moral cultivation will 
begin because it is the means by which we understand and respond to the cues of the 
social world.  According to Hume (1751/1983), our social dependence, and the sympathy 
it engenders, is what makes us humane (77).  Our mutual interdependence binds us 
together in human feeling, in sympathy, and love.  Empathy is the neurophysiological 
process that facilitates the attachment and communicative exchanges between 
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emotionally expressive creatures.  It is just such sympathies that inspired the ancient 
Chinese philosopher Mengzi (Mencius) in his moral philosophy about cultivating 
empathy, which he called compassion.  Like Kongzi (Confucius) before him, Mengzi saw 
the importance of the moral emotions for social harmony.  
As we will see, we are born with a basic empathy that allows us to apprehend our 
world, bond with caregivers, and which, with development, can be the means of our 
becoming increasingly humane over the course of life.  Mengzi called these basic social-
moral instincts “moral sprouts.”  Moral sprouts require nurturance or they will wither.  
Benevolence, or sincere and strong regard for others, is a vital virtue for Mengzi; Hume 
calls it humaneness.  Benevolence, Mengzi says, is developed from the moral sprout of 
compassion, the basic regard for others that we are born with (Mengzi 130).  I am calling 
this basic moral sentiment empathy.  The Confucians claim that the development of the 
virtues depend on the aesthetic practices of Confucian life.  This may at been a prescient 
insight into the responsiveness of the moral emotions to imaginative engagement, 
revealing that aesthetics are vital to moral growth.  Before we can explore ways of 
cultivating empathy, however, we need a full appreciation how it works. 
In this chapter, I will explicate the neurophysiological roots of empathy, and the 
implications of empathy for intersubjectivity and morality.  I will look at neuroscience, 
psychology, and philosophy to help us see the various forms of empathy and its roles.  
Our profound intersubjectivity means that individuals need an interpretive system to 
navigate their social relations.  Social groups need to trust that individuals will be 
genuine contributors to the group’s wellbeing, not moochers or abusers, refusing to help 
in return.  So, a system is also needed whereby humans can discern genuine helpers from 
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duplicitous pretenders.  The system, or confluence of systems, that serves the ends of 
both of these concerns is empathy.  Empathy profoundly influences and shapes our 
perceptions, experiences, feelings, and relations with others, actively facilitating our 
interpretation and engagement in social experience.   
Empathy: Working Definition and Discussion 
Empathy is a word that takes on a broad range of meanings and is used in a wide 
variety of ways by those in the various disciplines who work on empathy.  So, I begin by 
laying out my working definition, delineating aspects of empathy that will be explicated 
and justified in the course of the chapter.  Empathy’s roots reach into the primitive 
aspects of our automatic consciousness, indicating our shared neurophysiology of 
empathy with many other non-human species.  Franz de Waal and others claim that our 
more sophisticated neurophysiological attributes exhibited in morally exemplary forms of 
empathy are built upon these simpler and more primitive systems.  As such, an important 
means of shaping and stretching empathy is by touching the chords of these more 
primitive forms.     
My general working definition of empathy is a neurophysiological process that 
facilitates our social cognition and  relationality by provoking in us cognitive-affective 
responses that are resonant with the perceived
7
 feelings, experiences, and/or situations of 
others.  There are several facets of empathy that I am emphasizing which I will explain 
below: 1) Empathy exhibits a variety of cognitive-affective qualities, which can be either 
or both pre-conscious and conscious.  2) It is a form of perception, bound up with other 
forms of perception.  3) It intersects other feelings, and thus is highly complex.  4) It has 
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 By “perceived,” I include non-conscious perceptions. 
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powerful imaginative dimensions and capacities.  5) Its practical and moral worth are 
contingent on the development of self-other distinction, and regard for the feelings and 
rightful claims of others. 
Facets of Empathy 
1) Empathy is felt and expressed as cognitive-affective experience, receptive and 
expressive of the body and its cognition, above and below conscious awareness.  The 
various views on empathy depict it with differing levels of intellectual and emotional 
content, but the more sophisticated expressions of empathy generally require a high 
capacity of both cognitive and affective development and skills.  Recall also, from 
Chapter I, that Damasio describes cognition as both automatic and controlled conscious 
processes.  The lower levels may occur without our noticing, as we will see empathy 
often does.  Both levels include “cognitive-affective” content and indicate an 
interdependent relation.
 8
  Higher and lower level cognitions mutually inform one 
another.   
2) Empathy is a form of perception and is bound up with other forms of 
perception.  Empathy resonates in some way with what one perceives the other’s/others’ 
feeling, experience or situation to be.  Note that empathy, like other forms of perception, 
is not passive.  In empathic perception, there is selection, interpretation, and judgment 
based on the individual’s previous experience, which is brought to bear on the moral 
situation.  Whether habituated and automatic, or consciously attended to and directed, our 
interpretations mediate what we see, hear, feel, and apprehend.  Empathic perception is 
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 Interestingly, the ancient Chinese word xin, or “heart-mind,” appears to have noted this relation long ago 
(Ivanhoe 2001, 393).   
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complicated and mediated by other perceptions, so we can mistake other’s needs, or the 
meanings of another’s expressions.  Empathy interprets and responds to the empathic 
stimulus with greater or lesser aptness, depending on its knowledge and skill.   
3)  Empathy, as an experience and an expression, is highly complex in that it 
intersects with a variety of other feelings, perceptions, and interpretations.  Empathy 
helps us apprehend the feelings and intentions of others such that we may feel similar 
feelings.  Or we may, through our own experience, perspective, and interpretation have a 
very different response and yet fully resonate with the feelings of the target of our 
empathy.  For example, I may empathically understand a toddler saddened by the loss of 
his lollypop, without feeling his exact feelings.  Empathy is what helps me to understand 
his feelings with varying degrees of depth and fullness.  Empathic perception may 
comprehend the richness of feelings of the other, but not share them.  Some theorists, 
such as Amy Coplan (2011), insist on an affective match from empathizer to the subject 
with whom he is empathizing.  Affective match means that one has the same feelings as 
the one with whom one is empathizing.  Such a demand overlooks the interrelated quality 
of empathy with other moral sensibilities.
9
 
4) Empathy has powerful imaginative dimensions and capacities.  Empathy 
moves the imagination causing us to feel reverberations with aesthetic stimuli like faces, 
voices, sounds, word meanings, the brush strokes of a painting, and importantly for my 
purposes, with the stories of other people—even short snippets.  We are infected with the 
sense of their world, their feelings, and their humanity.  Adam Smith claims: 
                                                          
9
 As Adam Smith points out, our sympathies may lead us to feel pity, or shame on behalf of the other whom 
we perceive is ignorant of the significance of the social implications of their situation (Smith 9). 
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By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive 
ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his 
body, and become in some measure the same person with him and thence 
form some idea of his sensations and even feel something, which, though 
weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them (Coplan and Goldie 2011, 
xi). 
 
Empathy alone may not be able to motivate ethical actions, but this imaginative access 
point seems to be a powerful means of improving our responsiveness to ethical moments 
and increasing empathy’s range of responsivity. 
 5) Empathy’s practical use and moral worth are contingent on the development of 
self-other distinctions and regard for the feelings and rightful claims of others.  A proper 
sense of self-other distinction is necessary for accuracy in empathic perception.  Martin 
Hoffman discusses the naïve expressions of empathy in infants and small children, like 
offering one’s own mother for comfort rather than the mother of the suffering child.  
Such expressions are limited by the infant’s inability to comprehend self-other 
distinctions as older children and adults do.  Proper moral regard for others is also 
necessary for empathic moral perception to have motive force for ameliorating the 
suffering of others.  This regard must be cultivated. We need to appreciate the self-other 
distinction so as to facilitate genuine resonance with the feelings of the other rather than 
an obtuse self-projection. 
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The complexity of empathy means that one can feel conflicted and contrary 
empathic responses.  An empathizer may not resonate with the subject’s feelings as such.  
If we perceive someone as a victim who does not share our perception, we might desire 
to protect his feelings and his self-perception, and so work consciously to hide 
commiserating feelings.  Additionally, adults can empathize with the feelings of children, 
even when their responses seem exaggerated to us.  If a child is afraid of imaginary 
threats, we may not share the fear, but out of care for his feelings, we may wish to hide 
our incredulousness, not wishing to minimize his feelings about his experience.  One may 
sympathize with the feeling of fear, especially of the overwhelming fright of childhood 
fancies, even if one cannot relate to the object of fear, such as monsters under the bed.   
These important facets of the process of empathy are not exhaustive, but are the 
main issues that I wish to consider throughout this work.  Empathy’s cognitive-affective 
dimensions span a continuum of conscious and unconscious processes, and are bound up 
with perception and our self-other differentiation.  Empathy is complex, highly 
imaginative, and subject to the quality of our self-other perceptions as distinct and of 
value. To appreciate the array of empathic experience, it is helpful to understand the roots 
of empathy. 
The Primordial Roots of Empathy 
Franz de Waal (2006) claims that empathy is a very old system.  That 
primordiality is a good thing, according to de Waal, because an old system is more 
resilient and less likely to fade in successive generations.  That is promising news for 
humans.  Empathy’s primordiality, in de Waal’s view, reveals our shared ancestry with 
other primates and close genetic ties to some mammals.  In The Age of Empathy, de Waal 
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claims that our ways of relating have many similarities to our primate cousins’ ways, who 
are more cooperative and prosocial than we commonly think.  “[Some theorists] call 
human cooperation a ‘huge anomaly’ in the natural world…They have been quick to 
write off chimpanzee cooperation as a product of kinship, thus putting it in the same 
category as the communal life of ants and bees.  Only humans, they say, engage in large-
scale cooperation” (179-180).  This view, which is not anti-evolutionary, but perhaps, 
speciesist, places a larger gap between other social species and humans.  Primates, as de 
Waal shows, are capable of fairly sophisticated social interactions, but de Waal concedes 
that there is a distinction between ourselves and our primate cousins.  “My guess is that 
humans show these tendencies to a greater extent, and thus are capable of more complex, 
larger-scale cooperation” (181).  
De Waal cites numerous examples of primates being unwilling to receive rewards 
if they cannot share them, or if it will harm another of their species (181).  The alpha 
males might be more comfortable being selfish, but most of the rest of the group is not.  
One of the key emotions of empathy is distress.  Whether the feeling is in the form of 
distress, guilt, discomfort, anxiety, or a fuller kind of suffering on behalf of the other, 
there is a very unpleasant sense of dis-ease as a result of someone else’s distressing 
feeling and/or situation.   
De Waal argues that our feelings of empathy are the expressions of a bodily 
process rooted in primitive, automatic systems of mimicry, and synchrony that develop 
into a more sophisticated affective and cognitively complex process of role taking and 
perspective sharing with others, including imagined others.  More primordial forms of 
empathy include, but are not limited to: basic mimicry and synchrony, emotional 
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contagion/infection, and what de Waal calls “mood convergence,” in which one feels 
like-feelings in accord with the subject/target (de Waal 49).  I will explain these further 
below.  At the higher cognitive-affective levels are included perspective taking, 
compassionate regard for the other, and a willingness to sacrifice personal-interest for the 
other’s wellbeing.  Empathy as an old, shared system has evolved into a much more 
complex and variegated system influencing a variety of social-cognitive tasks. 
Looking more closely at some forms of empathy, we can begin to see the 
interrelated functions of primordial empathy with its more complex and cognitively 
challenging forms.  In treatments of empathy, these terms are sometimes lumped 
together.  Here we will see that they have distinct functions even as they often overlap.  
Mimicry and synchrony are early and ongoing expressions which can be conscious or 
unconscious.  They operate in imitating or matching the movements of another.  Andrew 
Meltzoff (1983) and his colleagues showed that within minutes of birth, an infant can 
mimic an adult sticking out its tongue.  Mimicry is thus a primitive process that binds us 
in interpersonal sharing of experience, namely, our primary intersubjectivity.  What is 
required for this is sufficient dexterity, which the infant has from its innate sucking 
capacity, and the mirroring processes that preconsciously provoke mimicking behavior.  
Smiling and imitative gestures come later with more developmental dexterity.  Infants 
practice these actions repeatedly slowly developing the skills.  Social expressions, like 
other motor skills, grow after hundreds or thousands of these social exchanges with 
parents/caregivers.   
Initially, the skills are awkward, but with practice they become smooth and 
natural.  Mimicry and synchrony are useful throughout life, allowing adults to develop 
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and execute new skills, as well as to read situations and people.  Performing in mimicry 
or synchrony with a group can provoke feelings of empathic regard, according to 
Jonathan Haidt (2006). Theoretically, mimicry and synchrony can be performed without 
shared feelings, but, as Haidt pointed out when speaking of soldiers marching and singing 
together, they felt a kind of togetherness, unity, and even a transcendence that they had 
not felt before (238).  So, there may be some shared feeling, but it may not be necessary 
for the process to accomplish mere mimicry.  However, when we begin to feel feelings 
that resonate with someone else’s situation, this is what we commonly think of as 
empathy. 
Emotional contagion or infection is related to motor mimicry and synchrony, but 
with the affective content that evokes feelings that do not originate in our experience.  
Such feelings have infected us by our empathic experience of the feelings of others.  
Many of these infections are not even consciously perceived by us.  De Waal (2009) 
speaks of the contagion of pandiculating, or yawning: “Yawn contagion reflects the 
power of unconscious synchrony” (49).  Our reflex is stimulated by the sight, sound, or 
even the thought of others yawning.  He refers to this as “mood transmission” and 
claims that it is essential for a traveling species in order to quickly convey relevant 
information like predator sightings.   
Mood convergence can be the experience of shared feelings occurring from 
synchronized activity as mentioned above.  Soldiers have described a feeling of unity and 
care for their fellow soldiers during synchronized drills.  “’I’ passes insensibly into a 
‘we’…and individual fate loses its central importance…I believe that it is nothing less 
than the assurance of immortality that makes self-sacrifice at these moments so relatively 
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easy…[my ‘I’] lives on in the comrades for whom I gave up my life (Haidt 2006, 238).  
All of these levels from mimicry to mood transmission are shared with a variety of other 
mammals, but obvious examples, such as songbird mimicry, shows that many species 
have this capacity. 
Empathy, in its preconscious expression, can cause us to empathize without 
knowing what we are feeling or the source of the feeling.  I previously discussed Antonio 
Damasio’s claims about conscious and nonconscious processes of affective cognition, 
empathy responds whether we choose to or not.  Empathy is an example of the continuum 
of preconscious to conscious affective-cognition that informs moral life. Empathy can 
describe this overall process from preconscious and low affective expressions of mimicry 
to more sophisticated forms of taking the other’s point of view.  In common parlance, the 
term empathy is used to describe the experience of feeling emotions resonant to another’s 
affective state.  In keeping with other thinkers’ general terms, I use empathy as an 
umbrella term for the continuum of emotional social cognition as exchanged 
interpersonally.  Empathy describes this general experience, but also the specific 
experience of finding ourselves experiencing a mood more “appropriate to another’s 
situation than our own” as Martin Hoffman defines it (2000, 4).   In this way, empathy is 
a category of neurophysiological processes that range from low to high in complexity and 
affective content, but empathy is also the basic sentiment of regard for the other which 
can be cultivated for higher moral functions like sympathy and compassion. 
Sympathy has had a number of meanings in its use.  Two forms are useful in my 
discussion.  I follow Hume and Smith speaking of sympathy as: 1) as “like feeling,” as in 
we have the same taste in music and 2) as “sympathetic concern for,” as in I have 
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sympathy for you in your suffering from illness (Hume 1739/2003, 355).  The former is 
relevant, even though it is more aesthetic than moral, because it often provides easier 
access to sympathetic regard.  We tend to care more for those whom we are like.  In 
Chapter IV, I discuss the challenge of empathic biases which are sometimes based in 
such sympathies.  The second form of sympathy expresses, for many thinkers, a moral 
development beyond empathy: from feeling with to feeling for.  I think that it is useful to 
preserve both understandings of sympathy as each describes different sentiments and 
social experiences.  Compassion, is also considered a moral development beyond 
empathy, and is often used to describe sympathy.  Philosopher Martha Nussbaum 
describes empathy in ways resonant to what some theorists call “cognitive empathy” or 
perhaps like what is called “analogical inference,” being more intellectual and less 
affective.  This view of empathy understands the other, but from an emotional distance.  I 
might say that I understand the difficulties posed by being short of the cash for one’s 
groceries.  I get that it is embarrassing, etc., but I am not arrested with the sensation of 
that understanding.   For Nussbaum (2001), empathy is an “imaginative reconstruction of 
another person’s experiences without any particular evaluation of that 
experience…different from and insufficient for compassion” (301-2).   For many 
theorists, compassion moves beyond empathy to active care because it suffers with the 
other and thus is motivated to act on his behalf.  Phenomenologist Max Scheler 
(1913/2008), sees this sentiment/experience as the height of moral feeling, identifying it 
with a kind of spiritual moral achievement.  In my use, I do not share Nussbaum’s 
definition of empathy because I am persuaded by the psychological literature that claims 
that empathy is an affective response which may have “cooler” tones, as Hume described 
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the cooler passions, but are affective nevertheless.  I do, however, regard the term 
compassion as aptly designated by Nussbaum and Scheler as being beyond empathic 
understanding.  As such, I use the term “compassion” to indicate when empathic regard 
has moved to motivation to act on behalf of the other.  Compassion is intently focused on 
the other as a unique person deserving of my attentive regard and active care.   
Fellow-feeling is another term associated with empathy, and is often understood 
as a more universal sentiment of humanity.  This is what we feel for all humans when we 
perceive them as fellows.  Adam Smith, David Hume and Scheler share the view that this 
regard forms the basis from which higher sentiments can develop.  The moral concern is 
to move one’s fellow feeling to recognize the other as a fellow human and as such as 
having a moral claim deserving a certain comportment and treatment.  Sympathetic 
regard and compassion are higher moral achievements in overcoming our self-concern 
and our resistance to vulnerability by focusing on the pain, suffering, or situation of the 
other (Scheler 2008/1913, 232).  As Nussbaum (2001) puts it, compassion exhibits acting 
on the sufferer’s behalf (302).  Fellow feeling is the basic sentiment for human ethos.  
Fellow feeling, as Scheler employs the phrase, may be understood as general or basic 
empathy.  Both have a primitive, automatic quality, and a more intentional form of 
expression, but are still deficient to sympathy and compassion.  It may be, however, that 
fellow feeling is the sentiment that emerges when we feel the inklings of our human 
likeness, evoking care and regard for the other as a fellow human.  If this is so, then it 
may be that what we want for ethics is that empathic responses will, when called for, lead 
to the sentiment of fellow feeling which can facilitate compassionate action. 
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My description of empathy includes a range of feelings which can progress in 
affective intensity and cognitive complexity, from primitive mimicry to compassionate 
suffering and self-sacrifice.  Empathy provokes various moral responses like helping or 
avoiding one in distress.  The feelings of empathic regard alone may be insufficient to 
motivate the empathizer to act for the good of the other, so understanding the 
neurophysiology of this process may give us insight into how we can improve empathy’s 
reach, aptitude, and responsivity.  
The Neurophysiology of Empathy and Moral Cognition 
 Current research into the neurophysiological underpinnings of empathy helps to 
explain 1) how it helps us understand others and 2) how it is foundational (and 
motivational) to morality.  In this section, I explore the first point by looking at cognitive 
science literature relevant to empathy, and then lay out the relevant issues from the 
interdisciplinary philosophical debate on theory of mind.  I will address the second point 
by exploring perception and empathic experience as the basis for moral acting.   
In this section, I discuss what appear to be the relevant neurophysiological 
systems that underlie and activate empathy, and how they assist us in understanding 
others.  I begin with Marco Iacoboni and Vittorio Gallese as two of the predominant 
pioneers in this area of research.  Mimicry is innate, in both automatic and controlled 
process, according to Marco Iacoboni, Vittorio Gallese, and others in the article, 
“Grasping the Intentions of Others with One’s Own Mirror Neuron System” (2005).   
What scientists have observed from fMRIs is the surprising amount of brain activation 
when the test subject is merely watching others act.  It has been assumed by theorists and 
common sense thinkers alike, that observation is passive, but according to these findings, 
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observation is preparatory to action.  Observer neural simulation was discovered by 
Giacomo Rizzolatti, Gallese, and others in Rhesus monkeys whose neural mimicry 
activated while watching a researcher grasp a cup (1992, 1996).  The monkeys’ brains 
activated, in the same neuronal areas that would be activated if they were performing the 
action.  They concluded that the ability to understand the intention of another’s actions is 
made possible by the activation of mirror neurons which neurophysiologically simulate 
the experience.  Mirror neurons are understood as mimicking what is observed in both 
motor and sensory areas of the brain.  Such activation enables us to understand and 
interpret, with reasonable accuracy, especially the most basic universal functions, like 
drinking.  “The stronger activation of the inferior frontal cortex in the ‘drinking’ as 
compared to the ‘cleaning’ intention...” shows the universality of the drinking action over 
cleaning actions, according to Iacoboni and Gallese (2005, 33).  Actions like cleaning are 
at a different level of activation due to cultural determinants.   In this way, practical 
experience affects the level of neural excitation with ramifications for the vividness of 
understanding. 
Experience and perception facilitate our ability to interpret experience.  An older 
child understands the meaning of train sounds and car honks in ways that toddlers may 
not.  And adults generally understand the meanings of social disapproval better than an 8-
year old may.  This accrual of experience, and the subsequent ability to understand the 
social and environmental reality, seems to be aided by mirroring systems by creating 
simulations of experiences in our brains and bodies.   Iacoboni (2011) points out that 
repeated bodily experiences of a given action evokes greater observer neural activation 
when observing those same actions being performed by another.  When watching actions 
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related to that bodily experience, the same motor and sensory neurons activate in the 
observer as were activated when she herself is acting.  Broader and deeper activations in 
motor and sensory areas of the brain occurs in an experienced player observer than a non-
player observer.  For example, a frequent (skillful) basketball player will have more 
neural activation in watching a basketball game than a non-player.  In each observer, the 
areas of the brain which would execute these actions activate, but the activation is fuller 
in the more skillful player.  Here is a detailed explanation from Salvatore M. Aglioti, et 
al. (2008): 
In the first part of the experiment, the researchers had all three 
groups watch film clips of players attempting free throws. The clips were 
stopped at ten mid-action intervals and everybody was asked to predict the 
likely success of the free throws. The players made more accurate 
predictions at every time interval, but their greatest advantage over both 
expert watchers and inexperienced students was at the earliest intervals, 
before the balls had even left the players’ hands, when there were no 
trajectories to watch. 
This indicated that athletes were better than the others at 
understanding cues from the filmed players’ bodies. But the researchers 
also wanted to know how much their motor systems, primed by their 
mirror neurons, contributed to reading those cues. So in a second 
experiment, using a technique called transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS), which yields the exact timing of neuronal firing, the researchers 
monitored the patterns of motor system activity in all three groups as they 
watched free throw video clips.  
Everyone’s motor system perked up watching the action, but the 
students showed a generalized perk-up, while both players and expert 
watchers showed activity of the specific motor areas involved in shot-
taking. What separated the players from the expert watchers, though, was 
greater excitation of the hand muscles controlling the ball, especially the 
muscle controlling the angle of the pinkie finger at the instant the ball left 
the shooter’s hand. There was not necessarily visible movement of the 
pinkie, but a measurable increase in what’s called “motor evoked 
potentials,” which signal preparation for intended action. The most 
unpredictable result: This activation was greatest when players watched 
the launch of a ball that was going to miss the basket (2008). 
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The “spectating brain is also a playing brain,” according to Iacoboni (2011).  This 
mirroring process appears to assist in interpretive meaning-making processes, indicating 
a reciprocal relation between observation and action, and action and observation.  
Observers with more experience in the activity being observed will, it seems, have a 
fuller comprehension of the significance, ramifications, or implications of events.  
Mimicking others teaches us the meaning of their intentions, and as experience expands, 
we can apprehend further meaning.  Mirroring processes, then, assist information 
processing, meaning-making, and the accumulation of meaning.   
Some theorists are skeptical about the claims being made about, and even the 
existence of, mirror neurons.  Iacoboni claims that there is evidence not only for the 
existence of mirror neurons in humans, but also for their evolutionary differences from 
some other primates.  Some of these neurons are not connected to motor areas but instead 
are bound up with emotions, according to Iacoboni (2011, 55).  This may show a 
relationship to empathy.  “All these studies provide compelling evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that the mirror neuron system is a critical neural system for empathy” (Ibid. 
52).  Additionally, there are neurons specifically inhibiting imitation (53).  The inhibitors 
perform two important functions relevant to my concerns for moral cultivation: 1) the 
ability to differentiate between the feelings and experience of self and the other, and 2) 
the ability to resist empathic emotional responses, avoiding the target’s need.  We can 
turn away from the empathic stimulus and repress our sympathetic response.  This 
capacity is important for personal and relational regulation.  Empathic responses would 
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disrupt and overwhelm us too often if we had no way to inhibit it.  Thus, the inhibitor 
may perform a role as important as that of empathy itself. 
Empathic intelligence enables one to understand others and form relationships, 
according to Iacoboni.  This empathic connection indicates an important contradiction to 
the traditionally held idea that self and other are deeply discrete.  Rather, according to 
Iacoboni, the functional sophistication and pervasiveness of mirror neurons in humans 
indicates that self and other are bound to one another empathically:  Self without other is 
incomplete insofar as the very nature of self depends on others.  We are effectually and 
affectively within each other (Iacoboni 2011, 56-57).  It seems that empathic processes 
are a primary means by which we navigate our ultra-social lives. 
Mimicry is an important indicator of how the bodily processes are bound up with 
cognition.  Even when we are not physically mimicking an action, mirroring neurons 
activate, helping us understanding what we see.  This embodied cognition is therefore 
deeply social as we continue building our mimicking repertoire and experiences in ever 
broadening activations of cognitive-affective processes.  
Embodied cognition means that motion and emotion are inextricably bound up in 
one another, according to Vittorio Gallese et al. (1999).  In the article “Perception 
Through Action,” Gallese, Craighero, Fadiga and Fogassi claim that while action and 
perception are two separate neural domains, they cooperate in ways that indicate that 
perception might be thought of as action preparation.  As we observe the events in the 
world, particularly the social world, our observations are readying us for action.  Space 
perception is achieved by the cooperation of these two systems (2).  The perception 
seems to have a role in both understanding action and preparing for it (2).  “The visual 
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RFs [receptive field of the visual cortex] of these neurons are anchored to the tactile ones 
regardless of eye position.  These neurons seem to play a crucial role in the process of 
visuo-motor transformation necessary to guide arm or head movements toward or away 
from visual stimuli” (3-4 emphasis mine).  One does not even need to see these actions; 
just imagining them can activate these systems.  “This common meaning [of the 
coordination of visual and motor systems] is the representation of an action, that can be 
triggered either by the presence of the object or by the memory of it, as it occurs when 
grasping is executed without visual control” (4).  The imagination is a powerful ally to 
empathy. 
 Gallese et. al.’s, work in motor theories of perception suggest that perception is 
actively engaged when we are observing what some cognitive theorists call “embodied 
simulation.” 10  Such “motor imagery” may be being used in “high level or cognitive” 
work such as “action understanding, mental imagery of action, perceiving and 
discriminating objects.”  Their findings contradict theories of a strict separation of the 
“knowing brain” from the “acting brain” (5).  They quote Roger Sperry (1952): 
Perception is basically an implicit preparation to respond.  Its function is 
to prepare the organism for adaptive action.  The problem of what occurs 
in the brain during perception can be attacked much more effectively once 
this basic principle is recognized (1999, pp. 5 my copy from Internet). 
  
Perception, then, is not a passive reception, but is highly engaged in action centers 
of the brain, and appears to be a necessary preliminary to action.  Such motor imagery is 
useful to social cognition, and is not limited to visual stimuli.  Kohler, Gallese et al. 
(2002), point out that the meaning of sounds is conveyed in a similar fashion to the visual 
perception discussed above, and likewise can raise anticipatory responses.  Monkey 
                                                          
10
 See Ben Bergen’s discussion in Chapter V. 
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subjects respond to the sound of a peanut cracking, activating neural areas in their brains 
for the actions of cracking and eating peanuts.   
Human subjects, likewise, hearing paper being torn have neural activations in 
their brains as if they themselves were tearing the paper.  In “Motion, emotion and 
empathy in esthetic experience,” Freedberg and Gallese (2007) demonstrate further the 
embodied phenomena to illustrate the “neural mechanisms that underpin the empathic 
‘power of images’ and show that embodied simulation and the empathetic feelings it 
generates has a crucial role” for social cognition (197).  Vittorio Gallese uses the term 
“motor schema” to describe these action perceptions.  These interworking systems feed 
our imagination to aid our affective cognition, our social perception, and intercourse.   
I have looked at these discussions in cognitive science to aid our understanding in 
what informs and motivates empathy.  According to Gallese, embodied simulation 
generates empathic feelings.  These systems are so deeply embedded in our cognition that 
they create a field of shared meaning that is both preverbal and verbal.  Gallese (2001) 
showed the underpinnings of intersubjectivity through his developing work on the motor 
schema.  He claims that the pervasiveness of our motor schema creates what he calls a 
“shared manifold” of experience and meaning.  “We are social animals” Gallese claims, 
explaining how the systems that enable us to automatically apprehend and comprehend 
many forms of meaning and their implications facilitate our shared existence.  This 
intersubjectivity as an interpersonal exchange of motion and meaning, is due to the 
“relational nature of action.”  Gallese claims that empathy is enacted and meaning made 
through the “conceptual tool” of the “shared manifold of intersubjectivity” (2001, 34).   
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Gallese claims that to understand the intention of a goal, and potentially reenact it, 
there must be a sympathetic link between subject and target.  “My proposal is that this 
link is constituted by the embodiment of the intended goal, shared by agent and 
observer…[and] that the embodiment of the action goal, shared by agent and observer, 
depends on the motor schema of the action and not only on a purely visual description of 
its agent” (36).  Motion and emotion are so primordially experienced by each of us and 
all of us collectively, according to Gallese, that there is a kind of manifold of experience 
in which we all participate, providing a basis of sympathetic understanding.  This shared 
experience of body, motion, and feelings.  In other words, our shared bodily simulative 
powers, activates our empathic understandings of each other.  Our own movement and 
perception of one another in movement are profoundly intersubjective at levels below 
conscious awareness (39).  Perception feeds comprehension, which participates in what 
one is observing imaginatively, and it is thus, ready for action.  On a cognitive-affective 
level, this affords shared meaning between ourselves and others.  Perhaps this is why 
wordless exchanges between ourselves and strangers (e.g., standing in the check-out line 
at a grocery store) that include knowing looks, chuckles, or sad expressions are not only 
possible, but have the power to touch us and make us feel the interconnections of our 
humanity. 
It is essential that in order to perform this dance of social expression and 
reception, we be able to almost instantaneously understand the import of the gestures and 
actions of other humans.  Perceptual understanding is essential to the meaning-making 
project.  Action is relational, according to Gallese (2001), “establishing a meaningful link 
between agent and observer.”  In order for mirror neurons to be activated in the subject, 
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she must observe a goal-oriented action of a relatable being; machines do not activate 
them (36).  The empathic link, our embodied intersubjectivity, for us bi-pedal tool-users 
provides a shared manifold of meaning from which we build a sense of agency for 
ourselves and recognize the agency of others (43).   
We have been discussing an accrual of imaginative structures, like the motor 
schema and shared manifold, that help explain our perceptual comprehension of the 
actions of others.  We have looked at how embodied simulation conveys meaning for 
social cognition.  Andrew Meltzoff and M. Keith Moore (1995)
11
 identified a related 
schema which can help explain how some action is then instigated.  This “body scheme” 
facilitates not only the ability to mimic, but also memory of the experience which evoked 
the mimicry can be stored and later mimicked again.  They tested forty newborns before 
they were discharged from the hospital.  The youngest neonate was 42 minutes old, and 
all the infants exhibited the mimicry of lip and tongue protrusion.  Infants, with their 
primitive “body scheme” can imitate such actions, but also have a self-orientation that 
indicates a low level awareness of their separateness from others.   
Infant subjects were able to mimic adult researchers in tongue protrusion whom 
they had seen on the previous day.  Moreover, the infants were able to replicate the 
unique style of protrusion that had been performed the previous day, such as tongue 
protruding on the left or right of the mouth.  Infants use proprioception to correct their 
mimicry attempts when a researcher performs such alterations of tongue protrusion style.  
Older infants can understand the goal of an unsuccessful effort, and try to complete a 
                                                          
11
 This research builds on their earlier research with infants in 1977. 
http://ilabs.washington.edu/meltzoff/pdf/77Meltzoff_Moore_Science.pdf 
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researcher’s unsuccessful task, like unsuccessfully reaching for a toy.  “Infants store a 
representation of the adult’s act and it is the target against which they compare their own 
acts” (59-60).  Infant subjects also showed emotional sensitivity to “judgments” of 
researchers who emoted negatively to another researcher in the child’s presence 
regarding a certain object.  When the “grumpy” researcher was again present, the infant 
avoided the object.  Following this and other studies, Meltzoff joins neuroscientist Jean 
Decety (2011) in claiming that there is a strong connection between the innate imitative 
impulse and the development of empathy: “the discovery of early motor imitation 
suggests a psychological and philosophical foundation for empathy prior to human 
language and complex adult thought” (60).  The relationship is complex, though, and 
there are multiple systems at work in each system even as some overlap. 
The nature of representation and inference complicate our understanding of the 
workings of empathy.  It may prove difficult to tease apart the functions of the physical 
and cognitive aspects of empathy since even infants seem to have both behavioral and 
mental influences their empathic response.  According to Decety and Meltzoff (2011), 
mimicry and empathy seem to be underpinned by “partially distinct, but inter-related” 
processes.   Motor mimicry is innate for a number of different species, particularly 
primates.  But, “human infants are the most imitative creature in the world” (58).  These 
neurophysiological processes enable us to apprehend meaning about the interplay of 
social relations in which we live and move.   
Theorists have been wrestling for a long time questions regarding the various 
cognitive processes, and how they work to facilitate our social understanding.  These 
theories regarding embodied cognition are controversial.  Some theorists hold that the 
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body has a secondary role to the intellectual processes.  Franz de Waal (2009) disagrees.  
He holds what he calls a “body first” view of social cognition, which means that the body 
is the first to apprehend and respond, and only later, if at all, do conscious processes 
engage (81).  He claims that many of empathy’s jobs are not consciously engaged.  Like 
Antonio Damasio (see Chapter I) he sees much of our cognitive-affective processing as 
generally below the level of consciousness.  This body first view is also known as the 
“bottom-up” view, meaning that cognition begins in the so-called lower processes, like 
mimicry, and moves up to reflective consciousness, or the controlled processes, when 
necessary.  This view will be explained more fully below in the theory of mind section.  
Body first theorists see empathy as continuous with other species and more primitive 
human systems.  De Waal claims that empathy begins preconsciously, responding to and 
resonating with the expressions of others, it thus enables our preconscious self to intuit 
the meanings of others’ expressions.  In this way, our bodies may start the engines for a 
flight before we are consciously aware of the need to run.  De Waal illustrates human 
continuity with other primates by showing an instance of body reading (as opposed to 
mind reading) between two chimps, an alpha male named Rock and a non-alpha female, 
Belle. 
Belle is a bright young female who learns how to deceive the alpha male, Rock, in 
a variety of ways, to keep him from eating all of the (human given) treats, as is his wont.  
Both chimps use their empathic perception to read one another’s actions and intentions.  
As part of this exploration of social cognition, researchers would give treats to the chimps 
and observe.  “If Rock was not present, Belle invariably led the group to food and nearly 
everybody got some” (97).  But, when Rock is present, she hides the treats.  Eventually, 
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he learns how she behaves when she is hiding the food.  He kicks or bites her, pushing 
her off of the food and eats it all.  Belle then learns to hide the food in a place apart from 
where she sits.  Rock pushes Belle away from her seat, but finding nothing, he leaves her 
alone.  Then, when he is gone, Belle is able again to share the concealed food with the 
others.  According to DeWaal, these primates are not reading each other’s minds as such, 
but their behaviors, whose meaning we primates empathically understand (96-97).  This 
is an example of how our body schemas and motor schemas, and what Gallese calls the 
shared manifold facilitate our social cognition. 
Theorists like de Waal favor the view that social cognition, in particular, is rooted 
in the bodily signs and responses to the social and environmental milieu which we 
inhabit.  As we move deeper into the discussions on empathy, some terminology and a 
sense of the relevant debates will be helpful.   Empathy theory intersects with Theory of 
Mind, as both are engaged in the question of how it is that we understand other subject’s 
minds and anticipate their intentions.  Theory of Mind explores the process of what some 
theorists call ‘mind reading,’ and what de Waal calls “reading bodies.”  Theory of Mind 
is relevant here because it deals with many of the questions in empathy research, and 
because it is part of the theoretical history regarding knowledge of others.  Empathy 
research indicates an alternative to the traditional theory of mind view that we know each 
other by a rough sort of folk psychology, or an “argument from analogy” (Coplan and 
Goldie 2011, xiii), but many ideas from Theory of Mind will help us to develop our 
understanding of how empathy operates.  Theory of Mind is concerned specifically with 
the question of how it is that we can apprehend the inner states of others.  What follows is 
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a sketch of the basic views and disagreements in the Theory of Mind debates, which will 
aid us in understanding some key issues in empathy theory and research.  
Theory of Mind Relative to Empathy 
Theory of Mind inquires into the nature of our knowledge of others, particularly 
how we know their inner worlds.  The discussions below lay out the spectrum of views 
about how it is that we understand the thoughts, intentions, and feelings of other people, 
how we know:  a) that they have inner worlds similar to our own—that they are “minded” 
like ourselves, and b) the import of what their expressions convey for meaning and 
predicting behavior.  There are two main views in the Theory of Mind debate, “Theory 
Theory” and “Simulation Theory.”  These views are often considered to be a “top-down” 
or a “bottom-up” theory respectively, which means that Theory theory asserts that we 
know that others are minded primarily, or exclusively, by intellectual activity, or 
theorizing, while Simulation theory claims that we know this via bodily simulation 
primarily.  Theory theory claims that we understand that others have minds and internal 
states by intellectual inference.  We draw inferences based on comparisons with our own 
experiences and states.  Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie cite Gopnik and Wellman (1994) 
as an example of the Theory theory view in which the observer views the subject with a 
kind of “folk psychology” like a “folk physics” and surmises what a subject will do based 
on theoretical surmises informed by that folk psychology (2011, xxxii).  
Alison Gopnik (2011) states that Theory theory is “the idea that children’s 
learning is like theory change in science…[exhibiting] both rich structure and significant 
learning”(162).  This is a kind of “top down” theoretical Theory of Mind, because it 
begins with a conscious theoretical representation that is inferred to be the state of the 
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mind of the other.  The “false belief test” is considered emblematic of such inferential 
theorizing, which one is able to pass by about four years old.  The false belief test quizzes 
a child’s ability to differentiate between her knowledge of the events of a story and those 
of the character from within the story (Bloom and German 2000, B25-B31).  The child 
indicates a low level theory of mind when she recognizes that she knows more than the 
character in the story.  The child recognizes that while she, the reader, knows that Little 
Red is talking to the wolf and not her grandmother, the character Little Red does not.   
In contrast to Theory theory, Simulation theory regards the understanding of the 
other as being primarily rooted in simulation rather than in theoretical intellection.  
Simulation Theory has two branches of thought.  The first branch is more explicitly 
representational in its view of our understanding of other minds.  We intentionally and 
consciously simulate the experience of the other in our minds, that is, one is cognizant of 
(and even an agent in) one’s mimicry of the other’s situation.  So, rather than making a 
theoretical inference to the states of the other, one simulates it, representing to oneself 
relevant insight into the other’s inner state.  It differs from the Theory theory inference in 
being more affectively valenced; there is emotional content, but not so much as in the 
second branch of Simulation Theory.  The other branch of Simulation Theory claims that 
understanding of the other is primarily embodied, rooted in automatic processes rather 
than conscious or controlled processes.  This view is considered “bottom-up” because it 
originates in automatic, nonconscious bodily processes with both cognitive and affective 
dimensions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).  So, rather than observing and then 
simulating my target’s experience so as to conjure the relevant insight, my embodied 
cognition began simulating before I was even cognizant of it.  “According to ‘simulation 
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theory’, other people’s mental states are represented by adopting their perspective: by 
tracking or matching their states with resonant states of one’s own.  The activity of mirror 
neurons, and the fact that observers undergo motor facilitation in the same muscular 
groups as those utilized by target agents, are findings that accord well with simulation 
theory but would not be predicted by theory theory” (Gallese and Goldman 1998, 493). 
When we watch a horror movie, we are viscerally charged with fear, sweat, and a racing 
heart.  We do not need much if any cognizing about the situation to experience this fear 
and understand its import relative to the characters.   
To recap then, Theory theory asserts that mind reading is conducted beginning in 
the intellectual, theoretical processes which make inferences from the other’s behavior to 
what the import is.  Simulation theory has the more mental and more bodily formations in 
which the former is an agent in the simulation process, running the simulation as it were, 
whereas in the latter, the neurophysiological processes are doing it nonconsciously.  The 
insights may become conscious on the second Simulation theory view, but they may not.  
This is the view generally held by embodied simulation theorists.  A simplistic example 
may assist our appreciation of the differences here.  Say I am at a grocery store, watching 
a mother and her child, who is in the cart.  I see their smiling interactions and playful 
bodily movements.  Theory theory would say that I see the smiles and can infer, based on 
my epistemic understanding of smiles as indicative of positive feelings, that the mother 
and child are therefore happy.  The more intellectually-based Simulation theory would 
suggest that I would run a simulation of the smiles that I see, and from that basis, know 
that they are happy.  Bottom up Simulation theory would suggest that I do not need to 
think at all.  The smiles automatically stimulate simulation responses in my 
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neurophysiological make up such that I look at their cheerful interaction and feel happy 
myself—even if only fleetingly.  It is fair to say that if I take the time to actually note 
their interactions, I will be touched emotionally by their expressions.  In the last 
description, there may be little to no intellectual content to my touched feelings.  I will 
not likely think, “Isn’t that sweet?” or “They must really love each other.”  Instead, I 
simply feel their sentiments, understanding their feelings for each other, and move on to 
search for apples. 
Philosopher Karsten Steuber (2012) seeks to offer another perspective to these 
three theories.  He thinks that Simulation Theory does not sufficiently capture social 
cognition.  Steuber breaks simulation down to: matching, simulation, and attribution.  He 
broadens the description of empathic inclinations to what he calls Narrative theory.  In 
our living theatre, our empathic matching is imaginative role-playing of the target’s inner 
state and ideas.  Simulation is cognizing possible reasons and goals of target.  Attribution 
is basing one’s folk psychological interpretation of the target’s action on one’s reflection 
from the simulation phase (57).  He is persuaded by theories that connect the activity of 
mirror neurons and empathic responses, but, thinks that they apply for basic empathy 
only.  Steuber sees mimicry as essential for what he calls reenactment empathy, which is 
role-playing.  Such role-playing is the sophisticated means by which we can infer the 
reasons for others’ actions; it has a tacit folk psychology and goes beyond basic empathy 
(60).  The meaning of reading the other is for ascertaining the import of the other through 
role-play, as well as to identify our roles with regard to the other. 
Philosopher Shaun Gallagher (2012) claims that it is interaction, rather than 
cognitive understanding, that motivates our empathic interest in the other.  He explores 
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what he calls Interactive theory which he claims is non-representational.  In the book, 
Moving Ourselves, Moving Others, Gallagher argues that since much of what is 
happening is a bodily response to external stimuli, calling the experience simulation mis-
describes the phenomenology of the event.  The cognitive science evidence does not 
seem to support the sort of agency required for a simulation in his view.   
In contrast to both of these approaches [Theory theory, Simulation theory], 
I have argued elsewhere (Gallagher 2001a, 2004, 2005, 2007aandb) that 
our primary and pervasive way of encountering others is not characterized 
by observation, but by interaction.  That is, the others we try to understand 
are usually people with whom we are interacting, engaged in some 
communicative act, or in some common task or situated in some common 
setting (173).   
 
Interactive theory, rather than depending on a 1
st
 or 3
rd
 person perspective is more 
immersed in an intersubjective experience which Gallagher describes as 2
nd
 person.  
Gallagher claims that Interactive theory captures the spectrum of low-level and high-level 
empathy.  He employs the terms “communicative and narrative competency” to describe 
a sophisticated level of sympathetic understanding, which requires an achievement of 
proficiency in self-understanding.  Such a self-understanding necessarily includes a 
narrative, or autobiographical, self-awareness within a larger narrative.   
My sense of the embodied simulation theories, like those of Vittorio Gallese and 
Franz de Waal, is that the experience being simulated is not representational as such.  
That is, it does not seem to entail an intellectually conscious choice to simulate, as the 
first version of Simulation theory claims.  Rather the simulation is body first, and 
provides the elements that come together in import for social cognition.  The bodily and 
cognitive processes work together to form and discern the social meaning.  The ideas in 
Steuber’s Narrative theory and Gallagher’s Interactive theory provide useful nuances and 
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points of view that the other theories would do well to note, however.  Interaction theory 
make our sociality explicit, and Narrative theory highlights the narrative structure of 
experience, which we will discuss in later chapters.  The latter theory looks like more of 
an accrual to Simulation theory since we do not need narrative information to simulate 
and understand the smile, but we do need it to understand the nature of mother and child 
relations.  
The Theory of Mind debate is concerned to identify where the knowledge of other 
minds is sourced and how it is manifested.  For Theory theorists, the process begins with 
intellectual inference that may then activate the lower bodily and affective states.  That is 
why it is called a top-down theory.  For some Simulation theorists, this intellectual 
process includes an internal representation or simulation, not mere intellectual inference, 
and has affective content.  For the “bottom-up” Simulation theorists, like Vittorio 
Gallese, the process begins with a (usually) unconscious simulation, including relevant 
affective responses that may reach consciousness, and lead to cognizance and emotional 
resonance of the other’s situation and/or feelings that we call empathy.  This outline of 
the views should help us track the discussions as we go into further depth on the nature of 
empathy and its social implications.  The views of Steuber and Gallagher add useful 
insights to the imaginative potentials of empathy, which I think is important for getting a 
full picture of how empathy works.  Empathy theorists tend to lean toward either Theory 
theory or Simulation theory.   I find that Stephanie Preston and Alicia Hofelich make a 
compelling case for the bi-directionality of social cognition (which Jean Decety, 2011, 
agrees with).  My tentative view agrees with de Waal’s body first claim, that the body 
simulates and then, sometimes higher cognitive-affective processes engage add 
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complexity and sophistication, as we grasp the intentions of others, for example the 
narrative components.  Then, as we grow in affective-cognitive skills, our empathic 
perception includes more bi-directionality, as Preston and Hofelich describe below. 
Perception and Experience of Empathy 
Perception and understanding, as theorists like Vittorio Gallese and Andrew 
Meltzoff have shown, work together for social cognition.  As we conduct our daily 
business, and routines, our perception, thoughts, and actions are guided by our automatic 
processes easily navigating social situations.  This is evolutionarily useful insofar as 
typical tasks, which have been habituated, are more efficiently executed by the automatic 
processes than the slower controlled processes.  This division of labor saves cognitive 
energy and capacity for tasks that do require controlled processes.  The work being done 
on mirror neurons is helping us understand these processes of social cognition, giving us 
a rich understanding of the interworkings of bodily cognitive processes.  Vittorio Gallese 
and Alvin Goldman (1998) suspect that the mirror neuron system is an adaptive trait 
assisting in interpreting an agent’s intentions as “cooperative, non-cooperative, or even 
threatening.  Accurate understanding and anticipation enable the observer to adjust his 
responses appropriately” (496).  It appears, then, that we are mirroring in such a way as 
to apprehend the nuances of social meaning.  We are also enabled to retrodict, to 
reconstruct, what someone may have felt or thought or intended in a past situation in light 
of new information (497).  So, as we reflect on the events of yesterday, we can reconsider 
what we witnessed, perhaps in light of new information, and reinterpret what we saw and 
what it meant.  We can predict or infer the intended goal of an action (498).  Thus the 
mirroring system facilitates both mundane and highly sophisticated social cognition.
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Some theorists like Martha Nussbaum (2001) identify the intellectual aspects of 
empathy as separate from emotional concern.  Psychologists Stephanie Preston and Alicia 
Hofelich (2011) call this form of empathy “cognitive empathy.”  They do not see 
cognitive empathy as absolutely distinct from other forms of empathy, but rather describe 
empathic processes as operating on a vertical continuum, activating bi-directionally.  
Most commonly, activation is from the bottom-up, from the viscera to nonconscious and 
conscious cognition.  Mindful of the debate surrounding theory of mind, Preston and 
Hofelich parse the semantics of empathy by outlining the various expressions of empathy 
from emotional contagion to cognitive empathy.  Preston and Hofelich suggest a dynamic 
view of empathy that is not exclusively bottom-up or top-down, because we may actually 
socially cognize in both ways.  The process may depend on the type of social 
provocation.  Most of the time, they suggest, we experience the other through the 
automatic processes of perception which are so habituated as to be invisible.  Driving, 
when all is going smoothly, is an example of this.  We immediately read the intentions of 
others and barely recall exchanges with other drivers unless something unexpected 
occurs.   
Preston and Hofelich (2011) survey the data on empathy research and claim that it 
indicates a continuum from lowest emotional levels (skin conductance, etc.) to highest 
cognitive levels, including intellectual apprehension without affective matching.  And 
they see the benefits of the various forms.  Cognitive empathy can compensate for the 
lack of shared experience by drawing on what we already know about others.  This 
effortful quality, using the controlled mental processes, may assist the subject in 
overcoming the temptation to self-focus.   
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This process combines higher level executive control, attention and working 
memory processes to generate and internal image of the experience which can 
then activate personal representations and downstream bodily sensation.  This 
process occurs during perspective taking and theory of mind, both of which are 
effortful, conscious attempts to understand the target without requiring direct 
perception (Ibid. 6).  
Preston and Hofelich add, however, that mere cognitive empathy may not result in the 
target feeling fully understood.  More affective engagement is needed for fuller empathy. 
Cognitive empathy appears to have an important role, though, in the work of 
building sympathy, as one reaches past one’s own experiences, and social biases in order 
to see other perspectives, role-play, etc., from within the life of another.  It seems 
particularly useful when one has time for reflection and deliberation on the social 
situation (though based on embodied simulation theories, even reflections have affective 
charges that motivate our evaluations).
12
  Contrarily, Preston and Hofelich claim that 
urgent altruistic acts tend to be the result of preexisting representations that enabled the 
helper in a “real-world” emergency to rush “into danger without thinking while those 
who do not help usually report not knowing what to do” (Ibid. 7).13   
Preexisting representations would refer to ideas and attitudes previously 
internalized and habituated.  If a toddler falls into a pond, most adults have sufficient 
preexisting representations (the concern for small children, ability to swim, etc.) to 
                                                          
12
 See Ben Bergen discussion in Chapter V. 
13
 This will be relevant in Chapter VI on Narrative Empathy in which I argue that narrative engagements 
create such representations in readers. 
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immediately motivate our action to save the child.  Like most aspects of empathy, 
preexisting representations have ambivalent potential to help, harm, or ignore, as they can 
provoke empathic biases.  Empathic bias tends toward only helping those we know, or 
those like ourselves; so I would be likely to save my child first if he and another child 
were in danger.  Nevertheless, rescuing a child from a pond is fairly effortless for most of 
us with moderate swimming skills.  Challenges that fall outside of one’s skillset can 
impede empathy from moving us to prosocial action (Ibid. 7).  Preston and Hofelich 
(2011) make a compelling case then for a complex system of cognitive-affection 
communication and social cognition.  They state that the evidence does not support an 
either-or conclusion for bottom-up or top-down exclusively.  We mostly seem to rely on 
bottom-up processes for the everyday variety of empathic needs, but also have need of 
the more intellectual cognitive processes when experiential or relatable sympathies may 
be lacking. 
Empathy theorists have a number of concerns regarding empathy’s ability to 
promote prosocial action.  One such concern is what is called the self-other overlap.  The 
positive utility of the self-other overlap is that we are able to feel resonant feelings with 
the other and that this can both motivate our helping behavior and give us insight into the 
nature of their feelings.  The negative aspect of the self-other overlap is emotional 
blurring and non-helping or misguided efforts to help.  In the self-other overlap, the 
perspective and feelings of the self and the other can be unclearly differentiated due to 
muddy boundaries, projection, poor emotion regulation, etc.  Some theorists are 
concerned that empathy is impaired by an over-focus on self, such as can happen when 
one experiences personal distress.  Personal distress is when the suffering of the other 
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overwhelms the subject with psychological pain that can be self-oriented rather than 
empathically oriented toward relieving the suffering of the other.  An example of this 
would be of sad Bob is describing his feelings and Mary, rather than listening 
empathically, interjects her own sad experiences of a like nature, cutting Bob off from her 
receptivity.  Or if one is overwhelmed by personal distress, one may abandon the sufferer 
altogether.  Empathic distress for the other is thus limited, or completely derailed by 
aversion to the sufferer.    
Personal distress can also result from blurring of self with the other, distorting 
perception and judgment for apt action.  Preston and Hofelich (2011) claim that there is a 
lack of evidence for an experience of empathy devoid of any self-other overlap, and that 
personal distress (focused on self) is not necessarily a hindrance any more than cognitive 
empathy is necessarily a help
14
.   The self-other overlap may be due to the dynamism of 
the neurophysiology of empathy, meaning that as a dynamic exchange of cognitive-
affective information between self and other, it is never purely one or the other.  Such an 
overlap may be a key motivating factor for prosocial behavior because we feel keenly 
how our own wellbeing is intertwined with the wellbeing of the other.  Martin Hoffman, 
whom I will discuss at length in Chapter IV, claims that personal distress, properly 
managed, does not interfere with prosocial action, and rather, that it may be a primary 
motivator to help the other.  Self-other overlap is not limited to human relations, which is 
why we can feel empathy with other species, according to Preston and Hofelich (8).  
Many empathy theorists are concerned about the self-other overlap because they 
worry that it will lead to a self-focus and disable empathy from moving the subject to 
                                                          
14
 Personal distress will be discussed more fully in Chapter IV. 
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prosocial action (Amy Coplan 2011, 11).  Such theorists claim that empathy, properly so 
called, ought to exclude self entirely.  However, Preston and Hofelich claim that the 
interpenetration of neurophysiological systems does not justify theorizing discrete moral 
categories of self and other.  The self-other overlap does not appear to be a hindrance for 
prosocial action.  Like the other complexities of empathy it has the ambivalent potential 
to assist or hinder prosocial action depending on a variety of factors.  The  bi-directional 
empathic processes then, entail self-other overlap, and depend on other influences to 
become properly moral. 
Empathic accuracy may be impacted by the self-other overlap, however, so 
theorists have explored the implications of the relation of self and other for prosocial 
action.  Neuroscientists Jean Decety and Megan Meyer (2008) agree with the views of 
Preston and Hofelich (2011) that the overlap does not necessarily mean that the self is 
confused as to whether she feels her own or the other’s feelings, however.  Distinction 
between self and other is still intact.  It is the psychological clarity of the distinction 
between self and other, together with the empathic feelings, that can help motivate 
prosocial action, not a lack of overlapping feelings.  Decety and Meyer define empathy as 
“an affective response stemming from the understanding of another’s emotional state or 
condition similar to what the other person is feeling or would be expected to feel in the 
given situation, without confusion between self and other” (1053).  They describe some 
of the developmental aspects of empathy in relation to the question about self-other 
overlap.  As they explicate the neurophysiological underpinnings of empathy, they come 
to the conclusion that:   
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a number of components contribute to the experience of empathy: (a) affective 
sharing, a bottom-up process grounded in perception–action coupling and 
potentially underpinned by mirror neuron systems; (b) the ability to differentiate 
oneself from a perceived target, which relies on a sense of agency, self-, and other 
awareness, and likely involves frontoparietal and prefrontal circuits; and (c) 
executive functions instantiated in the prefrontal cortex (PFC),which operate as a 
top-down mediator, helping to regulate emotions and yield mental flexibility 
(1054). 
 
The three components that Decety and Meyer (2008) deem necessary for proper empathy 
are affective sharing, self-other distinction, and the ability to regulate and direct 
cognitive-affective processes for the goal of empathizing.   
Affective sharing is the sharing of feelings between self and other.  It is 
underpinned by the perception-action mimicry processes, in agreement with the earlier 
discussion on mirroring systems and bottom-up processing (1055).  Self-other 
differentiation is developmental.  Initially, the overlap is fairly blurred as in the emotional 
contagion of infants beginning to cry when they hear others cry.  Through development, a 
child’s affective sharing preserves a psychological distinctness of self and other, so she 
no longer dissolves into despair when another toddler cries.  Decety and Meyer claim that 
a level of cognitive-affective control is necessary in order for the empathizer to focus on 
the one in need.  This requires development of the relevant cognitive functions and 
socialization as to how to guide and regulate affect and awareness (1059).  Regulation is 
an important part of our automatic processes, and emotions assist us in regulating our 
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conscious experience.  Decety and Meyer recount that Darwin and others since have 
noted the role that the emotions play in evaluating and reporting the status of social life, 
homeostasis being the goal.  Social cognition is instigated by the body (1075). 
Thus it is that social cognition needs maturation, experience, and training.  Mature 
and sincere empathy is not possible without developmentally appropriate social skills.  
Decety joins psychologist Sara Hodges (2006) in discussing the complexity of the 
cognitive-affect of empathy. They indicate two primary components of empathy that 
most theorists agree on: “(1) an affective response to another person, which may (but not 
always) entail sharing that person’s emotional state; and (2) a cognitive capacity to take 
the other person’s perspective” (103).  They seek to identify the “fundamental neural 
mechanisms” on which empathy is based (103).  As humans, we have the same basic 
neural structure in our brains and throughout our bodies.  This shared neural structure 
facilitates our ability to have shared representations of patterns of actions between subject 
and target, which can trigger empathy.  Representations will be informed by cultural 
styles.  As was stated above, shared experience tends to improve shared representation.  
“Shared representations rely on common neural coding associated with the perception 
and performance of actions.”  For example, emotions seen in facial expressions evoke 
similar expressions on observer’s faces (104).  We saw this in Marco Iacoboni’s 
discussion of the basketball game observers above.   
Without shared neural structures, empathy will be more difficult to achieve.  
Deficits in one’s own emotional capacity significantly limits one’s ability to perceive the 
other properly.  Jean Decety and Sara Hodges state the findings that, “Lesions of the 
amygdala may cause paired deficits in both the recognition of fear in facial expressions as 
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well as in the phenomenological experience of fear (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio and 
Damasio 1995)” (104).  So, damage in one’s ability to experience fear, that is to the 
amygdala, translates into an inability to recognize fear in another.  We need shared neural 
structures to recognize what we see in the other.   
As noted by theorist Karsten Steuber above, there seems to be a narrative quality 
to our empathic understandings.  Our stored ideas also play a role in our empathic skill, 
according to Sara Hodges.  Together with Lewis, et al., (2012), Hodges explored how 
stereotypes influence one’s inferences about another’s thoughts.  Some of our interpretive 
functions may be more behaviorally directed (reading the body), and others more 
inferentially directed (relying on stereotypes and other representative information).  They 
chose the stereotype of first time mothers to explore the effect of stereotypes on empathic 
accuracy and found that accuracy was improved by the frames of stereotypes (1042).  
“However, the gains in accuracy depended on the targets’ thoughts being consistent with 
stereotypes” (1044 emphasis mine).  Further study found that “perceivers used group-
based stereotypes to inform empathic inferences, which helped them to infer some (but 
not all) thoughts and feelings” (1045).  Interestingly, stereotypes diminished in usefulness 
with fuller knowledge of individual targets (1046).  Stereotypes are less useful in 
understanding the feelings and experiences of friends with whom we are more intimate. 
So it is that while reading others is primarily a bottom-up process, it may be that 
as we develop more cognitive skills and acquire more information from our cultural 
narratives, our sophistication and top-down processes can increase.  Perhaps, top-down 
processes are needed to adjust for novel developments.  And with sufficient experience, 
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the internalization of certain patterns of behavior is such that it requires a lesser degree of 
mimicry to lead to correct interpretations of others.   
So far, I have looked at a lot of discussion on the neurophysiological processes 
involved in empathic perception and its relation to prosocial action.  The indications of 
embodied cognition and embodied simulation give a compelling account of the way 
empathy works.  Such an understanding can lend insights into how empathy can be 
cultivated, both developmentally as children, and continuing throughout adulthood, as we 
assume responsibility for our own moral character development.   In the next section, I 
consider clues as to how we might improve the practice of empathic perception for 
individual and social wellbeing. 
Practical Empathy 
The developmental implications of empathy suggest that as a form of perception, 
it is altered by cultivation and experience.  The way in which empathic perception can 
mature into a skillful and sensitive responsivity returns me to considerations of the 
virtuous achievement of wu-wei from Chinese thought.  Wu-wei is well characterized as 
“effortless action” because it is not non-acting but acting in a very particular kind of way, 
without force or self-conscious impediments, and instead exhibiting a spontaneous 
insight and skill in fulfilling the requirements of the task.  A calligrapher whose well- 
practiced performance has become natural, spontaneous, and even improvisational, 
exhibits a wu-wei kind of excellence.  As mentioned in Chapter I, Mihalyi 
Csiktsentmihalyi claims that it is the repetition of the performance that eventually allows 
the clunky conscious processes to recede into the background as the automatic processes, 
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well-practiced in the performance, take over and we subjects can relax into the 
movement.   
One is no longer thinking, but doing, and awkward self-consciousness slips away, 
as one loses oneself in the performance of the task or skill.  Empathy, as a form of 
intuition, if properly trained and practiced well, can be performed like a musical or dance 
improvisation.  Skillful empathy might spontaneously respond to the nuances of social 
situations with attentiveness, grace, and moral excellence.  “[S]omeone who is truly 
committed to the values of his society has completely downloaded them into his 
embodied mind.”  Proof that this internalization process is complete “shows in the sages 
whose faces are ‘as smooth and untroubled as infants’” (Slingerland 2014, 190).   
This is a long process, obviously.  Beginning with basic attachment, infants 
protruding their tongues in mimicry at their loving caregivers will need years of guidance 
and correction to develop their capacities for proper empathic perception.  The 
automaticity that is achieved with mastery of a skill, facilitates the ease of these 
perceptions.  Habit is the internalization of a practice, once consciously engaged, which 
our automatic processes can now take over.  Automaticity can, unfortunately, also allow 
unproductive or unhelpful habits to persist without critical reflection.  We fall into bad 
social habits.  The profound sociality of empathy suggests to me that it is an ideal site for 
shifting automatic preconscious attitudes to be in better accord with our conscious values.   
Haidt, Hume, de Waal, Gallese, and many of the theorists above, claim that we 
are not only social, but profoundly social.  Our profound intersubjectivity is active even 
when we are alone in the privacy of our own spaces; those spaces are shot through with 
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our sociality.  Everything we touch, taste, or divert ourselves with is the product of 
visible and invisible social relations, from the books we read, the computers we use, to 
the food we eat, tended, picked, and perhaps prepared by unknown hands.  Even our 
ideas are not our own, but are formed, informed, deformed, and reformed by our 
culture—for good or for ill.  Empathy is how we understand and navigate these social 
spaces.  Like our five senses, empathy functions as an interpretive and communicative 
tool.  The evidence of the data surveyed in this chapter leads me to the view that the 
cultivation of morality depends on the cultivation of certain feelings, perceptions, and 
responses which are bound up with empathy.  We have yet to explore, however, how 
empathy can grow, or what attracts empathy toward growth.  What is the influence of the 
imagination on empathy, or empathy on the imagination?  Any cultivation project will 
need to appeal to the imaginative qualities of empathy so as to draw it into the shaping 
influences.  I will thus turn to philosophical and aesthetic theorists to help us understand 
the experience of empathy which may shed light on its relation to the moral imagination.  
We begin with Theodore Lipps, the 19
th
 century aesthetician, who brought the term 
empathy and the experience of it to the attention of aesthetic, psychological and 
philosophical thinkers.  Aesthetic experience, experience of the senses, leads empathic 
perception into the worlds of others.  What is revealed through empathy is not only our 
deep dependence on one another, but also the shared reality that binds us together, bodies 
and heart-minds.  The nature of such experiences may be the tipping point between 
helping, hindering, or ignoring the other. 
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CHAPTER III 
SEEING THE OTHER:  
EMPATHIC PERCEPTION AND PROFOUND INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
In a word, I am now with my feeling of activity, entirely and wholly in the moving figure.  
Even spatially, if we can speak of the spatial extent of the ego, I am in its place.  I am 
transported into it.  I am, so far as my consciousness is concerned, entirely and wholly 
identical with it. Thus feeling myself active in the observed human figure, I feel also in it 
free, facile, proud. This is esthetic imitation and this imitation is at the same time 
esthetic empathy. 
~ Theodore Lipps   
 
Human feeling is like the mighty rivers that bless the earth: it does not wait for beauty —  
it flows with resistless force and brings beauty with it. 
 
My own experience and development deepen everyday my conviction that our moral 
progress may be measured by  
the degree in which we sympathize with individual suffering and individual joy. 
~George Eliot   
Empathy and Imagination 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the way empathy works neurophysiologically, 
and some of the implications of that for ethical regard for the other.  What we have not 
looked at is what the experience of empathy feels like, what it does to us as subjects, or 
how it impacts our comportment in the intersubjective experience.  As the epigraph above 
suggests, empathic experiences can sometimes lead to a kind of transport out of self-
concern.  Engrossed, even entranced, by the one engaging our empathic attention, we 
forget self, forget thinking, and maybe even forget our bodies.  We feel only our 
absorption in the experience.  While most empathic experiences are fairly mundane, they 
facilitate understanding of our world, social and environmental. 
 In the previous chapter, we saw that empathy is a form of perception and as such, 
interacts with other forms of perception.  The American Psychological Association 
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defines perception as “the processes that organize information in the sensory image and 
interpret it as having been produced by properties of objects or events in the external, 
three-dimensional world.”15  This is a good starting point insofar as it describes the 
variety of perceptual duties and leaves open the element of consciousness in perception.  
What it leaves out, however, is the way in which perception is actively engaging the 
world by selecting what it looks at, interpreting, judging, and responding to it.  I am 
interested in both the receptive and the active functions of empathic perception.   
Much of perception is below the level of consciousness.  Proprioception is the 
form of perception that enables us to walk, balance, and physically navigate the world.  It 
is not something that we very often need to be conscious of unless something disrupts 
habitual performance.  If one closes one’s eyes and attempts to touch one’s nose with an 
extended hand, one does not immediately find the nose because human proprioception 
relies heavily on sight.  If the ground is irregular, one will also pay conscious attention to 
the alterations so as to adjust step, etc.  So it seems to be with other forms of perception.  
Once we habituate to a perceptual field, whether jogging on sidewalks, mountain biking, 
or driving in rural or urban areas, we are often able to navigate movement and terrain 
without conscious awareness, or perhaps only fleeting awareness.  This is the usefulness 
of automaticity for perception, but of course it is an achievement of cultivation and 
practice.  Many hours are needed behind the wheel of a car for one to automatically 
navigate traffic well.  That is how the habits necessary to the task are formed. 
                                                          
15
 Definition of Perception from: http://www.apa.org/research/action/glossary.aspx?tab=16  
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Habit is precisely how perception is cultivated; repetition in experience is what 
facilitates habitual automaticity.  As a young person, unfamiliar with painting as an art 
form, seeing Van Gogh’s Sunflowers may not signify much.  The meaning of Van 
Gogh’s style, his play with color, texture, perspective, and so on, do not usually strike the 
young/inexperienced observer as significant.  Only when we understand something about 
painting, color, light, perhaps a little about art, or art history, or the meaning of 
representation and non-representational art, etc., will the piece begin to speak more fully 
to the observer.  One literally cannot see what one is looking at.  So, we must learn to see.  
Then gradually, aspects of a painting can emerge for us as meaningful elements of the 
whole, deepening our experience of the painting and perhaps, even of life itself.  
Empathic perception, like other forms of perception, has its roots in our neurophysiology, 
but can be developed and refined.  As we train the ear to hear the tones and rhythms of a 
particular style of music, or the eye to appreciate the stylistic patterns and uses of color in 
painting, so can empathic perception be shaped and refined for moral sensitivity and 
responsiveness.  In the last chapter, I suggested that the empathic perception might be 
touched and moved by imaginative engagements.  In this chapter, I would like to explore 
the imaginative potential of empathy as a means of shaping it for moral life.  I begin by 
looking at the Confucian ideal of benevolence which is the matured development of basic 
empathy (Mengzi/Mencius calls this compassion).  
A Story of Empathic Perception: Limits and Possibilities 
The ancient Confucians were very interested in developing the virtues, and 
advocated for programs of aesthetic practices, accompanied by study of the poetry and 
thought from history, to facilitate such development.  The famous Confucian, Mengzi 
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(Mencius), noticed the way in which seeing and hearing mattered for morality.  He 
pointed out how perception was a matter of inclusion and exclusion, how we tend to see 
what we expect to see and overlook the rest.  In his view, our perception could be shaped 
to include more of the meaningful elements of a given moral situation.  Such shaping is 
necessary, according to Mengzi, to grow our “moral sprouts.”  In Mengzi’s (2001) view, 
we are all born with the potential for virtue in the form of moral sprouts.  Among them 
are the nascent inclinations to care for others, which he calls compassion, but which I 
think compares to empathy as I am using it here.   
The sprouts are the basis of being human, but developing them is necessary for 
becoming humane.   “If one knows how to fill them all out, it will be like a fire starting 
up, a spring breaking through!  If one can merely fill them out, they will be sufficient to 
care for all within the Four Seas.  If one merely fails to fill them out, they will be 
insufficient to serves one’s parents” (2A6).  Filling them out is growing them into their 
mature states, which for the sprout of compassion is benevolence. And if one does not do 
this, one will not have sufficient virtue to perform the most natural task of caring for 
one’s parents.  So, undeveloped moral sprouts are fairly disastrous for wellbeing. 
Compassion is a moral sprout of much importance for Mengzi.  In his discourse 
with King Xuan of Qi, he elaborates on its vital importance to genuine rulership.  The 
Confucians were concerned with just governance as a means to creating social order and 
harmony.  A just ruler is analogous to (and an exemplar for) an individual’s self-
governance, a father’s governance of his family, etc.  Cultivation of compassion, the bud 
of social feelings and impulses, is essential for the maturation of morality.  When 
cultivated, compassion matures into the virtue (de) of benevolence, or ren.   
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For the Confucians, de, like the Latin virtue, connotes strength, and like the Greek 
arête, connotes excellence.  De adds the quality of moral power, or charisma.  
Developing the virtues allows one to have a personal strength and moral appeal.  
Compassion is a leading virtue, especially for leadership, and so one of Mengzi’s 
followers recorded the following story.   He tells a story of his encounter with King Xuan 
of Qi.  King Xuan comes to Mengzi to ask whether he has the right de, or virtue, to be 
king.  Mengzi had previously heard from the king’s attendant Hu He of a situation that 
exhibited the king’s moral sprout of compassion.  In a recent bell consecration ceremony, 
as they brought the ox for sacrifice, the king was distressed. 
The King was sitting up in his hall.  There was an ox being led past below.  The 
King saw it and said, “Where is the ox going?”  “We are about to consecrate a 
bell with its blood.”  The King said, “Spare it.  I cannot bear its frightened 
appearance, like an innocent going to the execution ground.”  “So should we 
abandon the consecrating of the bell?” The King said, “How can that be 
abandoned?  Exchange it for a sheep.” Mengzi (Mencius) 1A7 Lines 14-21 
When King Xuan later asks Mengzi what is necessary to be king, Mengzi relays this 
event, pointing to the king’s compassion for the ox.  “This feeling is sufficient to be a 
king…I knew that Your Majesty could not bear the frightened appearance of the ox” 
(Mengzi 1A7). More is needed, however, to be what Mengzi calls a “genuine king.”  This 
basic compassion for the ox is the sprout of the de of benevolence, the generous and 
practical regard for all who are within one’s province of responsibility and concern.  
Benevolence motivates a man to care for his aging parents, for his wife and children; and 
that benevolence is expressed in the attentiveness given to cultivating the moral sprouts 
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in one’s children and the children of one’s state.  Compassion is innate, but benevolence 
requires the work of cultivation. 
Mengzi praises the king’s regard for the ox.  The king laughs at himself 
wondering at his concern for the ox, “What was this feeling really?!...the commoners 
…say I was stingy.”  “This is just the way benevolence works,” Mengzi says.  The 
generosity of benevolence extends to all whom it sees.  Mengzi reveals the king to 
himself, showing his regard for the fear and suffering of the ox.  As the king muses on his 
feeling and Mengzi’s interpretation of it, he is reminded of an Ode,  
“Another person had the heart,  
But I measured it.”16  
“This describes you.” The king says to Mengzi. “I was the one who did it.  I reflected and 
sought it out, but did not understand my heart.  You spoke and in my heart there was a 
feeling of compassion.”  What is happening here between Mengzi and the king will be 
important in later chapters as we look at the role of reflection and guidance in the 
development of empathy.  What we see here is that the king’s understanding of the nature 
of empathy and empathic experience is growing, and Mengzi uses this opportunity to 
help stretch the king’s empathic perception, to help him see more. 
Praising the king’s compassion for the ox, Mengzi begins to draw the king’s eye 
to other aspects of the scene, which the king had overlooked.  He points out that while it 
is virtuous that the king had compassion for the ox, such compassion did not extend to 
                                                          
16
 Mao #198. 
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the sheep.  Slowly, Mengzi reveals the most important aspect that the king is not seeing 
in his rulership.  Mengzi states, “your kindness is sufficient to read birds and beasts, but 
the benefits do not reach the commoners.”  Mengzi shows how the deficiencies in 
governance have left the commoners without proper structures such that they themselves 
may pursue de.  They are too busy tending to the indulgences of government officials to 
have proper time and resources to meet the needs of their families and communities 
(Mengzi 1A7).  The resultant disharmony leads not only to a lack of flourishing for the 
commoners but for the king, as well. 
Mengzi understood that the king’s problem was not a problem of sentiment so 
much as problem of an uncultivated perception.  Not only does he help the king to see 
what he has been not seeing, but also to understand his own responsibility for the failure, 
and further, the risks in not seeing things properly (acting self-indulgently denies him the 
protections of honor, leaving him open to violent rebellion).  This problem of not seeing 
properly has limited the king’s ability to fulfill his duty as moral leader of the people.  
This is a failure of imagination according novelists George Eliot and Henry James.
17
   
Perception and imagination are bound up with one another in our intersubjective 
relations as ways of seeing the actual—as the king saw the suffering of the ox—and the 
possible—as the king envisioned relieving that suffering.  Through our empathic 
perception we feel feelings resonant with the feelings and experiences of the other.  
Empathy infected the king with the feelings of anxiety that he read in the behavior and 
cries of the ox, but it also motivated him to find a solution to relieve both the ox and 
himself from the distress.  Empathy provokes the sense of experience from the 
                                                          
17
 See Mill on the Floss, Eliot, & The Golden Bowl, James. 
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perspective of another and proffers meaningful ways of navigating that experience.  This 
imaginative component of empathy is the source of not only our fellow feeling, but can 
be a profound sense of recognition of the meaning and import of the subjectivity of the 
other with whom we feel.  Mengzi is aiding the king’s dullness of sight to a keener vision 
by appealing to his imagination.  He helps the king to begin to see the people of his 
realm. 
Understanding the imaginative aspect of this experience provides understanding 
of how empathic perception can be led to see, to pay attention, and to appreciate the 
meaning of what is seen.  In the next section, I will look at the thought of Theodore 
Lipps, who brought the concept of empathy to the discourses of philosophy, aesthetics, 
and psychology.  Lipps, the 19
th
 century aesthetician who instigated much discussion 
with regard to empathy, elucidated the phenomenological experience of empathy.  What 
is important about his contribution for my work is his elucidation of the way in which we 
enter the world of the other.  Lipps shows how we empathically feel like we are in the 
other’s body. 
Theodore Lipps and Einfühlung 
Lipps’ word for this experience of empathy is Einfühlung (Lipps 1979), which 
literally means “feeling into” (Coplan and Goldie 2011, xiii).  This is distinct from 
Einsfühlung, which is “feeling one with” (Coplan and Goldie 2011,xiii).18 According to 
                                                          
18
 In the introduction to Empathy: Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives Amy Coplan and Peter 
Goldie explain that it was Edward Titchener who was elaborating on Lipps’ themes and introduced the 
term empathy in English in 1909 borrowing from the Greek empatheia: “Not only do I see gravity and 
modesty and pride and courtesy and stateliness, but I feel or act them in the mind’s muscle.  That is, I 
suppose, a simple case of empathy, if we may coin that term as a rendering of Einfühlung” (Coplan & 
Goldie 2011, xiii). 
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Lipps, Einfühlung is experienced as if we were inside the body of another, or inside a the 
scene of a painting.  As an empathic observer of art, we feel into the object, experiencing 
the perturbations of the piece from that vantage point.  We may strain with the body of 
Laocoon as he writhes with his sons avoiding the snake’s fangs.  Or we may feel the 
sweet peace of a bucolic painting.  The piece of art entices us into it imaginatively, and 
our viscera respond to the imagined world suggested by the piece.  Lipps elucidates the 
dynamic relation between the viewer and the object of art as a “…projection into definite 
sorts of objects, especially into the movements, postures, and positions of man, whether 
real or represented in sculpture” (Lipps 1979, 371).  Lipps claims that we respond 
empathically to art as we do to other humans because, “aesthetic objects elicit the same 
responses in us that are elicited by expressions and movements of the body, and we 
project these inner subjective qualities onto them” (Coplan and Goldie 2011, xii).   
Lipps identifies the salient feature of empathy as an inner experience that takes 
one out of oneself and into another.  The object (human or aesthetic) is not the cause of 
the empathic response: “Rather, the cause of esthetic enjoyment is myself, or the ego” 
(Lipps, 371).  When we are moved by art, we feel into the other (work of art/artist), thus 
experiencing “esthetic empathy” as if from within the other.  It is not a passive 
experience, but one that not only evokes pleasure, but also provokes an urge to yield or 
resist.  Lipps describes his own experience of watching someone extend her arm.  He 
feels a resonance in his own arm as an active striving.  He feels both effort and resistance 
in his own muscle.  This is not mere observing.  “Different is the doing or the activity, the 
endeavor, the striving, the succeeding, that I feel.  These belong to the ego; more than 
that, they are the ego or constitute it: I feel myself active” (Lipps 1979,. 373).  This 
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esthetic imitation, as he describes it, has a voluntary quality.  The willful element is 
evidence of the ego’s involvement.  This experience is not yet “esthetic empathy,” 
however because in esthetic empathy will is lost and forgotten.  Because I still feel the 
inclinations of will, it is only imitation, not yet esthetic empathy, in which one loses 
oneself and one’s ego.  It should be noted that Lipps’ account is not in full agreement 
with embodied simulation, but I think that he helps to draw out into relief some of the 
salient feelings involved in the experience of empathy. 
In esthetic imitation, one may still be aware of oneself, whereas in esthetic 
empathy, the subject is transformed.  One does not feel oneself, but is alive only to the 
feelings of the empathic encounter.  The deep absorption of the subject evokes powerful 
feelings devoid of conceptualizing categories, only pure feeling.  He calls this 
“contemplation" and indeed it is the person, piece of art, architectural structure, etc., that 
has engaged one, but one is not contemplating as a separate subject, on his view.  One has 
forgotten oneself, and conceptual thought in general, in the absorption.  This is why the 
experience is not felt as sensation per se.  “…sense-feelings…do not in any way enter 
into esthetic contemplation and into esthetic enjoyment.  It absolutely belongs to the 
nature of esthetic contemplation to eliminate them” (Lipps 1979, 378).  The sense-
feelings seem to refer to bodily awareness which is lost in the other or object.  The 
engagement in contemplation forgets self and self-concern. 
From the initially imitative position, one may surrender, or succumb to the 
absorption.  “[T]he more I surrender in contemplation to the esthetic 
object…preoccupations disappear entirely from my consciousness.  I am completely and 
wholly carried away from this sphere of my experience” (Ibid. 376).  As self-awareness 
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recedes, the joy of the experience floods in, even when it is full of sorrow, there is a kind 
of joy.  “The sorrow is empathized” (Ibid. 378).  Though he does not say so explicitly in 
this article, it seems that the transformative quality of the experience marks the 
empathizer in an enduring way.  There is a flavor of mystical or spiritual experience in 
this aesthetic engagement.  He uses the word unity several times.  “The two are simply 
one” (Ibid. 375).   As one is projected into the other, one is altered by it.  “In a word, I am 
now with my feeling of activity entirely and wholly in the moving figure” (Ibid. 377). 
The will impedes esthetic empathy, for Lipps, because one cannot be completely 
absorbed if one is holding back.  “The more I am absorbed in the contemplation of the 
seen movement the more involuntary will be the imitation…I am no longer conscious of 
my outward imitation” (Lipps 1979, 374-375). 
This point about surrender is important to the experience of empathy.  In the final 
chapter of this work, I explore the nature of surrender in empathy.  I will suggest that a 
giving over to the empathic encounter or aesthetic absorption is necessary for the fullness 
of the experience to do cultivation work.  There is something in this experience of the 
loss of self that seems to be a useful aid for growth.  There is resonance between Lipps’ 
description of absorption and Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi’s description of flow.  In both 
experiences, as these thinkers describe them, there is a loss of self, absorbed in the work 
or the other.  Lipps’ point about surrender is relevant also because surrender is necessary 
for performing a familiar task in that we have to let our body do it for us.  Finally, note 
that there is an element of risk in the idea of surrender.  Risk will be an important 
obstacle for empathy, so cultivation practices will need to aid us in facing risk. 
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The more famous example of Lipps’ empathic experience of a tightrope walker 
describes a complete absorption in what he sees.  His body’s tense reverberations of 
holding his breath, and anxious fear, and exhilaration, were thrilling Lipps with the same 
sense of danger that the walker himself might feel (de Waal 2006, 65).  While Lipps 
speaks of unity and describes the qualities of absorption as if from within the body of the 
other, it is not clear what he believes the import of the experience may be.  Is his anxiety 
really from the perspective of the tightrope walker, or from his own concern for the 
tightrope walker?  My own experience of watching fearful feats of daring is that I am 
totally engrossed in watching them, tensing with them at every moment, but my fear is 
for them.  I fear that they will fall and my subsequent sadness would be for their loss.  
My anxiety and concern, while manifesting a strong reaction and maybe a very similar 
one to the acrobat’s, still express from my point-of-view as a spectator rather than from 
his aerial view.  I do not disagree that my body is responding with a resonant anxiety to 
the tension of the acrobat, but I am not sure that it is right to say that it is the same.  It 
may be, however, that I am too worried for the safety of the acrobat to be able to 
surrender sufficiently to the empathic experience.  Nevertheless, Lipps’ account of 
empathy reveals a profound sociality in human nature that helps us to appreciate its 
import for the self-other relation, and that other thinkers have since developed.   
Primordial Intersubjectivity and the Perception of Subjectivity 
Phenomenologists Edith Stein and Max Scheler both agree with Lipps that 
empathy is foundational to aesthetic and social cognition.  Neither agree with him that 
there is a fusion of self in the experience of the other.  Each has different ways of 
characterizing the role of empathy for social relations.  Scheler picks up Lipps’ insights 
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by focusing on the moral and humanitarian implications of empathy, while Stein is more 
interested in the way empathy helps us to understand each other in a deep, full-bodied, 
and possibly mystical, way.  Scheler regards sympathy, which seems to be equivalent to 
the broader understanding of empathy as we are discussing it, as a moral foundation and a 
means for creating more humane relations among people.  It is not necessarily itself 
moral, but it is also decidedly not projected empathy as Lipps claims.  Stein seems to be 
more interested in the spiritual potential of intimacy between people, the special way in 
which we know someone.  I will begin by discussing Scheler’s thought and follow with 
Stein’s who continues the conversation which Lipps and Scheler began.   
Scheler (1913/2008) lays out the forms of sympathetic responsivity in such a way 
as to give insight to the possibilities for empathy, and also, perhaps, levels of empathic 
development.  In The Nature of Sympathy, Scheler gives a phenomenological account of 
the various forms of sympathy, and esteems benevolence as the developed sensibility 
born of fellow-feeling.  The five kinds of sympathy one may have are: identification, 
vicarious emotion, fellow feeling, love of humanity or benevolence, and non-cosmic 
personal and divine love (96).  Identification is seeing oneself as in the situation of the 
other, regarding what that would be like.  An example of negative identification, 
according to Scheler, is the Buddhist view that all is suffering, whether one is suffering 
oneself or not.  On his view, the Buddhist ethos identifies with the suffering of all who 
suffer (79).  Identification is a feeling of likeness or connection that is below the level of 
consciousness.  In a positive view, Scheler describes the identification that people have 
with nature or with the divine (82-83).  This discussion is in the chapter “Unity with the 
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Cosmos” and identification describes the experience of unity (83).  Nature mysticism 
would be inspired by a felt identification with nature. 
Identification provides the ground for vicarious feeling which is the infection of 
the subject with the feelings of the one observed.  Such feelings may only be partially 
felt.  Scheler explains their relation as follows:  
[T]he total subjective field (A) of which the vicariously felt emotion forms part 
must at least be accessible to identification on the part of the vicariously 
participating subject (B)…Hence such an identification may be either concrete or 
abstract, and this to any degree. I can identify myself with the animate universe, 
with mankind as a whole…without [including] all the particular emotional states 
actually possessed by the subject with whom I identify (1913, 96-97). 
Whereas identification is a non-conscious bodily process that occurs automatically, 
vicarious feeling is enabled by the choice to take up the feeling of the other and allow 
ourselves to feel them.  One might, for example, find oneself feeling identifying feelings 
with someone crying at a funeral.  She has lost her husband and has young children.  I 
find that I identify with her as a mother of young children and join her more fully in the 
vicarious feeling of how I would feel in her situation if I’d lost my husband.  I could have 
quelled the rising identifying feelings if I did not want to enter into the pain of such a 
possibility.  I could have retained my composure at a safe distance despite the 
inclinations of identification. 
Vicarious feeling is consciously noted as various feeling states following 
identification.  This in turn underlies fellow-feeling, which is a recognition of the other as 
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like oneself.  Scheler distinguishes fellow-feeling from Lipps’ view of empathy insofar as 
the feeling is on behalf of the other, not felt within oneself.  That is to say, it is more 
relationally instigated rather than a product of one’s absorption with the aesthetic 
stimulus which the other provides.  In my example of the funeral, if I remain in vicarious 
feeling, I remain in absorption with my own anxieties about the possibilities of losing my 
partner and do not take the further step of joining the widow in her grief.  Fellow-feeling 
reaches out to the other, embracing what she must be feeling.  I may remain resonant in 
my understanding of how I would feel, but my focus is on her suffering.  Vicarious 
feeling has the potential danger of excessive self-focus in personal distress, getting 
caught up in one’s own feeling to the point that it supersedes one’s ability to care about 
the other.  Fellow-feeling avoids this pitfall by focusing on the other. 
Scheler distinguishes fellow-feeling from community of feeling, which is a shared 
feeling such as two parents would have at the loss of their child.  Fellow-feeling does not 
share the qualities of the community suffering because, as in my example above, it is not 
my husband who has died.  Community of feeling is experienced when we have 
immediately shared interests.  Fellow-feeling may not yet get one to prosocial action, 
because one does not feel at stake in the suffering—again it is not my husband who has 
died.  So I may not do anything to mitigate her situation going forward.  Taking an active 
interest in the other’s needs or concerns requires something beyond fellow-feeling 
(Scheler 1913, 12-13).   
Fellow-feeling provides for the development of the sentiment and experience that 
will motivate personal response to the other.  One must achieve the level of benevolence 
(humanitas) to feel troubled on behalf of another (8, 98-99).  Benevolence is the sense of 
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community of feeling as regards all humans and the recognition of the other as a subject 
(98).  Fellow-feeling can extend to animals, but benevolence cannot since, by definition, 
it is love of humanity only.  The unfortunate limitation of this view is that it does not 
capture what Franz de Waal has aptly shown regarding the continuum of empathy 
between humans and many animal species.  Not only are we able to feel with our animal 
cousins, perhaps deeply, but our shared neurophysiology makes it possible for them to 
empathize with us, too (de Waal 2006, 118-157)
19
.  In the last chapter, we saw how 
concern for the vulnerable, a primal urge that helps us protect human infants, extends to 
include many young animals, especially fellow mammals.  And there are many anecdotes 
of animals caring for the young of another species indicating that they have a similar 
capacity to extend regard beyond their own species.  Dogs show signs of distress when 
their owners are hurt or upset.  While non-human animal empathy may be less complex 
than our forms of empathy, their capacity for the empathic intelligence and care admit of 
greater inclusion in our benevolent regard than Scheler may have understood. 
Benevolence, for Scheler (1913), does, however, extend to all humanity 
unprejudically.  “A genuine love of humanity does not discriminate between fellow-
countrymen and foreigners, the virtuous and the criminal, the racially superior and 
inferior, the cultured and the uncouth or between good and bad generally.  Like fellow-
feeling, benevolence embraces all men, simply because they are men, though marking 
them off distinctly from the lower animals and from God” (99).  Non-cosmic personal 
love is a spiritual regard for the other, related, he claims, to theism.  This love is love of 
neighbor as a spiritual person, and like the other sympathetic feelings, builds upon its 
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 In de Waal’s chapter “Oscar the Cat,” de Waal describes the uncanny ability of Oscar to detect when 
someone was dying. 
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predecessor benevolence (99-102).  It is the highest regard for the other that one can 
experience.  According to Scheler, one cannot have either fellow-feeling or benevolence 
for fictional subjects, so its aesthetic reach is more limited than Lipps’ view.   
These various forms of sympathy are the basis not only for our relationships, but 
also for self-understanding as emergent in sociality.  In contrast to Lipps’ view that 
empathic experience is a projection, Scheler views the experience as between two 
subjectivities; we do not “transfer something of our own mind and life onto and into the 
body of others” (Scheler 1913, xxxix).  Scheler’s view of the range of sympathetic 
responses is more interactive between subjects.  One is not merely motivated by one’s 
own fascination and absorption by the other’s movement, but is rather being moved by 
the other.  It is more like an ekstasis, or Platonic eros, taking one outside oneself.  Rather 
than the motive force coming from the ego, as Lipps describes, for Scheler, the subject is 
propelled out toward the other by the imposition of the other’s feeling on himself.  
Scheler’s view seems to accord with the science that claims that the body responds first; 
the experience begins involuntarily (de Waal 2009, 27).  The feeling imposing itself on 
the subject is what enables our understanding of very basic to highly complex feelings.  
This view of the phenomenon of fellow-feeling is based on a very different view of how 
we know ourselves and each other.  Rather than beginning with a solid and clear 
knowledge of self as most Western philosophers assume, for Scheler, even self is 
uncertain. 
For Scheler (1913), intersubjectivity is prior to subjectivity.  Scheler thinks that 
our common sense understanding that we know ourselves and each other fairly easily is 
mistaken.  In his view, self-perception emerges only within the relations of fellow-
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feeling.  And that knowledge of the other is similarly complex.  “Originally, the 
experience of self and…others is in no way differentiated…there is one broad roaring 
stream of living in which he is totally immersed…Even when we come to integrate our 
own self…we continue to see it against the background of a surviving, although 
progressively receding, common consciousness which contains…the experience of 
others…[and] the self” (250).  We come to understand ourselves as selves in and through 
these intersubjective experiences.   
Our self-understanding is not a given.  We become who we are through 
intersubjective engagement.  For Scheler, empathic experience offers understanding of 
the self as well as of the other.  Self is not a secure edifice from which one engages the 
mystery of the other.  In this way, he contrasts his view with the predominant views of 
mind-reading theorists.  Scheler uses the term empathy, based on his reading of Lipps and 
like-minded projection theorists, in his critique of the basis on which they found their 
inference views, namely that the subject is known to herself transparently, and from that 
solid ground can project her inner knowledge onto the other. 
It is a fundamental weakness of theories which seek to derive our 
knowledge of other minds from inferences or processes of empathy, that 
they have an inveterate tendency to underestimate the difficulty of self-
knowledge, just as they over-estimate the difficultly of knowing other 
people...so that Nietzsche, for example, could utter the pregnant words, 
‘everyman is farthest of all from himself’…this is just because [everyman] 
is closest to himself in practice (Ibid. 251).  
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For Scheler, we are unfolding to ourselves and rely on the intersubjective relations to 
develop an understanding of ourselves.  As one’s selfhood matures through multiple and 
myriad intersubjective relations, one is able to develop a more mature regard for the 
other.   
Fellow-feeling is a more advanced achievement than basic sympathy (or what I 
am calling empathy) since it is not automatic and entails a response to the well-being (or 
not) of another.  Fellow-feeling can develop into benevolence as an outgrowth of loving 
familial and community relationships.  Love is not mere attachment to another.  If 
genuine, it is like a Platonic Eros that draws one out of oneself and toward the good in 
the other, which love manifests in both lover and beloved.  While the movement of 
sympathy and love follow the trajectory of Eros, the form of love is decidedly Christian.  
For Scheler, the God of the Bible is the source of such love and those wishing to see God 
as moral must follow  
Augustine, in treating love as the inmost essence of God Himself, and 
identifying Him as Infinite Love.  It is to this heart and centre of the 
Divine activity that His infinite mercy and absolute moral perfection 
belong as attributes. Hence there is but on basic moral relationship 
between men of good-will: as fellow-servants, partisans of a common 
Ideal and co-partners in a common Love (164). 
 
So for Scheler, we are profoundly intersubjective, and our self-understanding is shaped in 
and through our intersubjective relations.  On a cosmic level, relations with the divine 
infuse our worldly relations with depth of concern and responsibility for the other.   
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Lipps’ view, according to Scheler, lacks depth of concern for the other.  He 
worries about a kind of “auto-eroticism” or solipsism in empathic projection as Lipps 
describes it.  He cites a Lippsian brand of sympathy:  “The compassionate man finds in 
the suffering of others a corresponding solace for his own discomforts” (Scheler 1913, 
52).  In response to theorists who claim that benevolent love grows out of romantic love, 
he argues that romantic/sexual love is focused on the self.  Benevolent love, and non-
cosmic personal love, however, are entirely focused on, and absorbed by, concern for the 
other, not as object, but as a unique and precious subjectivity.  “Love calls explicitly for 
an understanding entry into the individuality of another person distinct in character from 
the entering self…coupled indeed with a warm and whole-hearted endorsement of ‘his’ 
reality as an individual, and ‘his’ being what he is” (70 Emphasis mine).  Receptivity to 
the subjectivity of the other, and her concerns taken up as important to me, is vital to this 
kind of relating for Scheler.  So, generic fellow-feeling must be developed to be 
receptive, responsive, and adaptive to the need and invitation of the other. 
For Scheler, the experience of the other received through the medium of fellow-
feeling, then responded to with benevolence, is deeply charged with moral feeling and 
obligation.  This obligation is a kind of attentiveness to the reality of the other for who 
she herself is, rather than my projections of her.  Arguably, he is attempting to explicate 
the phenomenon of religious compassion, inspired by Christian thought and mysticism, 
particularly in the description of Kierkegaard’s love of neighbor.  There is a level of 
earnestness that goes beyond the more basic forms and expressions of sympathetic 
regard.  Scheler’s view of empathy then moves beyond Lipps’ interest in the phenomenon 
105 
 
of experiencing the other’s feelings into profounder humanistic and existential concerns 
of deep and genuine relating in social and personal life. 
Edith Stein (1917/1989), though less focused on the moral implications of the 
encounter with the other than Scheler, similarly sees empathy as a site of profound 
insight into the other as a subject.  Among other aspects Stein looks at “empathy as the 
cognitive source of foreign experience” (1).  She uses the term “foreign” to designate 
experiences that originate with the other.  She agrees with Scheler that it is an experience 
provoked by the external stimuli of another person and her experience, in contrast to 
Lipps’ view of the experience as originating in the self.  Empathy is not a projection, as 
Lipps claims, but an encounter.  She also disagrees with Lipps’ view that empathy creates 
of a kind of union between the self and the other.  She objects to the assumption that the 
other is ever given wholly to us as if it were an inert object: “This individual is not given 
as a physical body, but as a sensitive, living body belonging to an ‘I,’ an ‘I’ that senses, 
thinks, feels, and wills.  The living body of this ‘I’ not only fits into my phenomenal 
world but is itself the center of orientation of such a phenomenal world.  It faces this 
world and communicates with me” (5).  For Stein, the phenomenon of the other is an 
encounter with a living human person.  The other’s inner life is communicated with a 
fullness and poignancy.  She uncovers an existential quality of subjectivity in the 
empathic encounter.   
It is in this way that Stein objects to the dormancy of Lipps’ other in his depiction 
of their givenness.  Such dormancy is not possible on Stein’s view because the self that is 
engaged by empathy is what she calls a pure I (38).  The pure I seems to be a 
metaphysical entity of sorts which is the subject of our personhood and which prevents us 
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from complete fusion, as Lipps’ claims, with the other.  Rather, our individual 
subjectivity is preserved for each of us through our respective pure Is. 
While Stein and Scheler agree that there is no fusion of subjects in empathy, Stein 
differs from Scheler in characterizing the pure I in a way perhaps more Husserlian and 
even Platonic.  Schler’s self cannot be fused because it is embodied, based on a dynamic 
relation between self and other, but Stein’s pure I is unfuseable because it is immutable.  
“Lipps says that as long as empathy is complete…there is no distinction between our own 
and the foreign ‘I,’ that they are one…This assertion is not only refuted by its 
consequences, but is also an evidently false description.  I am not one with the acrobat 
but only ‘at’ him” (Stein 1917, 16).  Stein draws a distinction in the quality of 
experiences as either primordial, that is, originating in me, the subject, or empathic, 
originating in the other and infecting me.   
This primordiality seems to be both qualitative and epistemic insofar as 1) one has 
what William James describes as an intimacy with one’s own inner feelings versus those 
of another, and 2) the understanding that one has of the other, through empathy, is neither 
as intimate nor unmediated.
20
  What Stein means by the distinction of primordial versus 
empathic is that the selfness of the subject remains.  One is not unclear about where the 
empathic feelings are coming from, i.e., the other.  “What led Lipps astray in his 
description was the confusion of self-forgetfulness, through which I can surrender myself 
to any object, with a dissolution of the ‘I’ in the object.  Thus, strictly speaking, empathy 
is not a feeling of oneness,” according to Stein (17).  The subject may forget herself, but 
                                                          
20
 It does seem that Scheler, by contrast, wants to allow for a kind of unmediated experience of the other. 
See Scheler 1913 pp.230-233. 
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she does not lose that self in fusion with the other.  She may experience a shared feeling, 
or a communion, but not a complete unity. 
Stein gives an example to show how the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ rise above respective 
individuality without losing agency.  If a political barrier such as fortress, that separates 
loved ones from each other, falls down, we all feel joy.  The subject feels both primordial 
and empathic joy because she has as much joy as those who have been separated from 
her.  “We all have ‘the same’ feeling…[but] I feel my joy while I empathically 
comprehend the others’…I empathically arrive at the ‘sides’ of joyfulness obstructed in 
my own joy…we empathically enrich our feeling so that ‘we’ now feel a different joy” 
(18-19 Emphasis mine).  This might be compared with what Scheler describes as 
community of feeling.  In this way, Stein helps us to see the way in which empathy, being 
not our own feeling, thus expands our feelings, teaching us new ‘sides’ of a feeling that 
our own perspective did not admit before.  In experiences in which we do not have shared 
interests, Stein contrasts with Lipps in claiming that it is not as full or as complete of a 
sharing
21
.  A lack of shared feeling can limit the depth or breadth of empathy.  If one does 
not care for sports, one will have a difficult time entering into the joy or sadness of the 
other who suffers due to game losses.  The feeling of loss, which is universal, can be 
shared, but not the specific emotional investment in sports. 
Stein gives an example of a subject receiving news of a friend who has passed an 
exam and how the subject rejoices with the friend.  The joy is empathic because it is not 
personal, meaning that it is not her own elation for passing her own exam.  She feels 
                                                          
21
 As shown in the previous chapter, the science bears this out.  Experience and neurophysiological 
limitations can limit empathy range. 
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empathic joy for her friend’s achievement. Stein shows the complexity of feeling by 
showing how we can feel torn by our primordial and empathic feelings.  She gives an 
example of a subject who is grieving a death, when a friend comes with joyful news, and 
how the subject’s overwhelming grief inhibits her sympathetic joy for her friend.  “This 
grief does not permit predominance of sympathy with joy.  There is [a phenomenal] 
conflict…involving two levels…And now the ‘I’ feels pulled toward two sides at once, 
both experiences claiming to be a ‘cogito’ in a specific sense (i.e., acts in which the ‘I’ 
lives and turns toward its object).  Both [experiences] seek to pull the ‘cogito’ into 
themselves…being split” (15).  The subject’s cogito is divided by two demanding 
sentiments but also by two ways of being in the world.  The subject feels her subjectivity 
as a cogito in being thus torn.  Like Scheler, Stein views empathic experience as 
formative of an ever-developing subjectivity, as well as complexly involving a dance 
between points-of-view.  Stein states that in the torn place one may be so happy for the 
friend that one’s own suffering weakens.  We have the opportunity of following either the 
primordial or the empathic invitation.  And depending on which path we follow, we may 
be altered (Stein 1917, 15-16). 
Scheler and Stein resonate in a kind of existential emphasis on something like a 
sacredness of subjectivity in their respective accounts.  Both have a religious kind of 
esteem and respect for the self and other, even as they emphasize different aspects of the 
communion of subjectivities.  They both owe to Lipps the insight that such deep 
experience of the other is possible through the experience of empathy.  While I disagree 
with Stein’s view of the pure I because as I have argued, empathy is a neurophysiological 
process, inseparable from the body, I agree with her insight into the subtle possibilities 
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between the self and other.  Her account invites further thought for ways in which 
empathy can be taught to see the other more fully.  In Stein’s account, we see the nuances 
of feeling and the barely perceptible ways in which our feelings follow a route depending 
on the intersubjective relation.  She opens for us the moments in which empathic 
perception is capable of being led.  In this way, I think that Stein’s metaphysics are not 
essential to her account of the phenomenon of intersubjective engagements. 
I agree with Scheler’s view of the self as emergent from within intersubjectivity, and 
even the apparent transience of that subjectivity.  [Inference theorists] have an inveterate 
tendency to under-estimate the difficulty of self-knowledge,” (Scheler 1913, 251).  His 
view resonates with how consciousness itself seems to operate, rising to awareness and 
slipping back into automaticity.  It also makes apparent how self-awareness can get in the 
way of empathy and other valuable social and environmental navigations.  And yet, when 
experiencing the meaning of intersubjective empathic sharing, self-awareness is an 
important part of the process.  In loving experiences, we want the other to be aware of 
both themselves as the subject whom we are loving, and of ourselves as their beloved 
subject.   
Stein’s estimation of the other as a sublime uniqueness, and of the separateness of 
the self and other, bridged through empathic regard, evokes the sense of a deep 
interpersonal intimacy.  Stein treats the subjectivity of the other with a serious moral 
weight that I think is important.  The engagement of the self and the other, on Stein’s 
view, is a profound and subject-altering experience.  Stein and Scheler resonate in their 
valuation of empathy as profoundly formative of subjectivity.  We are somehow both 
bound up in intersubjectivity and also unique, separate selves, with our own unique 
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stories.  Our intersubjective life shapes and influences our subjective perspectives; 
through our empathic transports we are altered.   
Lipps was not wrong about the felt experience of transport.  Both Scheler’s and 
Stein’s accounts agree with the feeling of losing oneself in the empathic encounter.  I will 
explore later in this work how such transports occur not only in person to person 
subjective encounters, but also imaginative empathic encounters such as we find in 
reading stories.  Psychologists Melanie Green and Jordan Carpenter have highlighted the 
experience of transportation in which the reader is carried away by the narrative.  
Transportation depends upon perception and perception depends upon experience, and as 
we shall see, upon the conceptual frames which we are given.  The reach of empathic 
perception is limited by our sphere of experience and our cultivation practices.  Only by 
cultivating the perception to open up to a responsive relation to others can we broaden its 
vision and improve its judgment. 
Empathic Perception: Habits for Moral Practice 
I have been looking at these powerful accounts of empathy and their descriptions 
of how, through empathy, we can not only see from the perspective of the other, but enter 
into their suffering and their joy to such a degree that we not only share their feelings and 
provide receptive responses, but also achieve an experience of the other in her 
subjectivity. The reality of her inner life is made manifest to me and I understand her as 
an I. This realization works on my perspective of myself, and our relations to one another 
as subjects.  These insights aid our understanding of our profound intersubjectivity: the 
deep way in which we are part of a web of subjects, without whom we could not fully 
become ourselves.  This realization facilitates attitudes and behaviors that recognize the 
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value of others.  Out of such realization, one can learn to see others in light of this 
enriched understanding of interconnection, building moral practices with regard for the 
subjectivity of the other, and one’s own dependence on that. 
The title of this chapter, “seeing the other,” is about how we see empathically, and 
how we can learn to see more fully the moral realities that surround us.  The 
intersubjective experiences of empathy can teach us about the humanity of others by 
letting us see into their inner world.  Our seeing can be impaired, however, or mere 
projections of our own feelings onto the other.  So, we need critical practices that can 
help us to pay attention to the ways in which our own ways of seeing may be impeding 
accurate and sensitive appraisals of the situation.  John Dewey (1922) pointed out that 
character is the interpenetration of habits.  The collective of our patterns of behavior is 
what we are known by (38).  So it is that our perceptual habits form a character of our 
way seeing the world.  Below, I look at some insights into the nature of empathic feelings 
and perception that should help us see the ways that empathic perception can impede 
genuine understanding and how, if we understand the way it works, we might work to 
correct it.  I also look at David Eagleman’s discussion of visual perception as an insight 
into how, analogously, empathic perception is subject to framing and instruction.  By 
teaching empathy to include more morally salient aspects of moral situations in its 
purview we may be able to improve empathy’s responsiveness.  Empathy is both a 
neurophysiological process that operates automatically, and a form of perception that 
reaches out into the world shaping the way we interpret, judge, experience, and respond 
to the world.  It will be necessary to appreciate both its automaticity and our influence on 
it if we are going to insightfully cultivate it for moral practice. 
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David Depew (2005) highlights the ecstatic aspect of Lipps’ view of empathy to 
elucidate what is important about empathy and to limit our expectations of its potential 
for ethics.  His discussion of some of the technical history of the term is useful to our 
understanding of the term, and to the phenomenon of empathy.  Depew states that 
empetheia means a state of emotional undergoing.   In 1910, Lipps reached back into the 
Greek for the term empetheia which gives us our word “empathy,” though with a 
different meaning.  The word “em patheia” denotes in the ancient Greek an “intense 
passion or a state of emotional undergoing.”  Pathein means “to suffer or undergo.”  
Depew references the NeoPlatonist Plotinus’ claim that empetheia is the opposite of 
apathy or emotional neutrality (100).  It seems to function similarly to the term “en 
thusiasmos,” which is like a possession of divine inspiration.  What this means for 
Depew, is that rather than the word connoting a projection as Lipps claims, it suggests a 
kind of possession.   
In his discussion of Lipps’ mistake with the Greek term, Depew claims that Lipps 
was nevertheless correct in capturing the phenomenon of empathy.  Rather than empathy 
being a kind of inferential projection into the other, it is an undergoing of the sense of the 
target’s feeling.  Depew cautions us to avoid naively regarding it as a universal 
metaphysical sentiment that will bind us all together in human love, because according to 
Lipps, we are still enclosed in a circle of our own feeling (104).  That is to say, we do not 
undergo the actual feelings of the other, but our own responsive feeling is what possesses 
us.  For Depew, empathy is “the shared or mutually projected feelings of human beings, 
or those of animals where we experience some resonance of human psychology,” and 
only if we take seriously its limitations can it be a useful insight into intersubjectivity 
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(105).  Empathy then, must not be understood as a kind of magical access to the other, 
nor as a panacea to cure us of insensibility or insensitivity to others.  As a form of 
perception, it can be limited by what it has been cultivated to attend to.  As with any form 
of perception, much may remain unnoticed and unseen. 
What Depew misses, however, that Stein (and Scheler also) point out is how we 
are shaped and influenced by our empathic engagement with the other and respond to the 
other’s feelings, often letting go of our own for a time.  In this way, we are not always 
enclosed by our own feelings, but our feelings are taught to feel with the feelings of the 
other.  What Depew, relying on Lipps’ account, is characterizing is the more immature 
forms of empathy, such as Scheler calls vicarious feeling or identification.  Stein and 
Scheler both show how empathy grows in regard for the other, as well as how the self 
may be transformed by empathy with the other. 
What we see and do not see, whether through our visual perception or our 
empathic perception, is often a function of habit.  John Dewey (1934) argued that human 
individuals, like all other creatures, are organisms interacting with an environment.  The 
relation between organism and environment is inseparable, and is embedded in all 
experience.  Indeed, the environment is the condition for the possibility of experience in 
the individual. “Every experience is the result of interaction between a live creature and 
some aspect of the world in which he lives” (45).  One of the key aspects of perception in 
many creatures is habit.  Even with as ubiquitous of a perception as sight, we do not all 
see the same.  We understand now because of entomologists, ornithologists, and 
biologists that bees, birds, and dogs do not see as we do because of the structure of our 
respective eyes according to our hunting and navigating needs.  Yet, many of us might be 
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surprised to understand that the habits of humans can also dictate differences in how we 
see.  Dewey’s point about habit will have an important influence as we explore the 
cultivation of empathic perception.  Before delving into cultivation, however, we need to 
learn more about why Depew is right about how empathy is encircled.  What many of us 
may not appreciate is the degree to which not only empathy, but all perception is a bit 
“loopy.”  Neuroscientist David Eagleman helps us to understand how situational frames 
can dictate what we see. 
David Eagleman (2011) explains that while we see through our eyes, it is not our 
eyes that do the seeing, per se.  There are neural apparatuses that facilitate the connection 
between the visual stimulation and the mind’s comprehension of the images.  This is 
accomplished by electrical signals “coming into the brain: at first they are meaningless; 
with time they accrue meaning.  In the same way that you immediately “see” the meaning 
in these words, your brain “sees” a timed barrage of electrical and chemical signals as, 
say, a horse galloping between snow-blanketed pine trees” (43). 
In contrast to the traditional understanding of perception as a linear path from 
object to eye to sight, Eagleman shows how the neurophysiological path is more circular 
and what he characterizes as “loopy”.  “[I]t was discovered that brain wiring does not 
simply run from [point] A to B to C: there are feedback loops from C to B, C to A, and B 
to A.  Throughout the brain there is as much feedback as feedforward—a feature of brain 
wiring that is technically called recurrence and colloquially called loopiness” (46).  What 
this means for perception is it is always building of complexity, through an ongoing 
process of loops that, in a given situation, lead perception through loops of previous 
perceptual experience, which relate to what one is actually seeing in the present moment.  
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He refers to this as “nested feedback connections” and claims that they are “so extensive 
that the system can even run backward” (Ibid.).  So, if I see a wildebeast for the first time, 
and do not understand what it is, I will study it to place it within my areas of experience.  
I will see that it has horns and process that with previous horned animals I have 
experienced and surmise that it is related to them.  I will note its size in relation to other 
horned animals, and I will look at its size and mood in relation to myself, assessing any 
potential danger.  In this way, my visual perception is linking up with my experiential 
knowledge to help me get a sense of its genus or class, and perhaps more urgently, 
whether it is a threat to me, which will activate the affective responses of increasing my 
heart rate and send my eyes searching for escape.   
Rather than a straight line of percept entering the eye to neural comprehension, a 
complicated series of neural loops enable the sense of sight.  Add to that that the senses 
are not discrete in their functions.  According to Eagleman, vision dominates hearing in 
perception, so that a visual contradiction with a heard perception will result in us 
“hearing” what the visual dictates.  This is mostly true, but sometimes hearing will 
dominate as when a single flash is perceived as two flashes because one simultaneously 
hears two beeps (47).  We have long known that our sense perception can give us an 
inaccurate understanding of states of affairs, such as when a straight straw appears bent in 
a glass of water.  So perception, whether visual, auditory, or otherwise, is susceptible to 
mistakes.  What we may be less aware of is how perception also works cooperatively 
among the various receptions of stimuli to harmonize the experience and unify it into 
meaningful data for the subject.  Perception does not operate linearly, but loops, meaning 
that there are many other influences on reception than bare stimuli.  The traditional idea 
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was that an object, witnessed through our receptive visual processes, then becomes 
intelligible by neural recognition.  Object→eye→mind/intelligibility.  Rather than this 
straight-forward process, visual perception in coordination with other forms of 
perception, loops through various relevant processes to culminate in the experience of 
seeing. 
We thus need to correct the old model so that we can properly understand the 
function of perception accordingly.  Perception is impacted by the expectations of the 
perceiving subject.  Eagleman cites the experiment of psychologist Alfred Yarbus in 
1967 to show how what we see is largely driven by what we expect to see.  In the 
experiment, test subjects were asked to look at a photograph and each group was given 
different questions.  Using the eye tracker, Yarbus was able to see that the subjects 
focused their attention on different objects depending on their question.  One group was 
asked how old the people in the photograph were, and they looked repeatedly at the faces, 
while another group, asked about material circumstances, looked at worn accessories, 
furniture, and ornaments in the room.  The eyes attended to the objects that could 
elucidate the answer, while overlooking other perceptual data.  Rather than being passive 
recipients of information, according to Eagleman, “brains reach out into the world and 
actively extract the type of information they need.” 
The brain does not need to see everything at once…and it does not need to 
store everything internally; it only needs to know where to go to find the 
information.  As your eyes interrogate the world, they are like agents on a 
mission, optimizing their strategy for the data.  Even though they are 
“your” eyes, you have little idea what duty they’re on.  Like a black ops 
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mission, the eyes operate below the radar, too fast for your clunky 
consciousness to keep up with (Ibid. 30). 
Eagleman further clarifies the function of perceptual gestalt switching, in which 
the eyes can move between two interpretations of a black and white image, seeing either 
a vase or two faces, but that one cannot see both pictures at the same instant.  This 
process reveals that “nothing has changed on the page, so the change has to be taking 
place in your brain” (Eagleman 2011, 31).  These types of visual selection often go on 
below the level of consciousness.   
This raises the interesting question of how selecting occurs if one is not 
consciously aware of such actions, and I think that Eagleman’s discussion of framing 
provides insight.  What might be the frames at work as we view the world, as we 
empathically engage the world.  Habitual practices will influence our frames.  In John 
Dewey’s (1922) discussion of habits, he notes the differences between the animal feeling 
of hunger and the developed experience of appetite for particular foods and drinks.  A 
Thai child will desire a very different breakfast than an American child.  When we feel 
hunger, we often feel hunger for certain flavors.  This is a result of our enculturation.  As 
I said above, Dewey points out how our behavior shapes our character.   
So it is that our perceptual habits form a character of our way of seeing the world.  
I share these insights about sensory perception for the purposes of deepening our 
appreciation of the nuances of the experience of perception.  Empathic perception, like 
other forms of perception, is subject to a variety of factors and thus can be mistaken, 
misleading, and allow us to have inaccurate or unhelpful responses to situations.  Perhaps 
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we have been taught to hate or disdain certain groups of people, and in this way, when we 
see them, we effectively deny their subjectivity, their dignity, their right to opportunities 
for same goods that we ourselves have. Having been taught immoral attitudes, one’s 
moral sight is impaired such that one may not empathically recognize the subjectivity of 
the other.  This can change, however, because like other forms of perception, empathy 
can be cultivated to attend to the cues of others more astutely and responsively, 
understanding the meaning of our shared humanity.   
Parts of Lipps, Scheler, and Stein’s descriptions of empathy accurately resonate 
with findings about the neurophysiological workings that enable empathic perception and 
experience.  Empathic systems cover the range from very primitive mimicry to highly 
cognitive perspective taking.  Lipps focuses on the more sophisticated forms, but his 
account entails the more primitive forms, as well, as when he feels urges in his arm to 
reach like the arm that he is observing.  Scheler and Stein show the moral range of 
empathy, its implications for social relations, and ways in which empathy can grow as 
our complex feelings interact through the intersubjective overlap.  As I have said, 
empathy is both conscious and non-conscious or pre-conscious and it is shaped by 
experience.  Once certain empathic perceptions become habitual, automatic processes can 
more efficiently facilitate our social navigation.  This loopiness seems to be further 
evidence of the strong relationship between primitive and sophisticated forms of 
empathy.   
As I discussed in both Chapters I and II, consciousness processes manifest in 
automatic and controlled ways.  Vittorio Gallese (2007) links the process of empathy to 
primitive systems of cognition.  He refers to the “neural exploitation hypothesis” as the 
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means by which a primitive process can develop into a more sophisticated one or even be 
useful for an altogether different processing task (660).  A process that was initially 
developed for simpler evolutionary goals, can, over time, expand to assist with more 
complex tasks.   
Social and moral cognition rely on a complex system of perception, interpretation, 
behavior, and cognitive-affective assessment.   Antonio Damasio (1999) shows how 
cognition, including affect, operates at both conscious and nonconscious  levels 
impacting our interpretations and thus our perceptions.  Much of the work that shapes our 
empathic perception, or how we interpret our empathic feelings/experiences, occurs 
below the level of consciousness.  Empathy is influenced by emotions, perceptions, and 
both conscious and unconscious interpretations.  As I described in Chapter I, 
Damasio(1999) differentiates between emotions (pre-conscious) and feelings (conscious), 
and places them on a cognitive spectrum.  For Damasio, emotions, as automatic 
processes, are constantly engaged in simulation, and as such, are the ground of our more 
sophisticated skills in what some theorists refer to as mind-reading (120-123).    
What this means for empathic perception is that what Damasio calls core 
consciousness is always operative in extended consciousness. When we are stepping back 
from experience, even a little bit, we reflect, question, analyze, and assess how well our 
perceptions and interpretations are matching up with our experience of the world.  Such 
stepping back interrupts the pattern of behavior that may or may not be working 
effectively. This move is a product of extended consciousness, but eventually, it will 
feedback into and assimilate core consciousness to form an adaptation of the previous 
pattern.  So, some loops in our perceptive experience may be corrected, but it requires 
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clunky conscious thinking to do so.  This is the value of conscious processes, or what 
Jonathan Haidt calls the rider of the elephant.  The rider/controlled conscious processes 
can observe errant behavior, out of accord with our larger goals or values, and implement 
processes to correct such errancy.  We work in the slower processes to critique and 
correct what we are doing in the automatic and habituated processes (Damasio 1999, 
123). 
The loopiness of perception is extremely useful even as it means that we can get 
caught in unhelpful modes of perceiving, interpreting, and reacting socially, because we 
can interject new ways of thinking and perceiving into the loop.  While we may be 
habituated to overlook those who are marginalized by systemic injustice, and participate 
complacently in keeping people invisible and unheard, interventions by means of parents, 
teachers, mentors, peers, and others can disrupt the complacency of such habits.  As we 
discussed in the previous chapter, some aspects of empathy are outside of our control, 
such as lacking certain experiences, which can disable us from fully empathizing with 
someone going through that experience.  If you have never really loved anyone 
romantically, as for example a child or youth likely has not, it is difficult to really grasp 
how painful it can be to have such a relationship end.  This is why younger siblings may 
be unsympathetic to the pains of their older siblings. 
Neurophysiological anomalies can also impede empathy, as discussed in the last 
chapter. When the brain’s fear receptors are damaged, one’s ability to perceive fear in the 
other is impaired.  Empathic perception is only as useful as it is neurophysiologically 
whole and developed.  Skill also plays a role, however.  Skillfulness is acquired in the 
practice of reading others, and the subsequent check for accuracy.  Mentors initially 
121 
 
instruct us in this process, which we practice in childhood and youth.  Once we have 
internalized the moral habits of our mentors, we will have to continue the practice of 
empathic perception and responsivity, implementing new insights to the process as we 
encounter them.  Empathic skillfulness entails reasonable success in navigating the 
various social situations of one’s life, with healthy psychological self and other-regard 
and treatment.  To increase skillfulness and avoid getting caught in unhelpful modes of 
social perception, one needs to have an ongoing, developmentally responsive practice of 
self-critique. 
As Max Scheler and Edith Stein have shown, the self and other are not only 
relationally bound, but also are bound up with, and provide the possibility for, our self-
knowledge.  Empathic skillfulness is vital not only to social relations, but also to apt self-
understanding.  They are interdependent.  Good reading of others is contingent on a level 
of accuracy in self-appraisals and vice versa.  Thus, it is crucial that we regard the work 
of practicing and critiquing empathic perception as always lighting on self and other.  
The moral sprout of reading social cues that grows into a proper ability to attend to the 
import of social situations and the ability to fulfill one’s role in such situations is learned 
in countless trial and error experiences throughout childhood, youth and adulthood.  Such 
a process of self-evaluation begins when parents correct their infants and inform their 
toddlers of how their behaviors impact others around them.   
In the next chapter, I will explicate Martin Hoffman’s account of the process 
whereby empathy, as a basic social process in infancy, can be cultivated into a genuine 
concern for others.  Initially, children comply out of a fear of love withdrawal or possible 
physical punishment, but, in time, with support, the appropriate amount of moral pressure 
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and myriad repetitions, children begin to internalize the meaning of misbehavior toward 
others and feel guilt.  Guilt is an important moral emotion for the transformation of basic 
empathy to genuine concern for others, but so is our care for the other.  In the next 
chapter, I will begin by laying out some key problems for empathy and then bring in 
Hoffman’s discussion of childrearing as key for developing empathy.  
Empathic experience enables our imaginative entry into the worlds of others.  
Through this perception we are enabled to perform an array of roles in our emotional and 
intersubjective lives.  As Scheler and Stein point out, empathy is the means through 
which we can commune subjectively with others and attend to their needs.  We can be 
mistaken empathically, however, and we can misuse our empathic insight to hurt others.  
Empathy is no panacea for injustice, systemic or otherwise.  In the next chapter, we will 
look more closely at some important problems and limitations of empathic perception.  
Then, I will explore how empathy can be taught and cultivated.   
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CHAPTER IV 
CARING FOR THE OTHER: 
CULTIVATING THE CHARACTER OF EMPATHIC MORAL PERCEPTION 
Human speaking is necessarily tuned to the various nonhuman calls and cries that 
animate the local terrain. 
     ~ David Abram  
Those in the world who do not help the grain to grow are few.  Those who abandon it, 
thinking it will not help, are those who do not weed their grain.  Those who help it grow 
are those who pull on the grain…[this]…harms it. 
~Mengzi 2A2, 127 
What cannot be understood cannot be managed intelligently. 
~John Dewey HNC 3 
Empathy and Sociality 
Empathy is vital to our apprehension of the events that surround us and to our 
ability to see the significance and the implications of those events.  It is our primary tool 
for making sense of our surroundings and becoming actors within it.  It is crucial to our 
sociality, but like all forms of perception, its accuracy is contingent on multiple factors, 
internal and external to the subject.  Further, its efficacy for ethics depends on emotional 
and moral development.  So, while empathy is necessary for social cognition, its 
existence is not sufficient to ensure ethical behavior.  Like any other form of perception, 
empathy requires experience and guidance to attune it to the salient features of 
experience and critical thinking that can affirm, redirect or correct behavior toward 
preferred outcomes.  The Confucians recognize that a good society depends on the 
cultivation of such virtues in its people.  The symbiotic relationship between the 
individual and her society requires a mutually attentive relationship.  Without the efforts 
of moral cultivation, empathy has potential to facilitate the darker tendencies in human 
behavior. 
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Character is, in an important way, the heart of my project.  By that I mean that 
there is a reason for us to return to practices of moral self-cultivation as a means of 
developing personal character and community character.  I am identifying the cultivation 
of empathy as one of the primary means through which such cultivation can occur.  The 
automatic processes, which dictate most of our behavior, tend to be forgotten in our 
discourses on morality.  And yet, the general tendencies and tenor of our automatic 
behavior forms the general impression of our character in our community.  The pragmatic 
goal of crafting a life of flourishing profoundly depends upon one’s relations within that 
community.  Because empathy is the confluence of perceptual and intuitive processes that 
facilitates our understanding of ourselves and our social world, it is important to ensure 
that it is operating optimally.   And if it is not, it is necessary to perform the correctives 
necessary to improve its skillfulness and aptitude. 
In this chapter, I will look at the vulnerability of empathy to negative potentials.  
First, I lay out some of the more serious weaknesses of empathic perception for ethics.  
Then, I look at the work of Martin Hoffman who identifies key features of discipline in 
childrearing that assist the growth and development of empathy for improving 
cooperation with and consideration of others.  I then touch on the aesthetic stimuli for 
empathy to segue into the next chapter in which we explore how engaging in narrative 
empathically shapes moral feeling and sensitizes moral perception.  Empathy is how we 
see and understand the other—but this perception is only as good as its cultivation 
practices have made it.   
Recall my working definition of empathy as a neurophysiological process that 
facilitates our social cognition and relationality by provoking in us cognitive-affective 
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responses that are resonant with the perceived feelings, experiences, and/or situations of 
others.  I further claim that empathy is a form of perception that, through guided 
development, may become morally sensitized and responsive.  In this way, empathic 
moral perception is the means through which we perceive and engage the moral import 
of the various situations of our social and environmental milieu.  Like other forms of 
perception, empathic perception is geared toward apprehending and navigating social 
meaning and as such has a morally ambivalent quality.  Even a sadist must navigate her 
social context.  While we are neurophysiologically driven to pursue wellbeing, and that 
wellbeing depends on our social wellness, we obviously have the capacity to behave and 
think in a manner contrary to such goods.  Empathy facilitates social cognition, but its 
moral usefulness depends on its being habituated to see well, and overcome 
preoccupation with self-concern.  We can ignore empathy’s cues, and rationalize immoral 
responses, if we think it is in our self-interest.  Or we can misperceive or misinterpret the 
meaning of what we are feeling and perceiving, thus leading to mistakes in empathic 
response.  It is important to look at the problems of empathy, both of inadvertent or 
unintentional failures of empathy, as well as manipulative uses of it, so as to have an 
accurate account of empathy, and to mitigate its harmful potentials. 
Some Problems for Empathic Moral Perception 
Any definition of empathy must address a number of significant problems that 
arise from the complexity of the concept and empathy’s many relations to other 
emotional and moral phenomena.  Some of the more important problems for empathy as 
a form of moral perception are: 1) self-other differentiation, 2) personal distress and 
egoistic drift, 3) emotional/empathic obtuseness, 4) biases (kith and kin, proximity, in-
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group out-group, differentness of gender, race, sexual-orientation, religion, ethnicity, 
culture, species, etc.), 5) schadenfreude, or even sadism and 6) poor emotion-regulation.  
These problems are not discrete, so a brief explication should enable us to appreciate the 
nature of the problems.  Mitigating efforts in a given area can often improve another area 
as we shall see. 
Self-other differentiation relates to problems discussed in the previous chapter.  
Neuroscientist Marco Iacoboni claims that it is an inhibitor in the empathic processor that 
enables proper self-other distinction (Iacoboni 2011, 53).  When working properly, the 
subject has a clear sense of herself and what feelings belong to herself, thus facilitating 
her ability to see the other in his own right.  Sometimes, however, our ability to recognize 
that separation is impaired, making empathic mistakes of over-identifying with the other.  
One of those mistakes is misperceiving the other’s suffering as one’s own.  In the last 
chapter, I described the differences in vicarious versus fellow feeling for others.  I used 
the example of a mourner at a funeral who shares the experience of the recent widow 
(having children to raise), and how in vicarious feeling, the mourner would be absorbed 
in the imagined suffering she would experience if, like the widow, her husband were to 
die.  If this mourner let herself get carried away with this worry, and did not bear in mind 
the many differences in the widow’s and her own situation, she might get overwhelmed 
by her imagined suffering and believe that her suffering was as acute as the widow’s.  
She might offer “comfort” to the widow by focusing on her own feelings, making offers 
of help that pertain to herself and not to the widow.  This mourner’s sense of her 
suffering and the widow’s are confused and, as such, she is likely more distressing than 
comforting to the widow. 
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If one does get carried away with self-focused feelings, it generally leads to 
personal distress.  Personal distress is the suffering or emotional pain that we feel when 
we empathize with someone else’s pain.  It generally connotes the situation in which the 
subject is so overwhelmed by the pain of empathic feelings that he avoids the empathic 
encounter.  This might be the case when we walk faster upon seeing a homeless person 
looking unhealthy and forlorn; we want to avoid the distressing reality of their suffering.  
As we will see, Hoffman does not view personal distress as an impediment to empathy, 
but rather a response that needs to be governed so as to prevent its impeding empathic 
action. 
The other mistake of over-identifying with the sufferer can lead to the empathizer 
projecting her wishes or feelings onto the other mistaking the actual needs of the 
situation.  The former problem leads a potential moral actor away from the distressing 
cause, the person in need, due to being emotionally overwhelmed.  Hoffman calls this 
egoistic drift when the needs of the other lose command of our attention and we instead 
focus on ourselves.  This would fit into my description of the funeral mourner’s moral 
failing above.  These problems overlap with one another and it can be difficult to separate 
them. 
Personal distress is considered by many empathy theorists to be a cause of non-
helping behavior, but it can also lead to a variety of mistaken intended helps and may be 
due to emotional/empathic obtuseness.  An example of a poor empathizer’s projection 
and/or obtuseness might be when she insists on “helping” when to a more astute 
observer, the assistance does more harm than good, as was seen in the funeral example.  
Alternately, emotional/empathic sensitivity enables an empathizer to read the genuine 
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need or desire of the sufferer, attending and responding to the real needs of the sufferer
22
.  
Using Scheler’s discussion of fellow-feeling, we can imagine the mourner above 
managing her own anxieties regarding the existential realities that her husband could die, 
recognizing that there is no immediate danger, and instead guiding her imagination to 
considerations of the anxieties that the widow must be feeling.  This might lead her to 
offer assistance with sensitivity to the widow’s wishes. The widow might then find a 
responsive space in this mourner’s empathy from which to garner support for the painful 
transition ahead.  Moral obtuseness, as Martha Nussbaum (1990) points out, is a moral 
failing. The empathic mistakes that we often make may not result in overt harm, but they 
are neither helpful nor morally skillful, and can seriously impede or damage relations. 
Many theorists worry that empathy is not only not sufficient, but may even be 
problematic for morality (Prinz 2012, Keen 2007).  This is, in part, because of its biases 
for kith and kin.  We preferentially empathize with loved ones, near ones, familiar ones, 
or just similar others.  This leads to injustice when groups in power favor their own 
groups in benefits, resources, protections, etc.  Another moral problem of empathy is that 
we can malevolently empathize with the suffering of an enemy as the German word 
schadenfreude suggests, literally taking pleasure in the suffering of another (de Waal 
2006, 72). This might be an innocent form of pleasure such as Franz de Waal’s (2006) 
laughter at the fall of an alpha male chimp during a boisterous show of power.  None of 
the chimps who witnessed the fall of the alpha male showed any pleasure in it.  So, while 
these primates share our capacity for empathy, they do not exhibit this form of it (160).  
Schadenfreude can have the darker tones of revenge and torture as well.  Without 
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 Personal distress can also be a cause of helping, particularly if one is unable to escape the distress of the 
sufferer. 
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empathy, such pleasure might not be possible.  Max Scheler (1913/2008) claims that this 
is only possible in vicarious feeling, however, not in fellow-feeling, and Martha 
Nussbaum (2001), likewise claims that compassion excludes such bitter sentiments.  
Literary theorist Susanne Keen (2007) expresses concern that a naïve faith in empathy as 
a means of mitigating or eradicating harmful inclinations could have disastrous results for 
ethics.  She surveys readers’ empathic experiences in reading by asking questions like 
whether novels had altered their beliefs or evoked behavior change.   Her analysis reveals 
very mixed results, noting that many readers identify with the antagonists and selfish 
characters (75).   
Emotion regulation is an important developmental skill that facilitates the 
accuracy and aptness of empathy.  Good parenting helps a child to channel and direct 
emotions and feelings into productive expressions rather than disruptive or harmful ones.  
A toddler learns to say, “I’m angry” or the like in lieu of hitting her brother.  A pre-
schooler learns how to sit at the dinner table and manage the urge to get up, which not 
only inculcates mores for her conduct at a meal, but prepares her for the extensive self-
management of elementary school and so on.  Adult life requires even more sophisticated 
skills, insofar as the snide attitude of an adolescent will not likely garner success in the 
work world.  Poor emotion regulation leads to many problems, but for empathy it can 
spell a stronger self-focus because the unregulated feelings can overwhelm the 
empathizer.  Good emotion regulation is bound up with the self-other(s) relation insofar 
as one is more capable of managing proper psychological boundaries, separating one’s 
own concerns from the other, at the same time one exhibits and feels concern for the 
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other.  The problems of empathy, apart from neurological impairments, seem to be at 
least partly rooted in the lack of self-management skills and proper self-other distinctions. 
A lack of a proper sense of agency, a lack of the ability to genuinely see the other 
in his own right, a propensity for egoistic drift, or invariably returning focus to self are all 
serious problems for empathy as a moral impetus.  And if one has poor emotion-
regulation skills, many empathic distress encounters will dissolve into mere personal 
distress which is no use to anyone.  According to psychologists Nancy Eisenberg and 
Natalie Eggum empathy generally becomes either sympathy or personal distress, so there 
is not much neutral ground (2009, 71)  
Psychologist Martin Hoffman contends, however, that empathic distress, which is 
what we feel when observing another in distress, will always have some amount of 
personal distress in it.  What is at issue, then, is the degree of concern for the other versus 
that for one’s own feeling.  Sympathetic distress is actively motivated to attend to the 
sufferer, while empathic distress, which may be the middle ground between sympathetic 
and personal distress, may not (Hoffman 93-110).  Much of what is at stake in empathic 
perception and the feelings of empathic distress becoming prosocial action is a subtle but 
crucial matter of degree.  Emotion-regulation is an important aspect of empathic 
responsivity and therefore an important moral skill to develop (Ibid. 87-91).  And yet, 
emotion-regulation is on the spectrum with emotion suppression, and suppression may 
impede one’s ability to feel at all for the other.  One may have sufficiently perceptive 
empathic perception such that one can read the import of the other’s expressions and 
situation, but insufficient concern to motivate action.  This is precisely what makes 
empathy dubious for ethics. 
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Jesse Prinz (2011) is worried about reliance on emotion for ethics, and claims that 
empathy is insufficient to promote moral behavior and can even be a barrier, since one 
may avoid the feelings of distress that accompany empathy.  “It can promote compliance 
and complacency” (14).  Feeling with the other may not be enough to mitigate the 
interference of self-protective impulses or the many biases that plague empathy.  Worse, 
it may promote injustices against those with whom we do not empathize (Ibid. 15-16; § 
5-6).   
Martin Hoffman might agree with Prinz’s concerns.  He elucidates the many 
weaknesses of empathy including being a bystander and egoistic drift, which leads back 
to self-focus and self-concern.  A vital mitigating factor appears to be an imposition of 
guilt.  Hoffman explains the process by which we cultivate empathy in childrearing, 
claiming that in childrearing the induction of guilt-scripts is a necessary part of learning 
to act on empathy (2000, 161-4).  Like de Waal, Hoffman claims that there is an internal 
motivation to help.  He is in agreement with Hume who claims that there is a pleasure in 
helping and relief in helping.  However, we need the provocation of internalized guilt-
scripts to motivate cooperative and helping behavior (164).  So, while empathy is a tool 
for prosocial action through its mimicry, sympathy, and distress for the other, it is not 
sufficient on its own to achieve moral behavior.
23
  
So, there are several problems for empathy.  No wonder theorists like Prinz prefer 
a more rationalist system; empathy seems too wily to be reliable.  I cannot help agreeing 
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 Note: I do not discuss empathy deficits in individuals with certain forms of autism and 
psycho/sociopathy.  There is recent work exploring the size of the amygdala in those lacking in emotional 
resonance (See http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5568609.)  These are serious 
concerns for social morality, but they are beyond the scope of this work as they may have more biological 
than psychological foundations. 
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with Hume and Jonathan Haidt, however, that flawed and fickle as our moral emotions 
are, they are highly responsive to the judgment of our community.  And as I understand 
the cognitive and social science literature at this point, such empathic responsivity may 
be as good as it gets for our social cooperation and prosocial action.  As Hume pointed 
out, and social science seems to agree, the emotions (or passions) provide the impetus to 
act.  No amount of principled discourse will get us to sacrifice creature comforts for 
service to non-kin needs.  Empathy alone cannot create more humane moral sentiments 
and actions, but it does command care and other-oriented behavior.  My query is how 
empathic concern and skill can grow to a broader reach.  
 It may not be necessary to choose between rationalism and sentimentalism 
exclusively, because as Martin Hoffman argues, empathy can be bonded with ethical 
principles.  Guilt is an important moral emotion for Hoffman’s process and it may be 
promising at least as an antidote to apathy and complaisance.  Cultivation of empathy 
entails application of guilt in what Hoffman calls induction-based discipline encounters.  
Like the cultivation of Mengzi’s moral sprouts, the shaping of empathy is a delicate 
process.  One must not force it, nor must one neglect it.  One must have the right sources 
of nourishment and the right approach in care such that the sprouts mature into trees that 
bear real fruit. 
The darker side of empathy is not overcome in my discussion.  Nor can it be, I 
think.  I believe we will struggle against our baser inclinations to merely please those we 
like rather than those we do not, and we will struggle in some degree against the 
inclination to demonize, vilify, and revel in the losses of those with whom we differ.  As 
we saw in Chapter II, empathy is an old system, which might explain why it is so 
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complicated.  Since we cannot isolate the boundaries of a solely good empathy, it seems 
to be more productive to focus on shaping empathic perception toward greater moral 
skillfulness.  My discussion is motivated by the concern that if we do not do the work of 
cultivating empathy, we may not be able to mitigate its darker inclinations.   
Empathy and Moral Development 
Empathy, being primordially imitative (whether conscious or unconscious), is 
nature’s way of assisting our connectivity with others, since we humans are stronger in 
groups than we are alone.  This imitative quality is the primary means by which we 
express and understand our sociality from infancy onwards, and is vulnerable to its social 
context for development.  Childrearing is the primary beginning point for the empathy’s 
maturation, so much of our later empathic potential is contingent on our parents’ relative 
empathic skill.  Aristotle was right to note that it is a matter of luck as to whether one can 
identify and cultivate the good.  Whether one is born to caring, moral parents, necessary 
material and social resources, availability of education, as well as a social/political 
structure that facilitates the wellbeing of its citizenry will impact one’s relative potential 
for moral maturity.  The success or failure of moral life depends greatly on the factors of 
one’s social conditions.  As creatures responsive to our social situation, our moral sprouts 
will grow out of the garden in which we live.  Confucians celebrate the wisdom of the 
sage Mengzi’s mother.  She understood mimicry in children.  She knew that a child’s 
responsivity and identification with its social milieu would provoke the child to emulate 
what it was exposed to.  Knowing the important influence of those whom we imitate, she 
is renowned for the following story. 
Mengzi’s Mother, three moves: 
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In the beginning when Mencius was still very little, the mother and son lived in a house 
nearby a cemetery.  Because of this, Mencius and all the neighbouring children had 
plenty of opportunities to witness the funeral rites of the time.  One day, Mother Meng 
noticed that her son enjoyed playing in the cemetery.  He would bury things, build tiny 
mounts out of earth and emulate the burial proceedings. “This is no place to raise a 
child,” said Mother Meng when she saw this.   
So she decided to find a new home.  Mother Meng and Mencius found a house 
nearby the marketplace and they moved there.  And they both soon settled comfortably in 
the new environment.  Some time passed and Mother Meng noticed that her son had 
mixed well with the neighbouring children.  They were playing games together.  Mencius 
was pretending to be a street vendor selling his merchandise at the market while the other 
kids were the customers.  When Mother Meng saw this, she once again said, “This is no 
place to raise a child.”  She decided to search for a new home once more. 
After careful consideration, Mother Meng and Mencius found a house located 
nearby a school.  Again some time passed and Mother Meng saw her son settling into the 
new environment.  One day, she saw her son enjoyed performing Confucian rites and 
emulating the proper etiquette of the literati. “Now this is a place to raise a child!” 
Mother Meng finally declared. To her great joy, Mencius grew up to become a great 
Confucian philosopher, second only the founder, Confucius himself. 
~ http://chinesecauldron.com/story-index/mother-mengs-three-moves/ 
The Confucians see the practice of rituals and other aesthetic practices such as 
calligraphy, painting, and martial arts as a means to improving moral character.  The 
highly imitative nature of empathic processes can lead one either to a more adept and 
sympathetic empathic perception or to a weaker, muddled, or self-absorbed perception.  
As a social-cognitive process, empathy is deeply complex and intermingled with many 
other processes that influence our perceptions, our feelings, and our willingness to help.  
In Chapter III we saw how Mengzi regards the sentiment of general sympathy or fellow 
feeling as a moral sprout.  Awareness of the contingencies that facilitate growth in moral 
feeling, or impede it, can assist us in better attending to its cultivation as Mengzi’s 
mother did.   
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The neurophysiological systems that enable empathy are what most of us have in 
place as infants.  Martin Hoffman explicates the process through which empathy can be 
cultivated for social morality.  This process is based on our shared neurophysiology.  
Recall from Chapter II Vittorio Gallese’s (2001) view of intersubjectivity which he calls 
a “shared manifold,” and his claim that we are social animals.  The shared manifold is the 
shared experiential basis of our mutual understanding.  Having the same bodies and 
neurophysiology, we come to social interactions with many of the same conceptual and 
emotional structures, like motor schemas and body schemas, which then lead to shared 
understandings.   It is through this shared manifold that we are able to automatically 
apprehend and comprehend many forms of meaning, and their implications facilitate our 
shared existence (34).  Our shared body structures allow for our shared meaning as 
humans beginning in infancy.  They allow for, but cannot enable shared meaning without 
attentive nurturance in parenting.  Empathy needs stimulation and support for proper 
development and ongoing maturation.  Once empathy has been properly cultivated for 
young adulthood, it needs maintenance and refinement to attune it to the complexities of 
ongoing adult life.  As is the case with good health, which is the metaphor that Aristotle 
uses for flourishing in the Nichomachean Ethics, empathic skillfulness requires lifelong 
practices that keep it fit and healthy.  Those practices begin in the interactions between 
parent and child.  In infancy, we have only the buds of empathy that facilitate our social 
cognition.   
In Empathy and Moral Development, Hoffman (2000) describes the preconscious 
process of mood mimicry in emotional contagion as the beginning of empathy.  Initially, 
a child feels personal distress, or self-oriented anxiety, when she is infected with the 
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upset expressions of another child.  A newborn seeks personal comfort by crying or 
fussing until she is consoled by a parent.  By 6-12 months, she may be disturbed but is 
less intensely so.  An 18-month old child, capable of seeking a soothing solution for 
another may offer her favorite stuffed toy or her own mother to a crying child (26).  This 
is an interpretation error in empathic perception.  The child is not merely feeling personal 
distress, but empathic distress, or distress for the other, but she is not yet able to take the 
other’s point of view sufficiently to appreciate what will console him.  By two years old, 
the empathizing child learns that the crying child does not want someone else’s toy or 
mother, but his own.
24
  This is a development in interpretive skills, in the capacity to take 
another’s point of view, and an advance in empathic skills.  This development does not, 
however, mean that the child experiences no personal distress. 
An empathic relation between mother (primary caregiver) and baby is essential to 
infant survival and wellbeing.  Infants empathize by detecting the emotional displays of 
others such as the parents’ happy babbles or worried eyes.  Hoffman claims that infants 
empathize with the distress of others by being infected with the feelings.  This is why 
crying can be contagious among infants.  Initially, they feel this egocentrically as a point 
of view protoself, but along with physical and moral development, empathy also develops 
an other-focused orientation (6).  With cultivation, one may acquire the ability to imagine 
empathetically those not present and those very different from oneself.  Hoffman claims 
that empathic development eventually joins a sympathetic (that is more fully other-
oriented) concern, but it is still mixed with empathetic personal distress.  This distress is 
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 This is possibly in disagreement with the view of the “false-belief” test in theory of mind research as 
discussed in Chapter II.  The discrepancy may be due to the fact that the false-belief test requires language 
to indicate, whereas the situation Hoffman describes is an observable development without the use of 
language. 
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identified by many theorists as problematic for ethics insofar as personal distress 
demands the emotional focus toward the self rather than the victim.  Empathic distress is 
what we feel for the victim, and Hoffman claims that some of that distress will be 
personal.  Sympathetic distress is a stronger form of empathy that prioritizes the feelings 
of the other as the center of one’s attention and offer of help (6-7).  Personal distress, on 
the other hand, if strong enough, can lead to egoistic drift (loss of empathic connection) 
or to empathy avoidance in which we turn away, avoid eye contact, etc. (57, 61). 
Concerns about empathy for ethics often invoke the vulnerability of empathy to 
these focuses away from the subject.  Amy Coplan (2011) argues that for empathy to be 
genuine, it must be absolutely devoid of personal distress.  Empathy, for Coplan, requires 
affective matching and clear subject-object/target distinction, and particularly, other-
oriented perspective-taking.  The subject or observer must feel as the target feels, be clear 
that it is the target’s situation and not her own that evokes the feeling, and feel solely on 
behalf of the target for the experience to be called empathy (6).  A number of theorists 
share her view that genuine altruism must be devoid of personal distress, but Hoffman 
(2000) claims that personal distress may be precisely why we are motivated to help, and 
therefore, claims that the empathic relief we feel is still other-oriented.  So long as we 
avoid helping, we continue to suffer (unless we leave the situation, in which case it may 
or may not dissipate).  “Subjects who did not respond overtly continued to be aroused and 
upset...When children helped others their empathic distress appeared to diminish; when 
they did not help their distress was prolonged” (32).  And, interestingly, if aid was 
offered but did not alleviate suffering of victim, empathic distress did not subside.  “This 
implies that empathic helpers do have their eye on the ultimate consequences of their 
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action for the victim and it does matter whether their actions reduce the victim’s 
distress,” according to Hoffman (32-33). 
To respond to criticisms that this empathic relief that we feel when in response to 
the sufferer’s improvement, and our own suffering abates, indicates a self-oriented 
motivation, Hoffman refers to studies that give evidence of his claims (Batson and 
Weeks, 1996, Batson and Shaw, 1991).  The caveat is that when there are many helpers, 
individuals may be prone either to “pluralistic ignorance” where we believe that nothing 
is actually wrong because others are not concerned.  Or we may be duped by a “diffusion 
of responsibility,” assuming that someone else has called the police, etc.  But, when one 
feels the onus, one then feels a distress which either must be followed with action or it 
may not abate and may cause deeper discomforts of cognitive dissonance.  “It seems 
reasonable to conclude that although empathy-based helping makes people feel good by 
reducing empathic distress and providing empathic relief, the main objective of empathy-
based helping is to alleviate the victim’s distress,” according to Hoffman. “Empathic 
distress is, in short, a prosocial motive” (33).  Of course, the pull of the self is strong in 
young children, so parents and care-givers have to press children into looking at the 
feelings of others. 
Hoffman claims that the right amount of developmentally appropriate moral 
pressure on growing children is what is needed to turn their self-absorbed point of view 
to a view that includes the experiences, needs, and feelings of others.  Hoffman defines 
empathy as “an affective response more appropriate to another’s situation than one’s 
own” (4).  This definition is sufficiently broad to include the spectrum of responses from 
infancy to later moral development.  He claims that as a product of natural selection, it is 
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a “multidetermined response that can be aroused by cues of distress coming from the 
victim or the victim’s situation” (4).   
Hoffman lists five modes of arousing empathy which operate on two levels, 1) a 
preverbal, automatic/involuntary level which includes motor mimicry, afferent feedback 
and classical conditioning, (which is a variant of classical conditioning entailing a direct 
association of cues from the victim or his situation with one’s own painful past 
experience).  2) A higher cognitive level which includes: mediated association, and role-
taking, which can be self or other-focused, or a combination thereof (36-59).   More 
automatic forms require less effortful cognitive processing, while more intentional forms 
require higher cognitive-affective skills (5). 
From our previous discussion in Chapter II, we have an understanding of motor 
mimicry, but the other terms need some explanation.  Feedback is a form of mimicry 
according to Hofffman.  When feelings are expressed around us, our automatic processes 
mimic them and then we begin to receive feedback that evokes feelings in us.  “The way 
people know how they feel is by sensing it from their muscular as well as their glandular 
and visceral responses” (40).  He quotes William James (1890): “We feel sorry because 
we cry, angry because we strike, and afraid because we tremble” (Vol. II, 450).  This 
describes afferent feedback.  Afferent feedback carries the sensory stimulus to the brain 
and efferent feedback carries the message to the relevant systems for reaction, (e.g., to 
jump out of the way of an oncoming vehicle).
25
  Hoffman (2000) claims that the research 
is not conclusive as to whether the feelings that result are produced by afferent feedback 
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or whether it is associations that produce the feeling due to “perceived …changes in 
facial-expression kinesthetically associated with certain sentiments” (41).  He describes 
the association experience as, “When I’m angry, my jaws are clenched and my brows are 
down” (41).  Whether it is afferent feedback or associational, what is useful to understand 
is that there is an important and meaningful connection between the mimicked production 
of facial-expressions and one’s feelings. 
A child, then, is conditioned through his experience of his parents’ facial and 
bodily responses to various stimuli and his own feelings about such experiences.  As he 
imitates his parents’ facial expressions, especially those spontaneously evoked by the 
parents’ experiences, the child builds associations of the meanings of the expressions.  
This kind of conditioning is called direct association because one learns to directly 
associate certain facial expressions and their corresponding experiences such as fearful 
faces and fearful events (45).  Distress experienced on behalf of another is mediated 
association through language and role-taking, which requires advanced levels of 
cognitive processing and includes the self/other foci as mentioned above, according to 
Hoffman (53-59).  The import of what one sees alters with the position of the imagined 
point of view.  For example, one can ask oneself how one would feel in such a situation, 
or how it might be for the other person being in that situation.  Projecting oneself into the 
scenario will afford a different sensibility than intuiting how the other herself, given her 
particular temperament, situation, etc., will feel.  The latter is other-focused role-taking.  
Asking how one would feel in another’s shoes, is self-focused role-taking and it produces 
more intense feelings in the observer.  This has positive and negative implications for 
empathy.  If one imagines oneself in the situation, it can detract from the experience of 
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the other through preoccupation with one’s own feelings.  It may also serve to heighten 
one’s regard for the other in knowing that one is “safe” from such troubles, and may then 
motivate one to mitigate them. 
Hoffman argues that a combination focus may be the “most powerful because it 
combines the emotional intensity of self-focused role-taking with more sustained 
attention to the victim of other-focused role-taking.  Indeed, fully mature role-taking 
might be defined as imagining oneself in the other’s place and integrating the resulting 
empathic affect with one’s personal information about the other and one’s general 
knowledge of how people feel in his or her situation” (58).  These different modes, 
according to Hoffman, enable a broad base of responsivity to the various social cues and 
situations that each of us must navigate daily (59). 
Hoffman’s discussion of the focus of role/perspective-taking as either a self-
focused, other-focused or a combination of the two, provides nuance to the issue of 
personal distress and sympathetic distress in ethics.  Many theorists who share Coplan’s 
view of empathy seem to be replicating the age-old debates about selfishness and 
altruism.  Some theorists want to claim that any amount of personal or self-oriented 
feeling precludes the action being genuine empathy or genuine altruism.  While it may 
make one a consistent ethicist to claim that the moral worth of an action performed on 
behalf of the other depends on its unequivocally expressing a purely other-focused 
regard, I would argue that such an absolute requirement is psychologically unrealistic.  
Such purity is not pragmatically necessary to achieve the goal of care for the other. 
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Hoffman’s account admits of such alloys and even conflicts of feeling.  His theory 
is based on empirical data, and squares more with what, it seems to me, real efforts in 
ethical practice look like.  For a psychologically valid ethics, we should leave aside 
questions of purity and concentrate our attention on the critical degree of other-focus and 
how to facilitate that.  Empathy’s accuracy and efficacy might even be impaired if there 
is not some back and forth checking between self-feelings and other-feelings.  
Additionally, accepting a conceptualization of an impure empathy contributes to the case 
that I want to make for regarding ethics and empathic moral perception as a matter of 
dynamic moral skillfulness rather than a matter of attaining some impossibly pure other-
directedness.  In my view, it is not empathy’s purity, but its trainability that makes it 
useful for skillful ethical practices. 
We have talked in previous chapters about how our regard for the other can 
motivate empathic action.  That regard has positive and negative impulses, one of which 
is reaching out in care, and the other is recognition of guilt and so either helping or 
avoiding hurting.  Hoffman discusses guilt as a motivator for correcting behavior, 
because I think that it is also an important corrective for unskilled empathic perception 
and response.  Guilt is an important part of the cultivation practice because it induces the 
pain of moral failing, or the anticipatory pain that seeks to avoid that failure.  Empathy 
enables and provokes our feelings of shame and guilt, according to Hoffman.  And 
helping the victim mitigates and helps with management of guilt (117).  These are 
essential social motivators that weaken inaction and the subsequent bystander guilt, so as 
to strengthen prosocial action (8-9).  Initially, parents induct children into the meanings 
of these moral emotions, but in time, children internalize them.  Hoffman regards this as a 
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process of acquiring autonomy.  The sense of guilt which one initially felt toward the 
parent (and/or the victim), is eventually internalized such that one feels a sense of 
personal responsibility.  Rather than guilt before an authority figure, or simple fear of 
love withdrawal, one feels an inward shame, and an outward guilt before the one whom 
we have harmed.  Through internalization, one comes to feel what Hoffman calls 
anticipatory guilt as one imagines how one will feel if one acts harmfully (162-3).  
Empathy is one of the main processes by which this internalization is possible.  So, I will 
now lay out Hoffman’s discussion of the process by which parents induct children with 
the guilt-scripts that eventually become internalized as a sense of personal responsibility 
for their action/inaction. 
Empathic distress, which for Hoffman is a prosocial motive (we might say moral 
sprout), requires nurturing and training to activate appropriately, so that a child learns 
how his behavior impacts others and how to respond accordingly.  This relies on mimicry 
insofar as how we care for and nurture our children gives them the experience to mirror 
to others.  So, parental nurturance will be vital for empathy’s growth.  Hoffman (2000) 
shows how this nurturance is then augmented or weakened depending on parental 
discipline style.  He highlights two types of discipline, 1) Power-assertion and 2) 
Induction.   
Power assertion (Hoffman 1960) utilizes the power differential in parent-child 
relations to coerce the desired behavior from the child.  Hoffman does not favor this as he 
believes it undermines the development of empathy by causing the child to focus on the 
self in fear (Hoffman 2000, 146).  If the child is absorbed in her own suffering, she 
cannot attend to the meaning being ascribed to the event.  This is an important clue for 
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induction as well, since it does apply moral pressure on the child and if it is too heavy, 
the child again dissolves into self-focus.  “Too little pressure obviously gives children no 
reason to stop, attend, and process inductive messages.  Too much pressure, as long 
known by information-processing researchers, directs a person’s attention to the physical 
features of a verbal message, to the relative neglect of deriving meaning from its 
semantic content (Kaheman 1973; Mueller 1979)” (Hoffman 2000, 153). 26   
Induction, by contrast, is a form of discipline “in which parents highlight the 
other’s perspective, point up the other’s distress, and make it clear that the child’s 
action caused it” (143).  In this way, the parent leads the child to induce the causal 
relation between her behavior and the reaction of the other child, to comprehend and 
appreciate the moral import of the harm she has caused, and then to make amends, taking 
responsibility for the pain given.  This is the style which asks, “How would you feel if 
someone did that to you?” and the like.  It is the style of discipline that is referred to for 
empathic cultivation. 
Pressure is used in both discipline techniques, but power assertion tends to exploit 
the physical and developmental disparity between parent and child, while induction 
utilizes the child’s own empathic feeling to help him improve his social and moral 
cognition and behavior.  Mengzi also cautions against forcing things.  In a discussion 
over the way to accumulate righteousness, he advises his disciple Gongsun Chou to avoid 
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 This strikes me as an insightful intuitive check for discipline practices.  Particularly, as different 
temperaments respond more or less sensitively.  I have two sons and the elder required/requires more 
dramatic pressure to penetrate his self-oriented view point.  The younger boy required that I use more care 
because he was highly sensitive to moral failure or empathic distress when he was responsible and his guilt 
response would be so strong that he would have overwhelmingly negative self-assessments negating his 
ability to focus on the other.  Such attentiveness and responsivity in discipline are skills that are incredibly 
difficult to develop. 
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being like the farmer from Song who was concerned about the growth of his grain.  “One 
must work at it, but do not aim at it directly.  Let the heart not forget, but do not help it 
grow.”  This farmer from Song (a place notorious in Confucian writings for its slow-
witted inhabitants) returns home after “tending” his sprouts by pulling them up a little.  
“Wearily, he returned home, and said to his family, ‘Today I am worn out.  I helped the 
grain to grow.’  His son rushed out and looked at it.  The grain was withered” (Mengzi 
2A2, 127).  The “help” that the farmer offered destroyed the crop; this is an important 
insight for the cultivation of empathy.  It is a process that requires attentiveness, 
sensitivity, and insight in its application so as to apply an apt and not too forceful amount 
of pressure. 
Hoffman does not presume that power-assertion is never used, but claims that it is 
less effective toward these ends.  If the child is lost in personal distress he cannot attend 
to the meaning of the disciplinary encounter.  So, it is important that the parent keep the 
induction encounter’s intensity attuned to the emotional responsivity of the child.  If the 
child is able to pay attention properly, then she can be directed to the feelings of the 
sufferer.   
As Hoffman describes the induction process, one is struck by its resonances with 
theatre. You construct the scene for your child’s imagination to enter and witness the 
events of her actions from the standpoint of the recipient.  There are characters, events, a 
scene, and scripts.  Inductions,  
like all discipline attempts, communicate parental disapproval of the 
child’s harmful acts…but unlike other types of discipline, inductions do 
two additional things: First they call attention to the victim’s distress, and 
by making the victims’ distress salient they exploit an ally within the 
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child, the child’s empathic proclivity.  That is, inductions activate certain 
empathy-arousing mechanisms—mimicry if they get the child to look at 
the victim, role-taking if they encourage the child to imagine how he or 
she would feel in the victim’s place and mediated association if they bring 
up the child’s relevant past experience.  In this way inductions elicit 
empathic distress for the victim’ pain, hurt feelings, and (if relevant) 
suffering beyond the situation (157). 
 
Parental disapproval awakens the child’s need to belong, so that she pays 
attention.  The parent then illustrates the experience of the other so that the child can 
imagine empathically what it felt like to be the recipient.  Having gotten the child’s 
attention and turned it to the recipient, the second part of the induction is partly logical 
and partly imaginative.  The logical part is to show the cause-effect relation of her 
actions.  For example, “You threw the golf ball and hit Timmy and it hurt.  That’s why 
he’s crying.”  The imaginative part is in making the recipient’s feelings salient for her.  
“That ball is very hard.  Do you remember when you got hit with the soccer ball?  This 
ball is much harder.  Look at the bump on Timmy’s head.”   With optimal pressure, the 
child will see her role in the hurtful event, resulting “in a self-blame attribution that 
transforms his or her empathic distress, at least partly, into guilt, that is, transgression 
guilt, in contrast to bystander guilt over inaction” (158).  Transgression guilt is the 
emotional acceptance of responsibility for harm done.  This moral emotion is then 
responsive to guidance in proper reparations. 
Over the course of many such repetitions, Hoffman claims that moral schemas 
build up and scripts develop.  When we have a new experience, our minds set up a new 
schema of the moral import and implications of behavior (Nelson 1993).  Through 
repetitions of similar experiences, a script begins to develop building from initial 
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episodes.  Hudson and Nelson (1983) claim that it takes about 5 repetitions for us to 
begin building a script.  Hoffman extrapolates from this to his account of what is 
happening in inductions.  Following Nelson’s model, Hoffman suggests the following 
sequence: “child’s transgression…parental induction…child’s feeling empathic distress 
and guilt.”  Initially, these are mere episodes, but with repetition, the discipline 
encounters form scripts.  “Once a discipline-encounter script is formed, relevant 
information and details from subsequent discipline encounters are integrated into it.  The 
full script may include reparative acts…[such as] apologizing, comforting, hugging, 
kissing the victim” (158).  When parents show approval through affection, words, etc., 
the child’s empathic distress is relieved and guilt is reduced.  These experiences are 
stored in the child’s memory as the process that leads to successful relief of empathic 
distress. 
The full script for Hoffman is “Transgression→Induction→Empathic Distress and 
Guilt→Reparation.”  Hoffman’s emphasis is motivation and so for brevity’s sake he calls 
it Transgression→Induction→Guilt script.  “It has motive properties due to its 
empathic distress and guilt components” (159).  He credits Piaget for the idea of the 
moral script since Piaget claimed that emotions are stored in memory (159).  Hoffman 
adds that cause-effect scripts are an integral part of the Transgression→Induction→Guilt 
script and that the cause-effect scripts are morally enriched by the 
Transgression→Induction→Guilt script because the scripts are infused with affective 
content.  This affective content, or what he also calls affective charges, can activate the 
proper moral sentiment and action.  Over time, those affective charges, which Hoffman 
calls “hot cognitions,” form more automatic, faster responses.  He refers to cold 
148 
 
cognitions as those that do not have affective charge yet bonded to them.  They are the 
initial formative communications during which the child must attend and do a lot of 
conscious processing to follow the moral meaning of the event and his culpability.  For 
example, a parent says, “You have to wait your turn, Lisa.”  Initially, Lisa obeys (if she is 
reasonably compliant) because she accepts her mother’s authority in this matter.  
Eventually, she will feel angry (hot cognition) when that more is violated by her peers, or 
guilty (also a hot cognition) when she is caught violating it. 
When these [cold] scripts are activated in children in conflict situations, 
they are at first no match for the pull of the prospect of egoistic gain.  In 
time, however, cognitive development enables children to ‘decenter,’ that 
is, to transcend the egoistic pull, free themselves from the grip of their 
own perspective, and take another’s perspective as well.  But, the newly 
acquired cognitive ability to decenter is not enough to keep children’s own 
viewpoint from capturing most of their attention in a conflict situation, 
unless they are compelled to exercise this newly acquired cognitive ability 
(160). 
 
This inculcation of moral responsivity relies on parental intervention until the child is 
mature enough to have an internal motive system based on successful internalization of 
the guilt-scripts.  Hoffman (2000) speculates that for rearing young children inductions 
may occur up to fifty times a day.  These scripts continue to adapt and integrate new 
material throughout adult life.  Hoffman cites evidence for his theory of induction’s role 
in moral development referring to numerous articles on parental discipline’s contribution 
to guilt and moral internalization (Brody and Shaffer, 1982; Crockenberg and Litman, 
1990, etc.).  He points out that mothers who use induction (fathers’ results are mixed) 
produce children who respond with “guilt over harming others” without the influence of 
external sanctions.  He also observes that the Germans who helped Jews in WWII had 
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been reared by parents who were nurturing, and generally used induction over power 
assertion (Hoffman 165).   
At this point, I hope that I have given sufficient attention to empathy’s complexity 
and ambivalence, but also shown that is amenable to shaping influences.  Hoffman’s 
description of induction shows empathy being shaped in an affectively charged theatrical-
like experience complete with characters, an event structure, scripts, and themes.  The 
regularity of such phrases as, “How do you think that makes him feel?”  “Wouldn’t that 
hurt your feelings if someone did that do you?” and the like, suggest that we have been 
using some form of induction in discipline for some time to help our children see the 
importance of considering the feelings of the other. 
We must be nurtured by our caregivers in order to be able to mimic their care in 
regard to others.  So, caregiving is essential to empathy’s development.  We sometimes 
emphasize this point, however, to the detriment of some of the other important moral 
emotions like guilt.  Hoffman shows how the emotion of guilt can be used (without too 
much pressure) as a means of inculcating empathic moral feeling for others, and 
instigating anticipatory feelings that can prevent us from causing harm.  Guilt and even 
fear appear to be important parts of the process of attuning our awareness to the many 
ways in which we may harm one another, however inadvertently.  Mengzi sees the value 
of these emotions for morality.  Recall Mengzi’s compassion education for King Xuan.  
The king is reluctant, claiming weakness, inability and finally avarice as inhibitors to 
benevolent action on behalf of his subjects.  Mengzi turns to threats of personal safety to 
motivate the king.  He points out that feeble, greedy men are not noble (but only mere 
fellows), and that only a noble leader deserves the respect and protections that the 
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mandate of heaven provides to a virtuous ruler.  The ignoble one is a “mere fellow,” 
deserving of the ills of personal harm or rebellion.  “I have heard of the execution of a 
mere fellow ‘Zhou’ but I have not heard of the killing of one’s ruler” (Mengzi 117-120).   
For Mengzi, ruler is a morally laden term, not merely he who has the power, but 
he who has the “mandate of heaven,” the right to rule, because he is following the way of 
virtue.  In this way, Mengzi shows that even the king is subject to the expectations of 
virtue.  Genuine rulership is required if King Xuan wishes to have the protection afforded 
a ruler.  So it is that the king, no less than his subjects, is beholden to the rules of 
character and conduct for his role.  If we subscribe to the view that we are ultrasocial, and 
therefore absolutely dependent upon our community for our material and social 
wellbeing, then we must acknowledge that we are also beholden to that community for its 
support and maintenance, both material and moral.  It is because of this beholdenness that 
guilt, responsibility, and accountability are essential to individual and communal health.  
While empathic moral perception is a primary means of achieving the responsibility and 
responsivity of such health, it will not do so without attentiveness to its instruction and 
correction, which is provoked by guilt and fear before those by whom we are bound. 
Hume, Smith, de Waal, Gallese, and Hoffman see the roots of our social and 
moral cognition in the shared feeling experiences of empathy.  None of them see empathy 
as sufficient for social morality.  Arguably, one may follow social conventions 
sufficiently without empathy, or without much, but mere compliance with convention is 
not sufficient to ensure communal health.  We must learn how to attend and respond to 
what situations require and acquire skills to meet such needs.  Learning to see and hear 
requires the cultivation of perception.  Getting from empathy as a mimicker for social 
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cognition, to empathic distress as a prosocial motive, as King Xuan of Qi felt it when 
looking at the suffering ox, is the work of good parenting.
27
   
Conclusion: Fellow-Feeling, Love, and Empathic Moral Perception 
Getting from basic empathy, which one can regulate to suit various situations, to 
an empathic moral perception that sees and hears the needs of people, other animals, and 
even the planet itself takes more cultivation and will likely expand on the imaginative 
work begun in childhood.  If quality relations between self and community are necessary 
for wellbeing, and if empathy facilitates receptivity and responsivity in such relations, 
then a skillful empathic perception is essential to flourishing.   
In the U.S, our social structure is based on ideas of individualism and the unit of 
the so-called nuclear family.  The insights of my research on empathy suggest that not 
only do such practices not lead to flourishing, but they may be responsible for weakening 
the fabric of social and environmental wellbeing.  My research prompts the question of 
whether there might be better ways of sociality than the way we are currently living.   
We want to belong to human groups and to be cared about by members of those 
groups.  Being profoundly social, our flourishing depends on the wellbeing of our social 
milieu—the wellbeing of one’s relation to one’s community and the wellbeing of one’s 
community itself.  As Mengzi and other thinkers have shown, our sociality disposes us to 
care about each other and about what each other thinks of us.  The sociality of our 
empathic perception is not only a means by which we can understand each other, that 
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 I say that this is necessary, but it is not sufficient since, as ultrasocial animals, we require communal 
support for our moral skillfulness and correction of our misbehavior. 
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sociality is an apt enforcer of our morality.  Our morality is a key means of sustaining 
strong, healthy bonds.   
As induction guides children, so there are ways of guiding adults aptly through 
the complexities of adult morality.  Adam Smith (1759/2000) claims that we find 
pleasure in sympathy, whether in sorrow or joy.  We find reprieve from suffering in 
companionship, and joy is sweeter when shared.  This is true for both sufferer and 
sympathizer (30).  This ground of shared feeling is the basis that parents, care-givers, 
family members, teachers, coaches, ministers, rabbis, imams, masters, and other 
mentoring guides use to help their children, students, teams, acolytes, etc., to develop 
care, to expand inclusion to others, to deepen their regard for others, to build 
attentiveness to the nuances of our behavior and its impact on those with whom we are in 
relation.  We cannot help emotionally resonating with others, but this does not mean we 
always apprehend what is needed or how to best fulfill a necessary role.  Recall that 
empathic avoidance, according to Preston and Hofelich, is often due to lack of training in 
an emergency.
28
   
So, getting from basic empathy to compassion can be difficult, and further, 
getting to skillful responses is even more challenging.  All of the aforementioned 
problems for empathy plague potential sympathizers.  Varieties of unskillful emotion-
regulation, or self-other differentiation can muddle one’s competence in reading empathy 
correctly and helping others in the right way.  Since most moral living requires 
spontaneous, unplanned responses, the moral improvisation I spoke of earlier seems to be 
an important point of focus for refining one’s emotion-regulation and self-other 
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differentiation, as well as other morally salient skills.  And stories may be an important 
means not only of helping us to remember the hows and whys of our moral values, but 
even further, of writing those values into our very neurophysiology itself. 
Story is one of the main structural frames through which we see and experience 
our world, according to Paul Ricoeur (2007, 163).  Not only does our social 
understanding rely on culturally shared narratives about our lives and our world, but our 
personal identity is shaped in and through these shared narratives as well.  These 
narratives facilitate clarity, meaning, and development of an ethos as they represent our 
cultures in distilled forms.  Immersing ourselves in such narratives, we can find ways to 
expand our empathic limits and deepen our empathic engagements.  Nussbaum (1990) 
claims that it getting lost in narratives that allows us to change minds and to aspire to a 
fuller moral life (364).  When we engage narratives, our worlds are expanded through 
experiences beyond the reach of our own singular existences.    
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CHAPTER V 
NARRATIVE AND EMPATHIC MORAL PERCEPTION: 
ENTERING THE WORLD OF THE OTHER 
I can only answer the question, ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question  
‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’ 
~Alisdair MacIntyre 
 
We tell stories because in the last analysis human lives need and merit being 
narrated…The whole history of suffering cries out for vengeance and calls for narrative. 
~Paul Ricoeur  
 
My discussion so far has focused on the kind of creatures we humans are, how we 
are profoundly intersubjective, how our emotions are important resources for our moral 
cognition, and how empathy, in particular, motivates moral responsiveness.   In Chapter 
I, I argued that, rather than the rational autonomous deciders that we have long believed 
ourselves to be, we are actually profoundly social, navigating that sociality primarily 
through emotional intuitions.  In Chapter II, I showed how empathy enables us to read 
and respond to social cues, thereby anticipating the roles that we might play in the ethical 
dramas that surround us.  In Chapter III, I then described the aesthetic and 
phenomenological qualities of empathy that make it susceptible to social mimicry, 
synchrony, and role playing, all of which contribute to empathy’s use for ethics.  I 
explored how empathy can be seen as a form of perception and that, like perception, it is 
influenced by how and what it sees, and does not see.   
Neither perception nor empathy are passive, but actively select, albeit often 
preconsciously, what we pay attention to.  Because they automatically interpret the nature 
of the situation as they have been shaped to do by our habits of thought and feeling, we 
are not consciously aware of the selecting and interpreting process that perception and 
155 
 
empathy are engaged in.  In Chapter IV, I explained the ways that, beginning in 
childrearing, empathy is shaped toward greater or lesser prosocial impulses and skills 
such that we may influence empathic perception and response.  Childrearing forms the 
very habits of attitude and judgment that activate our automatic responses.  Psychologist 
Martin Hoffman thus suggests that what is needed for moral development is active 
cultivation of the empathic sensibilities such that our automatic cognitive responses and 
behaviors are more morally sensitive to the needs and claims of the other.  This requires 
that we have internalized both the regard for the feelings of the other as well as the 
anticipatory guilt should we fail in that regard.  
 In this chapter, I argue that stories are an essential part of this cultivation and 
internalization.  I further claim that one very important way that we continue to sensitize, 
refine, and expand empathic moral perception and moral responsivity in adult life is 
through engagement with stories.   Stories are not merely enjoyable augmentations to 
moral education; they are indispensable to moral development.  As Alasdair MacIntyre 
(1981) claims, “Deprive children of stories and you leave them unscripted, anxious 
stutterers in their actions as in their words.  Hence, there is no way to give us an 
understanding of any society, including our own, except through the stock of stories 
which constitute its initial dramatic resources.  Mythology, in its original sense, is at the 
heart of things” (216).  Stories are expressed in the various forms of storytelling and 
narrative, for example, dramatic theatre, TV shows, films, novels, children’s literature 
and live storytelling.  As short distillations that follow and imitate real life, stories are a 
vital source of moral insight and exploration.  We seek stories, I argue, because they 
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nourish us emotionally, morally, and experientially.  In the next three chapters, I will 
explain how. 
Why Narrative? 
Some ethical theorists may question the relevance or value of narrative 
engagement for the cultivation of empathy or ethics.  How can stories have bearing on 
serious ethical inquiries and argumentation, particularly as many are entirely fictitious or 
even fanciful?  I hope that my discussion so far has offered insight into an answer to this 
question.  If we are not rational, consciously deciding agents most of the time, then we 
require other means than propositional argumentation to move our moral emotions and 
automatic processes in the direction of what we morally value.  In Chapter I, I explained 
the ways in which we are not rational autonomous moral agents, but rather are ultrasocial 
animals who largely rely on feelings to motivate behavior.  Rational argumentation has 
little impact on moral agents in a morally charged moment.  And while a story or its 
characters are no more likely to jump to mind when in the midst of a dilemma, stories 
have a way of embedding themselves in our psychology and our imagination that goes 
beyond conscious reflection.  They walk us through experiences and give us insight into 
potential outcomes. 
What I suggest here is that the stories actually shape our automatic impulses, such 
that we become the stories that we consume.  Whether these stories lead us toward or 
away from what we value will be up to individuals to judge, but the power of story is too 
important to overlook.  I will demonstrate how narratives are intrinsic to human life and 
therefore are already cultivating us morally.  Whether we mean them to or not, stories 
infiltrate our preconscious ideas, beliefs, and attitudes.  Being aware of their influence 
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allows us not only to be selective in what we will consume, but also to consider how 
stories could aid us in our moral self-cultivation projects. 
There are a number of reasons why narrative is a necessary part of any moral 
cultivation project.  1) We are narrative creatures.  Jonathan Gottschall (2012) calls us 
Homo fictus or fiction man, speaking of the seduction of stories which “can sneak up on 
us on a beautiful autumn day, make us laugh or cry, make us amorous or angry, make our 
skin shrink around our flesh, alter the way we imagine ourselves and our worlds.   How 
bizarre it is that when we experience a story—whether a book, a film or a song—we 
allow ourselves to be invaded by the teller” (xiv-xv).   It is natural for us to tell stories, 
whether for humor, to gossip, to pass the time, or to go on imaginative journeys to 
faraway places.   
Engaging stories is more than a way to pass the time, however.  They are an 
important vehicle for understanding ourselves, our lives, and the lives of others.  This is 
because 2) Narratives are meaning-making structures of experience.  They provide 
particular scenarios in which our imagination can experiment with general ideas, claims, 
behaviors, and attitudes.  We can envision life from a particular perspective, not our own, 
try it on or see how it plays out.  This is a kind of deliberation, which according to John 
Dewey (1922), is a “dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible 
lines of action” (190).  Stories take us through experiences that we might not otherwise 
have and then open for us insight into our own lived experience.  They provide us with 
information that enriches such imaginative deliberation insofar as they help us see what 
might be missing from our visions of possibility.  The imagination expands and increases 
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in complexity by engaging stories and can then instruct us in the nuances of living with 
others, showing us both the successes and failures of moral living.    
Finally, narratives are important to a moral cultivation project because 3) 
Narratives entice us into empathic experiences that change our unconscious attitudes and 
feelings.  When we immerse ourselves in narratives, we enter the life of another.  If the 
narrator has access to the interior world of the character, we can see from inside the 
character’s perspective, feel her dispositions, desires, and distastes.  This sort of 
experience helps us to see through another’s eyes, but also shows us what it is like within 
another’s life, given her constraints and limitations.  In his book, I Know That You Know 
That I Know, George Butte (2004) describes the subtleties of wordless knowing that take 
place in fiction.  He shows how characters like the shy and constrained Anne Eliot in 
Jane Austen’s Persuasion communicates what she knows in her shamefaced blush.  
Participating in the wordless exchanges between Anne, Captain Wentworth, and Anne’s 
sister Elizabeth, we see the subtle communiques of body language, and the narrator helps 
us understand what it means.  Anne is ashamed that her classist sister Elizabeth regards 
the man that Anne loves as socially inferior, despite his wealth and success in the British 
Navy.  “It did not surprise, but it grieved Anne to observe that Elizabeth would not know 
[Captain Wentworth].  She saw that he saw Elizabeth, that Elizabeth saw him, that there 
was complete internal recognition on each side; she was convinced that he was ready to 
be acknowledged as an acquaintance, expecting it, and she had the pain of seeing her 
sister turn away with unalterable coldness” (186).   As Anne reads the others in her 
situation, the reader also attends to the tentative glances between Captain Wentworth and 
Anne toward the sister who does not deign to acknowledge him.  Readers share Anne’s 
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anxiety, frustration, and concern in the matter, and in the process, perhaps learn to 
understand such social nuances and their potential meanings more fully for themselves.   
Butte claims that as a novelist, Austen ushered in an experience in deep 
intersubjectivity for the reader by attending to the internal movements of intersubjective 
meaning, bringing them to the reader’s awareness.   
When Anne Eliot watches Wentworth and Elizabeth negotiating complex force 
fields of memory and protocol, the enabling strategy of her story is a new layering 
of human consciousness, or a new representation of those subjectivities as layered 
in a specific way.  Deep intersubjectivity has made its appearance in storytelling 
in modern culture, and it has altered our sense of self and community and the 
discourses that construct and reflect them (4).   
 
Austen teaches her readers the nuances of reading bodies and minds.  By drawing us in to 
the inner worlds of others, stories allow us to see what they see and empathically feel 
what they feel, attracting our attention and perception to what we may not have seen or 
felt before.  They bring the subtleties of our ultrasociality to the fore such that we may 
see their implications for the characters and comprehend new meanings.  As readers we 
can see how her sister’s social snub puts more distance between Anne and Wentworth, 
and we understanding that, as a 19
th
 century English woman, Anne is restricted by social 
mores as to what she may assert on her own without the support of her family.  That, 
together with the shyness and reserve of her own character, means that these looks and 
lack of recognition create a difficult obstacle for Anne’s connection to Wentworth.  Such 
insights aid us in understanding attitudes and expression both similar to and different 
from our own as 21
st
 century Americans.  In this way, stories give us insights into 
possible meanings of social exchanges by distilling lived experience into tighter, more 
cognitively manageable sizes for us to imaginatively enter.  They make explicit what is 
implicit in our own lives and in this way afford us greater self- and other-understanding.  
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Once we are inside these stories, we are moved as the characters move, empathizing, 
sympathizing, expanding, and deepening our moral perspective. 
We Are Narrative Creatures 
What is it that draws us to stories in the first place, one might wonder?  How is it 
that they are able to enchant us over and over such that, almost like a drug, we can hardly 
resist them when they offer their alluring beginnings.  “Once upon a time…” is a phrase 
that signals the beginning of a particular kind of story, one that we generally believe is 
completely made up.  Notice, however, that it nevertheless feels like an invitation.  Even 
if we adults are too sophisticated to be completely drawn in by such an introduction, there 
is an appeal to it.  We may think that fairy tales are hardly necessary for children 
anymore now that we have cartoons and movies to entertain them, but these, too, are 
forms of storytelling.  Recent research in the cognitive sciences is revealing that stories 
play an important role in social cognition.  Literary theorist Jonathan Gottschall (2012) 
states that people are mistaken when they think of reading as passive:  “When we read 
stories, this massive creative effort is going on all the time, chugging away beneath our 
awareness...The writer guides the way we imagine but does not determine it” (4-5).  Our 
imagination joins the author’s creative effort fleshing the images in our imagination.  
Recall my discussion from Chapter II regarding the work of mirror neurons for 
mimicking and how that pertains to empathy.  Similarly, such simulations are occurring 
in narrative engagement.  This is how “authors [can] trick readers into doing most of the 
imaginative work” (4).  When we are reading, just like when we are observing action, 
neurons in our motor and sensory areas of the brain are lighting up in sympathetic 
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response to the imagery suggested in the author’s words.  Gottschall calls this the 
witchery of story.   
Cognitive scientist Ben Bergen (2012) explains that this suggestiveness of the 
brain is due to embodied simulation.  As I have discussed in previous chapters, cognition 
is a complicated business that, rather than being an intellectual ratiocination, is a deeply 
embodied experience.  I have highlighted how this works for empathy and understanding 
the other’s inner world, but it also has implications for how we think and experience the 
world in general.   According to Bergen, embodied simulation is due to the activation of 
mirror neurons in motor and sensory areas of the body which not only simulate, but also 
create meaning (33).  When we think, we are calling up simulations to aid our 
conceptualizations.  We have these simulations stored in groupings that we elicit when 
we need to think.  When we try to answer the question whether gorilla’s have noses, we 
visualize their faces—a familiar pattern from which to discern the particular part in 
question.  “It seems that routine mental activities, like deciding whether a gorilla has a 
nose or whether blenders are loud, engage the specific parts of the brain dedicated to 
different modes of perception and action.  Simulation abounds” (47).  Through such 
simulations, we can imagine the experience in much of its sensory richness. 
Bergen describes how visualization improves the performance of athletes because 
“we humans, more like birds of prey and honey bees, prioritize our sense of sight” (49).  
Our many metaphors connecting sight and understanding indicate this, as in “You see 
what I mean? The argument was crystal clear.”   This is because vision can play an 
important role for understanding.  When we read or hear sentences about visual 
experiences, we “perform embodied simulations of the events they describe—using [our] 
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brain’s vision system” (51).  The simplest actions, like hammering a nail into either the 
floor or the wall evokes visual imagery that corresponds to vertical or horizontal 
movement respectively (55-56).  Such spatial simulations are often carried out in these 
narrative descriptions as the situation for Anne Eliot above.  When she looks at her sister 
and her beloved, we simulate the direction of her gaze and immediately intuit the 
meaning of Elizabeth’s cold snub.  Embodied simulation is how we assimilate and make 
meaning of our experiences in the world by making connections and expanding previous 
understandings.  As I previously discussed regarding the mirroring system, we 
automatically (that is, nonconsciously) simulate what we see (recall Iacoboni and 
Gallese’s experiments from Chapter II).  Due to our ability to see in our mind’s eye 
through embodied simulation, we are able to experience the scenes of the story as if we 
are in them physically, according to Bergen.  This perspective is called the “immersed 
experiencer view” (66).  What this means is that when we are immersed in the narrative, 
we are actually experiencing what is happening in it. 
Through embodied simulations, we are not only simulating what we see, 
activating motor areas of the brain as if we were acting ourselves, but in so doing, we are 
also creating an interpretive import for the actions.  “It appears that language does 
manipulate what perspective you adopt when you mentally simulate objects.  This 
implies more generally that people reading sentences project themselves into mentally 
simulated experiences of the described scenes” (69).  Bergen claims that metaphors may 
augment embodied simulation by adding concrete images.  Metaphors evoke simulations 
from bodily experience, like describing Anne’s sister’s bearing as “chilly,” which 
combine images of mood and cold.   Bergen refers to the works of George Lakoff and 
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Mark Johnson as pioneering theories that show the importance of metaphor for 
cognition.
29
  Bergen suggests that we consider the metaphorical simulation hypothesis as 
the work that is being done concretely beneath our embodied simulations, stating that 
“maybe simulation goes way deeper than we ever thought” (198).  Metaphors, similes, 
onomatopoeia, and the like, work in narratives to provoke the simulations that create the 
experiences of the characters.  These simulations create experiences for us that then link 
up with other experiences and in this way, we make new meanings. 
Gottschall (2012) claims that the mind itself is a storyteller because it is 
constantly interpreting events in the world, as well as our own behavior.  He refers to the 
research of Michael Gazzaniga on split brains in which it was discovered that the left 
brain craves explanations even for inexplicable events and so confabulates interpretations 
(96)
30
.   Gottschall uses a simile based on Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s famous detective, 
whom he claims is not so much of an astute observer as a brilliant confabulator.   “We 
each have a little Sherlock Holmes in our brain.  His job is to reason backwards from 
what we can observe in the present and show what orderly series of causes led to 
particular effects” (102).  He claims that this hunger in humans for the reasons for things, 
or the meaning of things, has been useful for our survival and wellbeing.  “The 
storytelling mind is a crucial evolutionary adaptation.  It allows us to experience our lives 
as coherent, orderly, and meaningful” (102).   This adaptation of our species is not 
without fault, however.  Because our mind does not like uncertainty and ambiguity, we 
tend to invent clarity and meaning and impose that on reality (103).  Nevertheless, the 
impulse to tell and engage stories seems to be prevail in the human psyche.   
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 See Metaphors We Live By, University of Chicago Press: 1980. 
30
 See Gazzaniga’s book The Ethical Brain, Dana Press, NY: 2005. 
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Just as physical and imaginative play in childhood facilitates cognitive and 
physical development, so stories continue to facilitate creativity in thinking and problem 
solving throughout human life.  This play is not always fun; in fact a story of too much 
ease will often bore readers.  We are attracted to stories which take us on excursions into 
darkness and trouble.  Psychologist Jerome Bruner (1991) describes this as a normative 
breach.  We do not need stories about what is working or what is going well.  As Tolstoy 
says in the opening line of Anna Karenina, “Happy families are all alike; every unhappy 
family is unhappy in its own way.”   We need stories about hitches, breaks, and holes in 
the road.  Much like Martin Heidegger’s (1927/2010) description of tool use, we do not 
take note of either the tool or our use of it until it stops working.  The mostly unconscious 
process of tool use works because the tool is basically an extension of our body, “ready-
to-hand,” until it stops working (71-73).  Then we have a problem and need to figure out 
what to do to fix it.  So it is that we hardly notice how we are doing on a given day until 
something disrupts it, causing us problems, often troubling existential problems.  And 
only then do we need imaginative solutions to work through these emerging difficulties. 
Solutions to social problems are particularly tricky due to the complexity of 
human nature.  Because stories take us into the inner world of others, our empathic 
perception is able to experiment with interpreting and anticipating others.  With such 
hermeneutic practice, aided by the guidance of a good writer, we can learn how to fill out 
the contours of the meanings of what we see in the faces of the people in our living social 
milieu, what we hear in their words and tone, and feel in their bodily expressions.  I refer 
to this as narrative empathy and will explain it more fully in a later section.  As Marshal 
Gregory (2009) puts it, “From the time we are born, the narrative cradle of story rocks us 
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to the collective heartbeat of our species, ushering us across the threshold of 
consciousness and into the domain of humanity” (1).  Stories do this by exploring truths 
about the human condition.  As we read and listen to stories, as we tell stories, we 
understand a bit better what it means to be human.  
According to Bruner (1986), narrative is our primary way of organizing our 
knowledge about the social world.  The other form of exploration and analysis is what he 
calls the paradigmatic mode, which is useful for abstracting data and symbolizing it for 
theoretical computations and analyses, such as we utilize for mathematics, the sciences, 
and logic.  He focuses on the narrative mode,
31
 however, as an essential guide for 
understanding intersubjective relations and engagement, which makes it a primary source 
for ethical knowledge.  Further, Bruner (1991) claims that narrative is how we construct 
reality.   Narrative gathers what we learn in life into a kind of a unity.  This is necessary 
because, according to Bruner, knowledge does not accrue in a linear and cumulative 
fashion toward universality.  We cannot achieve a Gestalt, or complete whole, for what 
we know because knowledge accrues in aggregates that are domain specific.   
The growth of knowledge of "reality" or of the mental powers that enable this 
growth to occur, the critics argue, is neither unilinear, strictly derivational in a 
logical sense, nor is it, as it were, ‘across the board.’  Mastery of one task does not 
assure mastery of other tasks that, in a formal sense, are governed by the same 
principles.  Knowledge and skill, rather, are domain specific and, consequently, 
uneven in their accretion.  Principles and procedures learned in one domain do not 
automatically transfer to other domains (2).  
 
These aggregates of knowledge are also partial and particular even as such clusters may 
overlap.  Knowledge clusters are built up by experience and education which clumps 
particular elements together relationally in groupings that are never exhaustive and are 
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 In Ricoeur’s Time & Narrative, he refers to the narrative mode utilizing the semiotic term “syntagmatic” 
(1984 31, 56). 
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culturally determined by the experiencer/thinker’s social milieu.  “[Such a cluster] is a 
little "reality" of its own that is constituted by the principles and procedures that we use 
within it,” according to Brunner (2).  This challenges notions of the universality or 
translatability of knowledge and of knowledge as point-of-view-less.  In this way, 
knowledge is built up for “know-how.”   Perhaps this is how embodied simulation is 
involved in the accrual and use of bodies of knowledge. 
These “cultural tool kits” are what we use to construct our understanding of the 
reality that surrounds us, according to Bruner.  When we come to social knowledge, it is 
even more clear that our knowledge acquisition is not through being “little scientists” as 
children (4).  The way in which we construct our understanding of social reality is 
through narrative.  Narrative is thus not just the way we represent reality to ourselves; it 
is how we construct reality.  “The central concern is …how [narrative] operates as an 
instrument of mind in the construction of reality” (5).  According to Bruner (1991), we 
engage narrative early and often in the form of “stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing 
and not doing, and so on” (4). And its measures of reliability, or verisimilitude, are 
“convention and ‘narrative necessity’ rather than empirical verification and logical 
requiredness, although ironically we have no compunction about calling stories true or 
false” (4).  
He describes a number features of narrative among which are: diachronicity, 
which shows how we experience ourselves and others over time; particularity of 
individuals and their problems; hermeneutic (interpretive) composability; canonicity and 
breach.  Throughout my discussion in this and the following chapters we will look at 
some of these elements of narrative in trying to understand the role of narrative in our 
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lives and for our ethos.  Bruner (1991) draws on Paul Ricoeur’s work in Time and 
Narrative to which I will now turn to develop this point about our narrativity, how it is at 
work when we engage stories, and what happens to us as a result.  Ricoeur builds upon 
Aristotle’s discussion of mimesis as art’s imitation of life, developing a rich and 
comprehensive phenomenology of narrative engagement.  
The Narrative Structure of Experience: Ricoeur’s 3-fold Mimesis 
A great deal of social experience and understanding is accumulated and 
disseminated in and through narrative.  These narratives can be public and shared or the 
smaller, private narratives of family and interpersonal life.  We begin to feed on stories as 
soon as our caregivers, parents and family members begin to tell them to us, and as the 
stories develop complexity, so does our ability to interpret our world.  “The telling of a 
story and its comprehension as a story depend on the human capacity to process 
knowledge in this interpretive way,” according to Bruner (1991, 9).  This interpretive 
ability, like moral skillfulness as I have discussed earlier, is developed through 
experience and practice, which for many of us entails reading, being read to and being 
told stories from childhood on.   
The structure of narrative mirrors that of life, as Aristotle points out, with a 
beginning, middle, and end (50b 26).  This structure facilitates what Paul Ricoeur (1984) 
calls a threefold Mimesis of prefiguring, configuring, and refiguring (54).  For Ricoeur, 
there is a cyclical nature to narrative insofar as it is both the background from which we 
act and the way in which we describe, explain, and defend our actions.  Each act is then 
folded back into the fabric of one’s individual and shared narratives, harmoniously or 
discordantly.   
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Ricoeur highlights the phenomenal and temporal experience of narrative.  He 
shows the way that narrative opens us to the other while the present also is being opened.   
The present moment is “exploded” into three “ekstases:” Mimesis1, Mimesis2, and 
Mimesis.
3
  These perform this prefiguring, configuring
 
, and refiguring function on 
readers and writers alike (61, 54).  Narratives that we tell and read configure the actions 
into a cohesive whole bringing intelligibility to the events.  But action is itself narratively 
prefigured.  When we come to the text, we are prefigured by all the narratives that we 
bring to our perceptual and hermeneutic practices, including our personal dispositions, 
cultural mores, and moral commitments.  As we experience the configuring process by 
engaging the narrative, we ourselves are also re-configured by virtue of the experience 
with the narrative.   
Mimesis
1 
Mimesis is the Greek word for imitation, and art is understood in this way to be an 
imitation of life and action.  Mimesis reveals the relationship between time and narrative, 
action, and normativity.  Mimesis
1
 is the narrative character of experience itself, prior to 
our encounter with fictional or historical narrative.  Ricoeur claims that our ability to 
understand narratives is based on the way experience and action are already narratively 
prefigured.  “...if it is true that plot is an imitation of action, some preliminary 
competence is required: the capacity for identifying action in general by means of its 
structural features” (54).   What this means is that action, as an intelligible event, is 
construed through a narrative structure.  The narrative features that Ricoeur identifies in 
action are: action structure, symbolic import, and temporality.  They facilitate the 
intelligibility of action for us, even if we are not cognizant of them as such.   
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Narratives presuppose our competence in understanding such features of action 
structure as “agent, goal, means, circumstance, help, hostility, cooperation, conflict, 
success, failure, etc.,” (55).  Action structure is itself narrative.  When we describe an 
event, we follow the narrative arc and utilize narrative’s structural elements.  “I was 
driving home from the grocery store when the truck in the left lane made a right turn into 
my car, and I hit the fire hydrant.”  The two agents are myself and the other driver, I am 
motivated to drive home and the other driver was motivated by the need to make a right 
turn, insufficiently ensuring that the lane was clear.  We may not notice the narrative 
qualities of our thinking and explaining, but Ricoeur brings it to our attention.  Actions 
are understandable as they are embedded in narratives.  Understanding narrative, 
is to master the rules that govern its syntagmatic order.  Consequently, narrative 
understanding is not limited to presupposing a familiarity with the conceptual 
network constitutive of the semantics of action.  It further requires a familiarity 
with the rules of composition that govern the diachronic order of a story.  Plot 
understood broadly…as the ordering of the events (and therefore as 
interconnecting the action sentences) into the total action constitutive of the 
narrative story, is the literary equivalent of the syntagmatic order that narratives 
introduce into the practical field (56). 
 
The structure of action itself thus parallels plot structure.  The narratives that we create 
intuitively grow out of the way we experience our lives as actions structured in a 
narrative arc. 
The symbolic import of Mimesis
1
 is concerned with the meaning of events.  “If, in 
fact, human action can be narrated, it is because it is always already articulated by signs, 
rules, and norms,” according to Ricoeur (57).  The symbolic element provides mediation 
between action and knowledge, “symbolic forms are cultural processes that articulate 
experience” (57).  He suggests that our abstract explicit signs and symbols (like written 
language) may be built upon deeper implicit symbols.  It is in this symbolic element that 
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we get to the normative content of narrative insofar as the symbols mediate rules and 
prescriptions for action (58).   
Signs are representations from a given culture, and culture is by definition 
normative.  “The term ‘symbol’ further introduces the idea of a rule, not only in the sense 
we have just spoken of about rules for description and interpretation of individual actions, 
but in the sense of a norm” (58).   Therefore, cultural narratives express this dual sense of 
norms as “What we (our group) do’ and also ‘what we ought to do.”  “As a function of 
the norms immanent in a culture, actions can be estimated or evaluated, that is, judged 
according to a scale of moral preferences” (58).  Such evaluations are relative to the goals 
of a given culture and are thus deemed better or worse according to those goals.  All 
actions are performed and assessed within such structures.  “There is no action that does 
not give rise to approbation or reprobation, to however small a degree, as a function of a 
hierarchy of values for which goodness and wickedness are the poles” (59).  Symbolic 
import then is inherently normative and readers of those signs know this, albeit often 
implicitly and nonconsciously. 
Knowledge of symbolic import is presupposed by our competence in life itself.  
Once we have developmentally acquired the symbolic values of our culture, we 
intuitively know how to navigate them.  This is what Aristotle means by phronesis, or 
practical understanding (61).  The skillfulness of practical understanding increases with 
experience, and such experience depends on the final element of Mimesis
1
, which is time.  
Narrative embeds human action in a temporal structure which synthesizes it into a unity.  
For Ricoeur, we humans experience time narratively; it is the process through which time 
becomes human because it is bound up with our life concerns (61-63).  We care about the 
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causal changes that bring about what we call day and night.  Even the demarcation of the 
time duration of a “day” is rooted in our regard for the import of that passage of time.  
“…a day is not an abstract measure; it is a length that corresponds to our Care and the 
world in which it is ‘time to’ do something, where ‘now’ signifies ‘now that...’  It is the 
time of works and days” (63).  Our care invests those changes with the meaning of time.  
When Paul McCartney laments the losses of Yesterday, we understand the pathos of a 
time that is past, full of fond feelings or regrets.  It is because of our regard that yesterday 
matters in a different way than today.  Time becomes human through narrative.  
Ricoeur borrows from Heidegger’s discussion of time in Being and Time, in 
which humans are defined not only by mortality, beings-towards-death, but also by their 
care.  Our care is what makes time explicit for us.  “Within-time-ness is defined by a 
basic characteristic of Care, our being thrown among things, which tends to make our 
description of temporality dependent on the description of the things about with we care” 
(62).  Our attempts to speak of the present moment as “now” expresses our concern with 
action as it is occurring: “we say ‘now’ in our everyday acting and suffering” (63).  The 
present moment, or now, felt as a unity, is, according to Ricoeur, comprised of three 
movements in time, namely past, present, and future.  
 In the act of mimesis, of the artful and creative imitation of life, in this case in 
narrative, the present moment is opened up into three “ekstases” as Ricoeur puts it.  By 
this he means that the present is revealed in its threefold complexity as always being 
bound up with the past and the future (60).  There is never a pure present as such.  The 
present instead contains this threefold tension of what we might call a past-present, a 
present-present, and a future-present, which Ricoeur describes as memory, attention and 
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expectation (21).  I will explain this more in the next section as it pertains to all three 
mimeses at once. 
Mimesis
2 
Mimesis
1
 is then the narrative prefiguration of action, the way in which action is 
meaningful as an event.  We experience and interpret action through the prefiguring 
narrative structures of cognition.  As I said, the mimesis is threefold in that it prefigures, 
configures, and refigures (54).  In mimesis
2
, the configuration of action in the plot 
mediates the prefigured understanding that we bring to the narrative and the refigured 
understanding (mimesis
3
) with which we emerge from the story.  Narratives open up our 
present reality, facilitating deeper intelligibility for us as subjects and for our relations 
with our worlds, as well as our responsivity to those relations (77).  The prefiguring of 
mimesis
1 
folds into the configuration of the plot by carrying forward our expectations 
based on who we have been up to the point of the configuration of the plot.  “To imitate 
or represent action is first to preunderstand what human acting is, in its semantics, its 
symbolic system, its temporality.  Upon this preunderstanding, common to both poets and 
their readers, emplotment is constructed and, with it, textual and literary mimetics” (64).  
We readers and storytellers understand, mostly unconsciously, the import of human 
action as full of relational meaning as expressed in story form.  Mimesis
2
 is the 
movement from narratively prefigured action to the configuration of the plot, or 
emplotment. Ricoeur creates this neologism to characterize the action of ordering the 
events of a plot into a narrative, showing the dynamic quality of its creation. 
Emplotment is the narrative process of configuring events into a unified whole 
with a beginning, middle and end.  It is an abstraction, insofar as stories are taken out of 
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the larger intersubjective web of experience and meaning, isolating a particular arc of 
events, and distilling those events into a cohesive plot.  Emplotment is shaped by 
mimesis
1
.  Because human time is narrative time determined by our care, we construct 
plots according to our care.  Regarding the accident which I described above, we care 
about such events—bad things can happen in such events—so their components are 
charged with dramatic import.  It is a mutually defining process as our care shapes the 
plot and the plot “transforms the events or incidents into a story…mediating between 
events and a narrated story” (65).  Care motivates our action and our understanding of 
that action as narrative.  In mimesis
2
, we explore possibilities for our care. 
Ricoeur calls mimesis
2
 the kingdom of “as if” (64).  This as if allows the 
storyteller and the reader to imagine.  The structure through which such imaginings are 
possible is the plot.  The plot according to Ricoeur mediates in three ways: between 
individual events and the story as a whole; by unifying disparate elements such as 
“agents, goals, means, interactions, circumstances, unexpected results;” and by 
synthesizing temporal characteristics (65-66).  The plot transforms the series of events 
into a story, a unified whole comprised of events, agents, and periods of time.  This need 
not mean that the time or events occur chronologically.  Such events may appear to be 
completely unrelated save for the way the plot brings them together in relation to the 
protagonists or antagonists.  There is a “grasping together” in the work of emplotment 
that synthesizes the various elements, and, in so doing, creates a wholeness replete with 
meaning.   
To follow a story is to move forward in the midst of contingencies and peripeteia 
under the guidance of an expectation that finds its fulfillment in the conclusion of 
the story.  This conclusion is not logically implied by some previous premises.  It 
gives the story an ‘end point,’ which, in turn, furnishes the point of view from 
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which the story can be perceived as forming a whole.  To understand the story is 
to understand how and why the successive episodes led to this conclusion, which, 
far from being foreseeable, must finally be acceptable, as congruent with the 
episodes brought together by the story (67). 
 
The acceptable, congruent qualities of the ending are what give us a sense of a 
story’s being satisfying, but this is not merely a subjective assessment.  Plots have 
intentions in the form of a point or theme, and these themes are rooted in the temporal 
orientation of the story.  The point of the story is reached in the end.  Whether it is a 
tragedy or a comedy, its fulfillment completes the thematic meaning.  And the sense of 
the passage of time in the narrative also repeats certain either thematic elements or refers 
to events previously in the story and in this way repeats and closes the cycle of the story 
(67-68).  
Ricoeur shows how narrative is both normative and bound to its history.  Human 
life is penetrated by narrative thought and, as such, narrative is accountable to human life.  
He draws an analogy between narrative and a tradition.  “A tradition is constituted by the 
interplay of innovation and sedimentation” (68).  So it is that narratives take up the 
history of stories, even as they problematize them or our relation to them.  Narratives 
both articulate and structure human life.  Our engagements with them assist our own 
efforts to configure meaning out of the events of our lives.  Through our repeated 
engagements with narratives, our own pains can be transformed into sources of meaning 
and value that ease our suffering and connect us to our fellow humans.  Such an effect 
can only be realized by our proper comportment toward the text, “This only takes on its 
full scope when the work deploys a world that the reader appropriates” (50).  Thus it is 
that we transition to mimesis
3
 and understand the accountability that we have toward the 
text. 
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Mimesis3 
In mimesis
3
, narrative refigures the reader’s life by entering the world of lived 
experience through the reader and her worldly engagements.  Time is a key feature of this 
because narrative affords the opening of the present into the past-present, present-present, 
and future-present.  The past-present is our memory, our history our very selves as 
intersubjective beings up to that point.  The present-present is the opening up of 
attentiveness and receptivity to the narrative and its implications.  The future-present is 
the anticipation, expectation, and yearning that reaches into the future, bringing the 
present forward into the next existential moment (63). 
Mimesis
1
 is the way in which the present reaches into the past through memory, 
history and the like, as well as how the past moves in the present.  Mimesis
1
 carries the 
prefiguring background of the cultural milieu forward into Mimesis
2 
which is the 
configuration of action in the narrative.  Mimesis
3
 is the refiguring future-present 
mediated by the configuration of the narrative.  The cycle of narrative engagement 
expresses the circle of mimesis.  “Mimesis3 marks the intersection of the world of the text 
and the world of the hearer or reader; the intersection, therefore, of the world configured 
by the poem and the world wherein real action occurs and unfolds its specific 
temporality” (71). 
The refigured present is brought forward and into the existential world of lived 
experience altering one’s perception and hermeneutics and thus one’s moral activity in 
the world.  It is a three way dialectic in the present moment.  “In this dialectic, time is 
entirely desubstantialized.  The words ‘future,’ ‘past,’ and ‘present’ disappear, and time 
itself figures as the exploded unity of the three temporal ekstases.  This dialectic is the 
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temporal constitution of Care” (61).  Care is regard for the future which is implicated in 
the present, which grows out of the past of the present.  The now is bound to its past-
present and its future-present such that the now is pulled in three ways at once. 
I want to show how this might work by looking at my own recent engagement 
with the novel, A Tale for the Time Being by Ruth Ozeki (2013).  This book is 
particularly apt insofar as the author explores themes of just this sort regarding the 
narrative and normative interplay between reader and characters.  The two main 
characters are women who have life experience in the U.S. and Canada and are Japanese.  
Ruth, a middle-aged Japanese-descended woman from New York, lives in Desolation 
Sound on the west coast of British Columbia, and Naoko (pronounced NOW-ko) a 15-
year old Japanese girl lives in Tokyo.  Nao (her nickname) grew up in the upper-middle 
class privilege of Sunnyvale CA, but has been forced to move back to Tokyo after the 
dot-com bubble burst in 2000.  Nao’s father loses his job and the family finances are 
drastically altered when they return to the extremely expensive city of Tokyo.  They live 
in a trashy apartment with prostitutes and other impoverished families.  Nao is in the 
difficult position of being bi-cultural in a society where such a quality is not at all 
esteemed.  The dramatic change in her social status, in addition to Nao being fairly far 
behind her peers in Japanese education and culture, leaves her vulnerable to severe 
bullying, even torture, and psychological duress.  Her parents with their private pains 
neglect Nao and she is forced to cope with her social troubles relying on her own limited 
skills.   
We meet Nao through her diary which has washed up on the shore of Desolation 
Sound in BC soon after the 2011 Japanese Tsunami occurred.  It is sealed in a plastic bag 
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and Hello Kitty lunchbox along with a WWII Japanese Air Soldier watch, some letters 
written in Japanese and some in French.  The finder of these items is Ruth, a novelist who 
is currently lost in her memoir that will not progress.  She becomes obsessed with Nao’s 
story and the other artifacts in the collection. 
Ruth loses the thread of her own time as it seems to become intertwined in Nao’s 
narrative.  Ozeki reveals the shiftiness of the present moment for reader and character 
alike, as I, like Ruth, become absorbed in Nao’s drama, and fear for Nao’s life; we care 
very much about her fate.  Nao also wrestles with the present moment throughout the 
novel (“Nao” is a homophone with the English word “now”) as she tries to navigate 
serious challenges in her young life, trying to grasp the fleeting present to slow it down 
and make it more manageable.   She experiences this now as a slippery fish.  “NOW felt 
like a big fish swallowing a little fish, and I wanted to catch it and make it stop.  I was 
just a kid, and I thought if I could truly grasp the meaning of the big fish NOW, I would 
be able to save the little fish Naoko, but the word always slipped away from me” (98).   
The fish also represents the anxiety that Nao feels in the pit of her stomach 
regarding the bullying, her suicidal father, and her despondent checked-out mother (180).  
Ruth, fearful that Nao may commit suicide, searches frantically on the Internet for a way 
to connect with Nao’s family to warn them and help her.  This story becomes entwined 
with Ruth’s own story and her perception of time slips into confusion.  “[W]hen Ruth 
was gripped by the compulsive mania and hyperfocus of an Internet search, the hours 
seemed to aggregate and swell like a wave, swallowing huge chunks of her day” (91).  
She finds a former friend of Haruki’s (Harry), Nao’s father, at Stanford University.  She 
emails him her query for contact information and states that her search is urgent.  Ruth’s 
178 
 
husband, Oliver, on hearing about this later, is surprised at her sense of urgency.  He 
points out that the Tsunami just happened (2011), and that Nao would have been writing 
back in 2000-2001, so the diary is around a decade old (312-13).  Either Nao survived 
that difficult time and is now an adult, or she didn’t.   
In either case, there really is not a cause for urgency.  Ruth is confounded, 
speechless.  She had believed that Nao was in imminent danger.  “It wasn’t that she’d 
forgotten, exactly.  The problem was more a kind of slippage.  When she was writing a 
novel, living deep inside the fictional world, the days got jumbled together, and entire 
weeks or months or even years would yield to the ebb and flow of the dream…Fiction 
had its own time and logic.  That was its power” (313-14).  The reality of the diary’s 
time, ten years prior to her time had slipped into the present for Ruth.  Her sense of time 
was muddled by the sense of immediacy in reading Nao’s diary.   
What happens to Ruth in the novel often happens to us readers as we fall through 
the rabbit hole of a story.  Like Ruth, I want to know if Nao comes out okay and rush 
through the pages seeking a resolution to her suffering.  Readers feel an urgency which 
may provoke us to pause from our own times, to more quickly devour the time of the 
narrative.  We are worried when the problems heighten, and relax when they are safe.  
When we meet Nao’s old Jiko, her great-grandmother, a nun in the Pure Land Buddhist 
tradition, we feel relief because Jiko takes Nao to her temple where she is safe from the 
confusion of her world.  Old Jiko teaches Nao Zazen (siting meditation) to help Nao cope 
with her challenges.  Grandma Jiko teaches her the practices and theory of inner strength 
that helped Jiko to overcome her hatred against those responsible for the death of her son, 
Haruki, Nao’s father’s uncle.  Jiko calls these practices Nao’s “supa-powa” and the 
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reader hopes and worries whether it will be enough to protect her (182-3).  The story 
compels the reader forward as we begin to see some of the subtlest ways in which our 
intersubjective lives interface with one another across time and space, and even including 
quantum possibilities when Ruth seems to have an impact on future pages of Nao’s diary.   
Nao, as a vulnerable girl, unprotected in a hostile context, claims our concern, and 
commands our sympathy, much like Oliver Twist in Dickens’ famous story.  How can it 
be that we feel compelled to help someone across time and space and even fictional 
worlds.  What draws us in?  Because the setting of Ozeki’s novel is placed in North 
America and in Japan, I have some cultural resonances on entering the text as well as 
some challenges.  Resonances may ease us along path, while challenges can impede our 
imagination and our sympathies or they can spur us to imaginative creativity—perhaps 
growing our cognitive empathy.  As the reader, I am prefigured as a west coast American 
who lived in San Francisco at the time of the dot.com crash, and in South Korea in the 
late 90s, so some of Nao’s story resonates with me through my experiences, though only 
as a Westerner.  Some of my Korean-Canadian friends shared with me that they were 
badly treated by the Koreans, while we European-descended North Americans were 
regarded and treated well, even if not as equals.  Even apart from any of my prefigured 
access points into Nao’s story, most readers will share Ruth’s reactions of concern, anger, 
and fear for Nao’s wellbeing as poverty, unemployment, social ostracization, and 
bullying are fairly universal woes. 
Like Ruth, when I return to my world, I still think about and worry about Nao.  
My time and care become intertwined as her narrative enters my world.  I am refigured 
through the configuration of her story.  I can recall the feelings from my own life 
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experience as a teenaged young woman and its difficulties.  My few instances of bullying 
were nothing to the severity of hers, but I note that like her, my bullying happened when I 
was emotionally and socially vulnerable.  Unlike her, I had other options for my 
education.  Nao’s story has also refigured my perception and interpretation of the many 
young people I see.  I know that many young people like Nao do not have the protections 
of adults to correct bullying and abuse, or to remove them from unsafe or unsavory 
situations.  When Nao becomes a Ronin
32
, wandering lost like a “wave person,” I think of 
the many homeless youth, the desperate, and the so-called travelers, in my community 
and wonder how they fare.  Nao has impacted my sensitivity to their vulnerability.  
Already responsive to Nao’s situation, the reader may find that his sympathies reach out 
to the many teens suffering so in his own city. 
This is the way in which what Ricoeur describes as the exploded present opens up 
in narrative experience.  I remember my past as a teen and feel the similarities and 
differences with Nao’s life.  I consider the needs of teens in the present, and of my own 
boys who are not yet teens and the jeopardy that they may witness, if they are not subject 
to it themselves.  Nao’s story opens my empathic perception to wider considerations that 
both draw on and expand my experience.   
Ozeki makes explicit the impact of engagement with text in her novel as she 
provides Nao with a text for her to engage—the diary and letters of her great uncle, Jiko’s 
son, who is tortured and later dies as a Kamikaze pilot in WWII.  Reading of her uncle 
Haruki’s torture and forced suicide flight, Nao learns to put her own suffering in 
perspective (251-58).  Nao processes this as Ruth and I have been processing her 
                                                          
32 Ronin is an old Japanese word for a master-less samurai. The term now means a youth who has failed her 
entrance exams and isn’t going to school (2013 41-42). 
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suffering.  And now, I, too, am thinking with horror of the severity of  Uncle Haruki’s 
torture.  What I know of WWII, I know from American history books and media.  My 
21
st
 century perspective on this historical event now contains the images of Haruki, and 
his mother Jiko, who became a nun to mitigate her own hatred of the Japanese militants.  
“When Jiko found that her only son was going to die as a suicide bomber, she wanted to 
commit suicide, too, but she couldn’t because her youngest daughter, Ema, was only 
fifteen years old and still needed her.   So instead...Jiko decided to wait until Ema was a 
little older…[Jiko] would shave her head and become a nun and devote the rest of her life 
to teaching people how to live in peace, and that’s pretty much exactly what she did” 
(180).  I feel the repercussions of that history vibrating through Nao, and her father who 
was named for this uncle, and this quiet, ancient little nun Jiko, and wonder how it is for 
contemporary Japanese here in the U.S. and in Japan.  As Ben Bergen’s (2012) account 
of embodied simulation describes, images evoked by this story make my experience of 
their suffering and their growth viscerally real for me.  And thus written upon me, they 
become part of my story. 
As I mimetically engage Nao and Ruth’s stories, I am not merely mimicking what 
I read about, like lived experience, narrative mimesis evokes creative interpretation and 
interaction with the experience.  Ricoeur (1984) invokes the expression mimesis praxeos 
to explain how the narrative refiguring through mimesis
3
 affords opening for ethics.  This 
is why it is not mere copying of an inert object.  Mimesis is a dynamic practice, begun in 
the imagination, and completed in the life.  “But the praxis [of mimesis] belongs at the 
same time to the real domain, covered by ethics, and the imaginary one, covered by 
poetics, suggests that mimesis functions not just as a break, but as a connection, one 
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which establishes precisely the status of the metaphorical transposition of the practical 
field by the muthos” (46).  Mimesis thus connected narrative experience up with living 
practices in the material world.  Engaging Nao and Ruth’s stories changes my view of my 
own story, my view of history, of Americans and Japanese in WWII and in the present.  
As their stories have infiltrated my imagination, so do their plights, actions and sufferings 
infuse mine.  My practical action in the world, my ethics will be moved by the events of 
this story.  In this overlapping experience of the narrative’s imaginative reality and my 
lived reality, there is a transferal of meaning that changes my normative orientation and 
thus my world. 
In this way, my prefigured experience that I had brought to my present lived 
moment and my present engagement with Ozeki’s narrative is refigured by the 
configuration of her story.  
 
Mimesis2 has an intermediary position because it has a mediating function.  This 
mediating function derives from the dynamic character of the configuring 
operation that has led us to prefer the term emplotment to that of plot…the 
dynamism lies in the fact that a plot already exercises, within its own textual field, 
an integrating and, in that sense, a mediating function which allows it to bring 
about, beyond this field, a mediation of a larger amplitude between the 
preunderstanding and, if I may dare to put it this way, the postunderstanding of 
the order of action and its temporal features (65).   
 
Ricoeur’s point is that through our imaginative interactions with a given narrative, the 
realities of the character’s world, as they play out in the narrative’s slice of time, are 
exported back to our experience of our own world.  It does this to us in part through the 
existential aspects of the narrative.  The existential realities of the narrative awaken the 
reader to her own existential realities.  Realities like depression, suicidal thoughts, 
warfare, and our own powerlessness before government bodies.  She may ask how she 
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would endure the tortures that either Nao or her uncle faced.  What would she do?  Such 
questions call forth from us a reshaping of our thoughts, attitudes and feelings that we 
have had heretofore
33
.  As such we emerge from the narrative experience refigured.  And 
through Mimesis
3
, our world is also refigured, both in our perception of it and action in it, 
and in its subsequent responses to our refigured action.  “It is only at the end of our 
traversal of mimesis that [we see that]… narrative has its full meaning when it is restored 
to the time of action and of suffering in mimesis3” (70).  The time of action and suffering 
is our lived time.  This insight has implications for how shared narratives may impact our 
shared world. 
Ozeki has altered my thoughts, my feelings and perceptions of historical events 
and particularly of the way our lives are shaped by the experiences and pains of our 
families.  The pain readers feel on behalf of Nao, her uncle Haruki #1, and her father 
Haruki #2 teaches us greater sensitivity and solicitude for the unknown sufferings of 
others’ inner worlds, particularly for those whose despair is leading to suicidal thoughts.  
This is the working of the threefold mimesis.  It is a creative imitation that Ricoeur 
(1984) describes as a “dialectic of coming to be, having been, and making the present” 
(61).  My past engages Nao and Ruth’s pasts and presents, as I come to understand the 
anxieties and anticipations they feel, and my present and future engage theirs, as I yearn 
toward their respective goods at the end of the novel.   
Moreover, when Jiko, both of the Harukis, and even Nao herself rise up to noble 
heights of morality and care for others, I feel the yearning to likewise rise and grow in my 
sensitivity and solicitude for the wellbeing of others.  This could not be so without the 
prefiguring work of Mimesis
1: “To imitate or represent action is first to preunderstand 
                                                          
33
 See discussion of preconscious attitude shifts below Green & Carpenter and Sara Hodges also. 
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what human acting is, in its symbolic system, its temporality.  Upon this 
preunderstanding, common to both poets and their readers, emplotment is constructed 
and with it, textual and literary mimetics…literature would be incomprehensible if it did 
not give a configuration to what was already figure in human action” (64).  The threefold 
Mimesis uncovers the narrative structure of reality in action and time.  However, 
narrative also figures into our very identity. 
Narrative Intelligibility and Identity 
While my own actions can be unclear to me at times, and the import of events 
surrounding me can elude me, time in the world of the story can render back to me a 
clarity that makes my own self and world understandable and even more livable.  
Livability in this world for humans is bound up with the very strange phenomenon of 
selfhood.  We may unconsciously perform many of the tasks of our day, rarely thinking 
about this sense of ourselves, this “feelingness of the experience of the connected me,” as 
Antonio Damasio (2010/2012) describes it (4).  And yet, this me-ness is precisely what is 
at stake in all those mundane activities.  Me and mine motivate much that I do in this life, 
to whatever degree of success or failure.  I am the protagonist of my own story, but what 
does that mean, and what does it do for me? 
Narrative aids our self-understanding by providing an intelligible framework for a 
felt sense of me-ness, not only a point-of-view which is mine, but also the concomitant 
feelings, impressions, and memories that comprise my autobiography.  According to 
Damasio (2010/2012), in his book, Self Comes to Mind, the sense of self emerges in 
relation to its worldly interactions.  He suggests that as events occur between the 
protoself (the self that is not yet narratively defined) and the world, there is a gathering of 
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images in a nonverbal narrative that evokes a scene in which our point-of-view is, for us, 
the primary player:  “The self comes to mind in the form of images, relentlessly telling a 
story of such engagements” (216).  Narrative, as the structure of experience, unifies our 
experience and synthesizes disparate events into a meaningful whole.  It is therefore an 
essential feature of how we understand the world and how we make sense of our role 
within it.   
Mark Johnson (1993) points out that narrative is critical for intelligibility (175).  
To the objection that narrative is not necessary for knowledge, Johnson responds that 
“Our allegedly ‘synchronic’ understanding is but a slice of a more fundamental 
diachronic development of experience” (176).  Through narrative, we can understand the 
social world by situating our point-of-view, qua protagonist, within the unfolding drama 
which embodies other actors (agential and non-agential), some of whom are the 
protagonists in their own stories, and in whose dramas, we are actors.  This understanding 
informs our moral responses.  Johnson makes the strong claim that “human action is 
irreducibly narrative in character and that, consequently, moral theory must give a central 
role to the narrative structure of our experience and to the narrative form of our moral 
deliberations and explanations…stories are lived before they are told, because our very 
experience is narratively structured” (177).  This calls for a radical reappraisal of the role 
of narrative as a source of knowledge and meaning.  To adequately understand our 
possible roles in this world, we need narratives to provide us with possibilities. 
Human self-understanding is rooted in a narrative structure and as such, forms our 
identity.  We are the heroes, heroines, and villains of our own stories.  Our stories are not 
consistent, however, and that can trouble our sense of identity as a unity.  The idea that 
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our identity is rooted in a narrative, might suggest more consistency than there actually is.  
Instead, Ricoeur (1984) provides explanation and a productive tension for the diversity of 
the narrative self, calling it a discordant concordance.  This discordant concordance 
gathers disparate elements and makes meaning of the whole despite what has been left 
out of a complete chronology (31).  In a later work, Oneself as Another, Ricoeur (1992) 
describes this discordant concordance as a “synthesis of the heterogeneous” in the 
individual (141).  The narrative self pursues a cohesive sense of self, which emplotment 
affords, but that does not mean that the self is always in harmony with itself.  Rather, we 
are striving to find and achieve accord not simply with our selves as we are, and our 
histories as we have been, but also with our values, and the growth that we seek in 
becoming who we could be.  It thus that, like the three-fold mimesis, the past, present, 
and future, are at work in the self of the present moment.  We are made up of a history of 
which our present moment is the fruit; but we are also reaching toward the future and 
toward a self that we want to be.   
This discordant concordance then brings disparate parts of ourselves, our 
histories, and our possibilities together in a narrative unity, but it does not resolve all the 
tensions that such disparity brings (42).  The disjunctions of our experience and our 
activity in the world remain, but narrative composition brings together the heteronomous 
objects, like plot, characters, actions, histories, helpers, hinderers, locations into a whole.  
Time is part of this narrative composition as well, because narrative, by definition is 
diachronic.  Ricoeur states, “I propose to define discordant concordance, characteristic of 
all narrative composition, by the notion of the synthesis of the heterogeneous.  By this I 
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am attempting to account for the diverse mediations performed by the plot: between the 
manifold of events and the temporal unity of the story recounted” (141). 
According to Ricoeur, narrative identity not only gathers the discordant elements, 
but, also responds to a long-standing philosophical problem of identity over time.  
Ricoeur’s discordant concordance addresses the diachronic identity through narrative 
identity, claiming that narrative expresses a dialectic between one’s numerical and 
qualitative identity, and one’s sense of oneself as a person over time (141).  Ricoeur 
refers to the numerical/qualitative identity and the sense of personhood in Latin as idem 
and ipseity respectively (116).  The former is one’s sense of sameness as a person, which 
is often identified with the body, and the latter is one’s selfhood or inner world.  We 
sometimes abstract them from each other analytically, but the two are deeply intertwined.  
For example, if I am a soccer player, my sense of who I am inside is concerned with, and 
attached to, my skill and performance as a soccer player.  If I am saddened by the death 
of my best friend, I may lose some of my skillfulness on the field.  One might think of the 
idem and ipseity in terms of one’s what-ness and one’s who-ness respectively (116-118).  
Catriona Mackenzie (2008) provides a helpful elaboration and explanation of these terms: 
The characteristic ipseity, or mineness, of the first-person perspective is also 
central to Paul Ricoeur’s…phenomenological analysis of selfhood in Oneself as 
Another.  Ricoeur argues that personal identity should be understood as a dialectic 
between sameness (idem identity) and selfhood (ipse identity).  Sameness refers to 
both numerical and qualitative identity; to those dimensions of our identity that 
can be described in third-personal terms, such as our biographical histories, traits 
of character and temperament, social roles, bodily attributes and so on.  Selfhood 
(ipseity) refers to the first-personal phenomenological perspective of an embodied 
subject both at a time and extended over time; to the sense of “mineness” or 
“belonging” that characterizes one’s own experiences, memories, body and 
characteristics” (10). 
 
188 
 
Mackenzie claims that “narrative identity” assists developing theories about the 
self by elevating what Christine Korsgaard (1996a: 101) calls “practical identity,” above 
a metaphysical one.  The discordant concordance of narrative facilitates a functional 
unity where one may struggle to articulate one logically, according to Ricoeur (1992, 
141ff). The elements of one’s life as an intersubjective cluster of interrelations and 
interdependencies often have the character of disparateness and discordance; narrative 
facilitates a synthesized meaning.  As Mark Johnson (1993) puts it, Ricoeur “argues that 
it is the temporal character of human experience that calls for narrative ordering…our 
actions are…intertwined into an experiential web that develops over time” (174).  The 
narrative ordering makes a meaningful whole, while still preserving the tensions and 
conflicts in one’s identity and experience.   
The meaning of this unity can facilitate intelligibility for our lives.  As the 
narrative of self moves forward along his plot, the elements of the plot come together in a 
synthesis of meaning that makes all the events seem almost necessary, according to 
Ricoeur (1992).  “This necessity is a narrative necessity whose meaning effect comes 
from the configurating act as such; this narrative necessity transforms physical 
contingency, the other side of physical necessity, into narrative contingency, implied in 
narrative necessity” (142).  Configuring the elements of our narrative, we may find that 
events or actions of our history, which at the time seemed disruptive and incongruous, 
seem in hindsight to have been necessary to what we have since become.  In this way, the 
discordant concordance provides a way of synthesizing and assimilating the meaning of 
our lives. 
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Stories help us in this process as we see their characters wrestle with the events of 
their lives, and as the plots exhibit and enact the meaningful whole of the characters’ 
discordant concordances.  We may find the plethora of shifts, changes, and losses in our 
life experience as mystifying sometimes.  Stories can help by making explicit, what for 
us, immersed in our own narrative lives, is implicit and inexplicable.  We may then see 
the ways in which our own discordances have advanced our own plots.  Sometimes, the 
insights are not so explicit. Nevertheless, leaving one’s own life for a time, getting lost in 
someone else’s story, can make returning to one’s own life easier.  Stories can provide 
insight and meaning by instructing us about the myriad ways of being human, inviting us 
into one another’s worlds, binding us to one another, and giving us the pleasure of 
meaning.  That is their seduction, or witchery as Gottschall describes it.  They draw us, 
just like Alice was drawn, and like Alice, we fall. 
Narrative Seduction: Empathically Entering the Worlds of Others 
Narratives entice us into empathic responsivity with characters and their lives, 
sensitizing us to broader and deeper perceptions and judgments of others.  Narratives 
have the power to expand our empathic regard to include more people and particularly, 
those from different groups than those we inhabit.  Empathy is the cognitive process that 
facilitates both the emotional engagement with the story and the ability to feel with the 
experience of the living other.  Recall that empathy is related to mimesis as we saw in 
Chapter II.  Imitation itself engenders empathic feelings.  Empathy seems to be an 
important part of what links both the practices of entering the story and of taking the 
point of view of the other in living ethical situations.  Sometimes these practices bring us 
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the joy of shared pleasures, other times, they instigate meaningful connections with 
fellow sufferers.  Stories and human interactions promise both joy and suffering. 
Narrative seduction takes place in a variety of ways.  The first line of seductive 
attack is often in the beginning of the book.  For example, “It is a truth universally 
acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a 
wife” (51).  This famous first line from Austen’s Pride and Prejudice intrigues us by its 
ironic wit so that we cannot help but be drawn in to the next line.  “However little known 
the feelings or views of such a man may be on his first entering a neighborhood, this truth 
is so well fixed in the minds of the surrounding families, that he is considered as the 
rightful property of some one or other of their daughters” (Ibid.).  Austen entices us with 
a wry humor that laughs at such social expectations, even as it sets the stage for how such 
expectations might unfold.  
Once inside the story, narrative is not only a powerful means of stimulating 
empathic responsivity, it also persuades readers perhaps more effectively than 
propositional rhetoric.   As we saw earlier, regarding embodied simulation, imaginative 
experiences stimulate motor and sensory areas of the brain, thus evoking in us the sense 
of lived experience.  Psychologists Melanie Green and Timothy Brock (2000) 
investigated the influence of narrative on beliefs and attitudes to show how persuasive 
they are, both in impacting beliefs and in attracting the reader to protagonists.  The more 
imaginatively vivid, well-written, and engaging the narrative, the more persuasive it is 
and the more likable characters become (717-719).  This is due in large part to the 
experience of transportation which readers have when immersed in reading.   
191 
 
Transportation is “a convergent mental process, a focusing of attention, that may 
occur in response to either fiction or nonfiction.  The components of transportation 
include emotional reactions, mental imagery, and a loss of access to real-world 
information” (703).  The level of immersion is a key aspect of the transformative power 
of the text, since distractions weaken the grip of imagination.  Some participants were 
deeply engrossed (highly transported) and others more weakly so (low transport).  Their 
relative absorption pertained to their relative accordance with the story and its themes.  
Green and Brock refer to this reading style as immersion.  “Immersion (involving 
imagery, emotionality, and attentional focus) [engrosses the reader] in another setting 
with temporary distancing from a reader’s original situation,” (718).   The effects of 
transportation from immersed reading were that “highly transported participants reported 
beliefs more consistent with those implied in the story…[as well as] just-world beliefs 
that were more story-consistent than low-transported participants” (706).  Green and 
Brock found that the quality of the writing and its status (literary canon or best-seller list) 
influenced the level of transport, indicating the social influence of our response to the 
stories we read. 
Absorption in the narrative was also impacted by the frame of the task.  Some 
readers were asked to perform critical tasks, like evaluate the difficulty of the words for a 
fourth-grade reader, while others in the “theater” group were asked to “become” the 
character.  Findings indicated that the latter group experienced greater transport, but 
interestingly, the group analyzing for words sometimes forgot the task, getting immersed 
in the story instead (710).  The seduction of the story may have been too compelling to 
stay outside as critic.  Immersion in the story attracted readers’ beliefs and attitudes 
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toward those of the story, like crime doesn’t pay.  Unfortunately, this is true regardless of 
the legitimacy of the source, and can result in ambivalent outcomes in that “narratives 
might be used to advantage by low-credible sources or by speakers who lack cogent 
arguments” (719).  The key insight from their findings is that the greater the transport, the 
more the reader’s beliefs leaned toward those of the story. 
Transport seems to be the result of a highly resonant experience of mimesis 
between the reader, the text, and life.  When we are transported, the story comes to life, 
vividly carrying us to its world with its people.  According to Raymond Mar and Keith 
Oatley (2008), this is why narratives are so useful for social cognition.  They claim that 
literature is a simulation of social life and as such is instructive in self and other 
understanding. “Narrative fiction models life, comments on life, and helps us to 
understand life in terms of how human interactions bear upon it” (173).  Mar and Oatley, 
like Ben Bergen (2012), claim that the simulation is possible because cognition is 
embodied.  They point out that the discovery of mirror neurons has facilitated greater 
understanding of how these simulations are occurring below the level of consciousness 
(179).  They reference data that shows how hearing certain words evoke resonant 
emotional responses (180).  “The simulation of social experience that literary narratives 
afford provides an opportunity for empathic growth” (181).  There appears to be a link 
between empathy in real life and empathy in stories.  We are, in fact, often developing 
neuronal circuitry that assists in empathy’s growth when we read stories.   
Given that we humans tend to understand ourselves as pleasure seekers, it makes 
sense that we pursue and enjoy narratives that give us pleasure, but why are we willing to 
read stories that cause us pain?  How can we be seduced into undergoing discomfort, 
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pain, or even suffering?  Antonio Damasio (2010/2012) conducted studies to explore the 
different emotional responses of admiration and compassion in reading experiences.  He 
found a number of very interesting results, but most importantly, he found that physical 
and mental experiences in the readings were experienced differently in the brain.  It was 
not the sentiments of admiration and compassion that divided the brain responses, but 
whether the events were physical or mental.  “The shared feature of one pair of 
conditions—skill and physical pain—was the involvement of the body in its external, 
action-oriented aspects.  The shared feature of the other pair of conditions—the 
psychological pain of suffering and virtuous act—was a mental state” (137).  He found 
that the older brain responses, those of the body, like physical pain, occurred faster than 
those of compassion for mental pain.  The mental pain took longer to dissipate, however 
(138). 
Maybe this explains why the pain of being immersed in a story with physical 
violence is intense initially, but what remains with the reader are the affective 
experiences of admiration and compassion.  As an American white woman, engaging 
narratives which describe the suffering of non-whites at the hands of whites is painful.  I 
am well cultivated in the historical realities of white enslavement and the oppression of 
African descended people, as well as the concomitant guilt for the privilege of my 
ancestry.  And while I can extrapolate reasonably well from the accumulation of my 
understanding of suffering what it might have been like to be African American in the 
south in the 30s and 40s, reading The Color Purple, made it palpably real to me.   
I was inside Celie, experiencing the world from the perspective of a young, small, 
vulnerable black girl with no protection.  Her passionate love guards her sister from 
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similar suffering, and endeared me to Celie, making me want to protect her.  There is no 
white perspective in the story; whites are either perpetrators of violence, or ignorantly 
complicit with it.  The pain of shame as a white reader was endurable though, because 
Celie herself is such a compelling character.  My humanity was attracted to hers, rooting 
for her overcoming her obstacles. 
Empathy urges me to help, but how does one help a fictional character?   By 
engaging such a narrative, might we be witness to the suffering?  Following Celie as she 
grows and is loved by Shug, and watching Celie develop her voice, her autonomy, and 
ultimately herself as an artist and entrepreneur, I have the pleasure of sharing in her 
growth.  The history of her wounds form the soil from which she grows into a heroine 
capable of humaneness beyond what most of us achieve.  This calls forth my admiration.  
Her story satisfies what Ricoeur identifies as narrative fulfillment.  Perhaps the 
satisfaction of accompanying Celie in her overcoming of oppressive circumstances is 
what makes it feel worthwhile as an emotional and imaginative engagement.  Narrative 
seduction, in relation to narratives of suffering, is not a schadenfreude, or pleasure in 
another’s pain, nor a maudlin wish to wallow in hard things.  The attraction is that of life 
itself—the chance to experience, to learn to face challenges, and grow.  Celie’s world is a 
hard world, but it is a world so different from my own that I find I am partly drawn by 
that very difference.  What keeps me engaged is not merely fascination, however, but 
care.  I came to care for Celie, desiring her safety and self-fulfillment.  By following 
Celie through the hardships of life’s pains, I learn some of the texture and taste of that 
pain.  Such experience is a little like the education of hard knocks. 
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Painful stories like The Color Purple deepen our understanding of and regard for 
the weals and woes of the human condition.  And yet, while painful stories invade our 
private world and alter our feelings, they are still a kind of safe space for such an 
experience, according to Raymond Mar and Keith Oatley (2008).  Because the 
experience, viscerally real as it is, is not physically dangerous, we can step back from it 
and consider it in a way that we cannot do in lived experience.  “The structure and 
expectations of literature that encourages empathy in order for comprehension to occur 
also permits the reader to pull back cognitively and emotionally when desired and thus 
may be ideal for fostering understanding between different groups [of people]” (181-2).  
Reading stories affords us a distance that makes it easier to engage even the elements of 
suffering.  Perhaps we are being stretched in this process of imaginative engagement in 
such a way as to enable ourselves to be willing to engage such suffering in our lived 
experience as a result.  Perhaps I will be a little less naïve or insensitive with my black 
friends and neighbors as a result. 
Additionally for the sake of expanding empathy, engaging narratives of groups 
different from oneself can facilitate the possibility of improving sympathy when one 
actually encounters members from those groups, according to Mar and Oatley (183).  
Greater exposure to literature might then improve one’s empathic abilities and hone one’s 
social inferencing skills.  “By engaging in these emotional experiences, we may not only 
gain a greater understanding of emotions and of their breadth and quality, we may also 
pick up emotional cues implicitly communicated by the author” (187).  These influences 
are, of course, not limited to the printed word insofar as “a good film or television show 
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may demand as much complicated mental-inferencing processes as would a good novel” 
(186).   
The format of the story will bear upon the engagement, so that too is important.  
One must know oneself, one’s audience, class or group, as well.  Stories provide us a 
private place to experience the inner life of the other, a particular point of view for a 
particular time in history or place in the world.  Transported in time, place, and 
perspective, we can immerse ourselves in utterly new, strange, or even fearful 
experiences.  Reading books allows us a critical distance on the experience that allows a 
measure of control over our environment and the pace of our immersion.  We can pause, 
look up, ponder, or take a break.  This allows us a freedom with the text that may not be 
as easy in audio-visual presentations of story.  When I finished reading The Color Purple 
for the first time, I sobbed.  I was alone at home when I closed the book.  I felt the weight 
of history, a profound breach in the human family, and worry for how such a breach will 
ever be healed.  I felt anguish for the people of Celie’s story, for the women who had to 
struggle so hard just for a modicum of reasonable treatment.  I marveled at Celie’s ability 
to overcome these fearful and overwhelming obstacles, feeling exhilarated as she began 
to take her stand in the world.  Her triumph in calling her husband Albert a small man 
made me exhale in relief.   
One might also feel so moved by the film The Color Purple.  Because I had seen 
the film prior to reading it, I saw Whoopie Goldberg and Oprah and Danny Glover as I 
was reading.  And yet, my reading of this story was more poignant, more powerful, and 
more emotionally evocative than watching the film had been.  In my case, this might 
have been partially due to personal distress.  Recall that personal distress is generally 
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viewed as an impediment to empathy, in that it overwhelms the individual with 
uncomfortable feelings, potentially causing disengagement and avoidance rather than 
helping behavior.  Reading a painful story, as opposed to watching it, allows the reader 
the ability to disengage without necessarily disrupting the mood.  One can slow down the 
pace, allowing for a reflective tempering of emotional intensity.  Oatley (2010) makes the 
point that we need intimacy, but also distance from characters and stories to fully receive 
the narrative.
34
  Reading this story afforded me a kind of privacy that the film had not 
done.  Books also have the advantage of giving us more inner monologue and reflection 
of the characters than films can.  As such, books lend themselves to reflection, while 
films are rather like action in living experience in that it is less amenable to stopping and 
contemplating.  Reading about the violence that she and her friends and family endured 
was offset by Celie’s reflective inner world of writing and contemplations.  Her 
meaningful inner world made the hard outer world easier to bear somehow.  The 
accessibility of films, TV shows, etc., improves their reach, however, as reading takes 
more time and energy.  Films also provide a vividness of sight and sound that for some 
consumers is a readier captivation, and necessary to facilitate consumers’ engagement 
with the poignancy of the meaning. 
Keith Oatley (2009) claims that reading stories is an essential part of educating 
emotional understanding and empathy.  “In fiction, we can practice empathetic feeling by 
exploring our emotions in circumstances encountered by the characters, and thereby also 
understanding these characters” (211).  This is true of narrative generally, including 
films.  These imaginative engagements are experiences, and like the experience of our 
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 Note that this article of 2010 bears the same title as Oatley’s previous article from 1999, but has different 
content. 
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lived existence, they teach us about life, others, and ourselves.  Ricoeur (1984) claims 
that, “We tell stories because in the last analysis human lives need and merit being 
narrated.  This remark takes on its full force when we refer to the necessity to save the 
history of the defeated and the lost.  The whole history of suffering cries out for 
vengeance and calls for narrative” (75).  Such suffering, even in stories, makes a claim on 
us.   
Empathic Solicitude and the Claim of the Other 
Care motivates us and informs our interpretations of the world and its events, 
according to Ricoeur (1984, 1992).  It also draws us out of ourselves, and through our 
empathic perception and imaginative powers, into the world of the other, whether living 
and close by, or inside the world of a story.  Such stories, like the people who have 
suffered their dramas, seem to make a claim on us.  While we cannot physically help the 
Nao’s and Celie’s of the stories, we can be witnesses to their unfolding.  We can feel 
their inner struggles.  These stories need to be told and heard because they help articulate 
the range of possible meanings in the human condition.  Such insights can teach us much 
about ourselves, about the histories that may precede our own and one another, helping us 
to make meaning in our own lives and contribute to the meaning in others’ lives.   
The virtue of benevolence (ren) that the Confucians extol may be strengthened by 
being immersed in such powerful stories because of the way they teach us a deeper 
appreciation of what other people’s lives look like, and help us consider how we would 
feel in their shoes.   Such practices are actually sources of fulfillment, I argue, because 
they facilitate both personal growth and meaningful ways of connecting with other 
humans.  This is precisely what Ricoeur (1992) claims the human project seeks when he 
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says that selfhood depends on the other for fulfillment of the two-fold requirement of the 
good life: pursuit of excellence and friendship.  The possibility of personal growth 
depends on meaningful relations with others, a dialogical rather than a monological one.  
He develops his theory of this dialogic relation in his discussion of solicitude.   
  The powerful sentiments that I experienced while reading The Color Purple 
were made possible by what Ricoeur references as “the beautiful name of solicitude” 
(180).  Solicitude is our need of others for fulfillment in life.  In agreement with Aristotle 
in the Nichomachean Ethics (1.7.1098a), Ricoeur also emphasizes that the ethical aim or 
intention in life is the pursuit of excellence and of friendship (172).  We are driven by 
dual purposes as humans, personally to seek to realize our potential, which engenders 
self-esteem, but from this striving, we discern that we cannot do this without meaningful 
and moral relations with others.  Our ability for achievement in life is mediated by the 
“role of others between [our] capacities and [their] realization” (181).  Comprehension of 
our need of others is solicitude, which is the key to motivating ethics and is thus vital to 
any moral cultivation project (182).   
This need is felt both as a need for belonging with others and the need to be 
recognized as valuable by others.  It is essential to self-realization, which means that it is 
not only up to us to succeed in our endeavors.  Such striving is subject to the winds of 
fortune and the wills of others as well.  Practical wisdom, or phronesis, according to 
Ricoeur, is directed at the optimal behavior and actions that will facilitate both self-
realization and connection with others, as actors and responsive participants (172-178).  
As I discussed above, narrative identity of the self is a gathering of ourselves both as 
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actors and sufferers in this life.  Narrative elevates (by unifying) disparate actions into a 
somewhat unified character, a narrative of activity and endurance, or suffering.   
The idea of the narrative unity of a life therefore serves to assure us that the 
subject of ethics is none other than the one to whom the narrative assigns a 
narrative identity.  Moreover, while the notion of life plan places an accent on the 
voluntary, even willful, side of what Sartre termed the existential project, the 
notion of narrative unity we find in all stories places its accent on the organization 
of intention, causes, and chance that we find in all stories.  The person appears 
here from the outset as suffering as well as acting, subject to those whims of life 
which have prompted the fine Hellenist and philosopher Martha Nussbaum to 
speak of the “fragility of goodness,” the fragility of the goodness of human action 
that is (178). 
 
Narrative is our primary structure for understanding our experience, precisely 
because it creates such a unity of acting and suffering.  As reciprocal beings, incapable of 
making sense of our lives without others, we reach out to narratives like we reach out to 
other people, to attempt to make our weals and woes intelligible.   Understanding this 
reality facilitates the mutuality of our regard and actions.  “Reciprocity is part of its most 
basic definition and so encompasses the question of the primacy of philautia” (183).  
Philautia is self-love in the Aristotelian sense of being one’s own friend by pursuing 
excellence.  Ricoeur makes the age-old question of the primacy of self versus other a 
moot question because neither can exist as a self without the other.  Solicitude expresses 
itself as openness and receptivity to the other (180).  It is not an addition to our self-
cultivation projects, but a requirement for its fulfillment:  “Just as solicitude is not an 
external addition to self-esteem, so the respect owed to persons does not constitute a 
heterogeneous moral principle in relation to the autonomy of the self but develops its 
implicit dialogic structure on the plane of obligation, of rules” (218).  Because the drive 
to grow and increase in competence and skillfulness depends on meaningful relations 
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with others, selfhood manifests only in and through relation to the other.  By virtue of our 
own solicitude, our need of others, we are solicited both by living and imagined others. 
Empirical research on ultrasociality and empathy, as discussed in Chapters I 
through III, supports this view that we cannot thrive without one another.  And since we 
are dependent upon one another even for our selfhood, we reach out to one another in 
solicitude.  Empathy facilitates our perception of the meaning of other’s cues and our 
insight into the proper response, thus fulfilling solicitude’s need.  This accounts for the 
pleasure that we have in connection with others.  As I have shown, empathy helps us to 
intuit the nature of situations and the sentiments and moods of others and how to 
accommodate them given our own aptitudes and skill levels.  This is true also of 
imaginative engagements like stories.  As a form of imitation, we can both write and read 
imaginative creations and feel their liveliness in our own hearts and minds.  Novels like 
Ozeki’s and Walker’s indicate the kinds of engagements possible, if we accept the 
invitation.  Empathy facilitates both our immersion in and response to such stories.  It is 
because we care that we are drawn into stories.  Narrative woos empathy into relations 
with those whom we might never meet, but who depend on us and on whom we depend 
for intelligibility, for meaningful connection, and for the realization of improving our 
social and natural world through greater cooperation and collaboration.   
By immersing ourselves in novels, we allow ourselves to be transformed.  Ricoeur 
uses the term refigured for the final movement of the three-fold Mimesis.  We have 
brought what we carry into the text which has seduced us into relinquishing our bags and 
losing ourselves, losing time, in the encounter with the story’s world and its characters.  
Richard Kearney (2001) calls this transfiguration, insofar as we are found or made in the 
202 
 
crossing over itself.
35
  Through the very heart of our care (about our own projects and our 
relations with others), we are remade into a different form of our self.  However we 
conceive of or characterize this movement of experience, we are forever marked. 
It may be that we emerge from the narrative seduction a slightly (or perhaps 
dramatically) different self.  Like those who eat the fruit in Hades, now we are owned by 
the story, by the lives who have touched us.  Perhaps being owned in this way is how we 
become more humane.  In the next chapter, I will deepen the point about our 
interdependence and vulnerability to one another and suggest how this study might have 
implications for our personal and collective moral cultivation projects. 
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 In the fleeting moments of being between our own world and the storied world we are neither ourselves, 
nor an other, but somehow both, according to Kearney.   
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CHAPTER VI 
NARRATIVE ENGAGEMENT AND MORAL GROWTH 
Obtuseness and refusal of vision are our besetting vices.  Responsible lucidity can be 
wrested from that darkness only by painful, vigilant effort, the intense scrutiny of 
particulars.  Our highest and hardest task is to make ourselves people “on whom nothing 
is lost.” 
~ Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge (Henry James) 148 
 
Fan Chi asked about ren (humaneness). The Master said, “Cherish people.” 
When he asked about knowledge, the Master said, “Know people,” 
and Fan Chi did not understand. 
~Confucian Analects XII.22
36
 
Narrative, we should see by now, is a powerful medium through which we create 
meaning in our own lives, understand those lives within a larger web of narratives, and 
come to understand the inner worlds of others.  What narrative does for us ethically then 
is to touch the chords of empathy to draw us into the story, into concern for the 
characters.  Narrative has the power to seduce us into caring, if we will be seduced.  
When we emerge from the story, the alterations in our perceptions, interpretations and 
feelings come into play with our world and alter the way we see it and interact with it.  
This is the refiguring that is done to our prefigured selves by the configuration of the 
narrative.  Over time, this may mean changes in our understanding and shifts in our 
character.  A key concern in this chapter is how to assess whether the work being done by 
the narratives we engage is promoting habits toward the growth of empathy or its 
contraction. 
I began my discussion in this work by looking at the need for a more empirically 
grounded view of human nature that recognizes that others are essential to our ultrasocial 
natures and that the emotions play a key role in moral cognition.  I focused on empathy as 
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being a vital cognitive process to understand and develop for improved social relations 
and individual wellbeing.  I have now brought narrative in as an essential part of any 
cultivation project for the growth, refinement, and expansion of empathy.  I refer to this 
process as the cultivation of the empathic moral perception because moral perception is 
engaged in interpretation and judgment.  Like Aristotle’s discussion of phronesis, or 
practical judgment, the empathic moral perception has a lot of work to do in discerning 
what is the right thing to do and how best to do it.  So, the maturation of empathic moral 
judgment is essential to moral growth.  Moreover, this growth through moral cultivation 
requires an empathic regard for others, as a basis for prosocial action.  This, in turn, 
requires a deeper appreciation of interdependence and the obligation that grows out of 
that interdependence.  That obligation may be understood as reciprocity. 
It may be asked, however, why such an ethical project is necessary.  For Ricouer 
(1992), we need such means to fulfill our solicitude.  Solicitude, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, is rooted in a proper understanding of the individual’s pursuit of the 
good life.  According to Ricoeur, the good life is only possible in interdependence with 
others.  Solicitude, or the recognition of one’s need of the other, assists us in fully 
developing reciprocity.  Through the work of engaging narrative and cultivating empathy, 
we can enrich our understanding of ourselves and others as subjects who deserve the 
respect and care that reciprocity requires.  Through engagement with narratives, empathy 
can be developed to be more astute in its powers of observation, which I call narrative 
empathy
37
.  Empathic perception can then lead to a proper appreciation of our need of 
                                                          
37
 Suzanne Keen defines narrative empathy as, “Narrative empathy is the sharing of feeling and 
perspective-taking induced by reading, viewing, hearing, or imagining narratives of another’s situation and 
condition. Narrative empathy plays a role in the aesthetics of production when authors experience it (Taylor 
et al. 2002–2003: 361, 376–77), in mental simulation during reading, in the aesthetics of reception when 
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others, or solicitude, in this case as our teachers.  It can further assist us in envisioning 
good and bad ways of living out our reciprocity.  
Narrative Empathy: Ricoeur on Reciprocity 
Paul Ricoeur’s (1992) claim is that all action is narratively prefigured, and that 
narrative is inherently moral, that is, morally laden.  So it is that our social interactions 
are always morally charged.  We are always responsible to our normative expectations 
which are expressed in our stories.  Ricoeur explains this reciprocal relation that is at the 
center of narrative’s normativity.  At the heart of our engagement with others and our 
engagement with narratives is our deep need of others, or solicitude. In order to realize 
our possibilities for growth and meaning as humans, we must realize and live out the 
recognition that such realization is only possible in reciprocity with others. 
Ricoeur explains this dependence in detail by laying out the nature of the 
reciprocity of self and other.  Reciprocity involves three aspects of the self-other relation:  
1) reversibility, 2) nonsubstitutability, and 3) similitude (193).  Reversibility means that 
depending on who addresses whom, the “I” becomes “you” and the “you” becomes “I” as 
in “I am talking to you” and “Well, I am not listening to you.”  Nonsubstitutability is the 
value of each individual as that particular individual (217).  My sons are not 
interchangeable and losing either would not be compensated by the presence of the other 
or some other child, because each one is absolutely unique and irreplaceable.  Similitude 
is the recognition that the other and I are of equal value and have equal claims to the 
human goods of life.  This equality is expressed in the Golden Rule by Hillel and Jesus. 
“Do not do unto your neighbor what you would hate him to do to you,” and “Do unto 
                                                                                                                                                                             
readers experience it, and in the narrative poetics of texts when formal strategies invite it” 
(http://wikis.sub.uni-hamburg.de/lhn/index.php/Narrative_Empathy). 
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others as you would have them do unto you” (219).38  Similitude recognizes two things, 
first, that the other is of as much moral value as oneself, and second, that the other has 
feelings, aptitudes and aspirations that have equal right to consideration as one’s own.  In 
other words, it is the humble recognition that I have no more moral worth than another, as 
well as the recognition that I have just as much as another.  Both are true and facilitate 
what Ricoeur calls my self-esteem and my solicitude for the other. 
The pursuit of individual wellbeing depends profoundly on one’s attentiveness to 
moral reciprocity, according to Ricoeur.  Solicitude awakens us to our need of and 
dependence upon the other to thrive, but reciprocity recognizes the other as having as 
much of a claim to justice as oneself.  The obligatory quality of this reciprocity compels 
the ethical agent in a broad and important way.   Ricoeur calls this the ‘norm of 
reciprocity’ (219).  Reciprocity helps us resolve the tension between our need for others 
and Kant’s 2nd formulation of the Categorical Imperative that requires us to treat other 
people as ends in themselves, and therefore never to use them as mere means to our own 
ends.  
Just as the appraisal of good will as unconditionally good seemed to us to assure 
the transition between the aim of the good life and its moral transposition in the 
principle of obligation, it is the Golden Rule that seems to us to constitute the 
appropriate transitional formula between solicitude and the second Kantian 
imperative.  As was the case for the esteem in which we hold good will, the 
Golden Rule appears to be part of the endoxa acclaimed by Aristotle’s ethics, one 
of those received notions that the philosopher does not have to invent, but to 
clarify and justify (219). 
 
The norm of reciprocity has the more universal quality of a claim than the endoxa, 
or commonly held beliefs or ideas of a particular culture.  Unfortunately, while it may be 
                                                          
38
 Confucius also has a negative formulation in Analect V.12, “What I do not wish others to do unto me, I 
also wish not to do unto others” (2001). 
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the case that we are deeply dependent on one another, and that the norm of reciprocity is 
as universal as anything can be, cultural practices often do not reflect such realities.  We 
in the West are mired in myths of rugged individualism that deny the norm of reciprocity. 
Thus, we may need to shape our projects of moral cultivation to be more accurate 
representations of our real need of one another.   Accepting and taking up the 
responsibility of our interdependence ought then to infuse our moral cultivation projects, 
both public and private.  What we need are habits of mind and practice that keep us 
mindful of our interdependence and the obligation of reciprocity.  With practice, what 
Ricoeur identifies for flourishing, self-esteem through growth and solicitude in improved 
moral skillfulness, may be developed into a reliable ethos. 
Habits are what strengthen the elephant that I spoke of in Chapter I (automatic 
cognitive-affective processes) in tending in a particular direction whether that is toward 
mere self-indulgence or fulfillment.  As John Dewey (1922) famously said, “Character is 
the interpenetration of habits” (38).  How we behave toward others, facilitating affiliation 
or disassociation, is the product of how we have conducted ourselves on a day to day 
basis.  Such is our character: to be friendly, courteous, respectful, considerate and helpful, 
or less so.  “Of course interpenetration is never total,” according to Dewey.  “It is most 
marked in what we call strong characters.  Integration is an achievement rather than a 
datum.  A weak, unstable, vacillating character is one in which different habits alternate 
with one another rather than embody one another” (38).  A character that is consistent 
with itself will, in its variety of expressions, still reflect overarching values with 
reasonable harmony.  One who esteems respect for others will not regularly be 
inconsiderate of her student’s feelings or struggles.  One who values simplicity will not 
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habitually flash expensive accessories before his friends.  And aspects of character which 
are outliers in our values will have to be redirected if we wish our character to be in 
harmony with itself. 
The habits of awareness of what is due the other could be considered a matter of 
decency.  The practice of treating others with a modicum of respect and courtesy 
facilitates an abiding awareness of our shared humanity and our equal claims for social 
goods.  If our practice of cultivating such habits is regular and consistent, we can improve 
the likelihood of our behaving with the decency that we esteem.  We can lose good 
habits, if we do not mind their keeping.  And if we have bad ones, we can reflectively 
consider what changes to make and how to implement them.  Interestingly, in support of 
the moral intuitionist perspective (versus the rationalist one) Dewey observes that 
thinking obtrudes in the active effort to alter a habit.  If, for example, one wants to change 
from slouching one’s shoulders to holding ourselves up straight, “We must stop even 
thinking of standing up straight.  To think of it is fatal, for it commits us to the operation 
of an established habit of standing wrong…We must start to do another thing which on 
one side inhibits our falling into the customary bad position and on the other side is the 
beginning of a series of acts which may lead into correct posture” (35 emphasis mine).  
The best means of altering an undesirable habit is by “instituting another course of 
action” that takes one the direction one prefers (35).  This is common advice for quitting 
smoking: avoid sitting in favorite spots, take a walk after dinner (to avoid the lighting up 
stimulus), begin a new hobby, etc.  So, the rider (controlled consciousness) can project 
ways to create new habits and work to entice the elephant (automatic processes) into 
them. 
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Moral growth requires something of us in our unconscious attitudes and 
behaviors, however, which may pose an obstacle that merely altering our outward 
behaviors may not be sufficient to move.  Again, narrative engagements with good stories 
may supply the remedy because as they carry us forward, transported with concern for 
the protagonist, they are wooing our moral attitudes.  Habitually reading good books can 
slowly influence our moral attitudes in the direction we want to go.   According to Dewey 
“…every experience both takes up something from those [experiences] which have gone 
before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after” (1938, 35).  
Engaging narratives provides just such opportunities for experience that can augment our 
lived experiences.  Narratives offer experiences that can stretch us beyond what might be 
problematically complacent habits so as to consider points of view that trouble such 
complacency.  Narrative engagement thus can be a means of identifying misguided 
attitudes or discordant habits, so that we can then reflectively identify the necessary 
correctives. 
Experience is necessary for growth, but we can only have so many experiences in 
one life.  Narratives provide us with particular and complex experiences almost as vivid 
and visceral as lived experience.  We can never live as many experiences as we can read 
about, never live in as many places, in other time periods, or in another person’s skin.  In 
stories, this is just what happens.  Stories thus open up possibilities to consider new ways 
of being in the world.   As Dewey (1922) puts it, “Activity does not cease in order to give 
way to reflection; activity is turned from execution into intra-organic channels, resulting 
in dramatic rehearsal” (191).  In these “dramatic rehearsals” we can refine our empathic 
perceptions and hone our responsive skills.  Experience changes us, alters our 
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perceptions, judgments and feelings about ourselves, others and our world, and narrative 
can help make sense of those shifts.  Ricoeur (1984) claims that narrative makes explicit 
what we implicitly and unconsciously experience every moment of every day.  The 
process of putting it together into a narrative form, or emplotment, is the process of 
making experience intelligible to ourselves (54).  Not only can narratives assist us in 
making more sense of ourselves and our place in the world, but by taking us into the 
world of the other, they can make the other’s subjectivity more vivid to us. 
  Good narratives, therefore, provide powerful opportunities for growth.  The 
quality of the engagement, however, will determine its value and usefulness to such 
practices, so moral judgment is required in consideration of what contributes to and what 
detracts from developing insight into the demands of solicitude.  In these sub-sections, I 
will look at some suggested criteria for what makes good stories good.  These criteria 
show the responsibility of the relation of self and other again in the light of writer-reader, 
reader-writer (or film-maker—viewer), highlighting the normativity of writing and 
reading themselves. 
Authentic Craftsmanship: Moral Fiction and Moral Readers 
Walt Disney Studios has long been criticized for the ways in which stories like 
Cinderella and Snow White have limited women’s self-perception to being good, kind, 
and helpless, in need of a man’s protection.  Disney Studios has sought to correct such 
images with characters like the Scottish Princess, Merida, in Brave (2012), who refuses to 
marry a prince and is instrumental in saving her mother.  When a girl dresses up as 
Merida or Elsa from Frozen (2013), her princess images include those of power and 
strength, and love of family versus romance.  Narratives can further entrench or 
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problematize our current cultural mores, which is why marginalized groups protest when 
their ethnicities or religions are dramatized in too limited a scope or portrayed in 
offensive stereotypes.    Thus it is crucial that we attend to the shaping influences of our 
stories.  Many readers and viewers are already intuitively aware of the power of 
narratives to influence our self-regard as well as our attitudes towards others.  What is 
needed is practical reflection on which stories are strengthening our empathic moral 
perception, increasing our harmonious behaviors, and which are not.  What are our 
stories, whether 30-second sitcom-like commercials, or three-hour movies on slavery, 
telling us, or should I say, making us?   
To apply the adjective “moral” to fiction will give pause to many readers, who are 
opposed to censorship, but the same readers will likely require that a fiction have the ring 
of truth.  According to John Gardner (1978) in his book Moral Fiction, the difference 
between moralistic fiction and moral fiction is how the author approaches the writing 
engagement.  Moralistic fiction sets its agenda for the moral import of the story and then 
manipulates the words and events to suit that end, e.g., Pilgrim’s Progress.  Moral 
fiction, on the other hand, is an inquiry into a problem, usually related to some aspect of 
the human condition, and it is approached as an exploration.  The author undergoes the 
work of composition discerning the authentic words, images, and paths for his characters.  
In this painstaking work, the artist’s “imagination is working close to the conscious 
surface,” according to Gardner (117).  In this aesthetic inquiry, the author explores and 
discovers, allowing his imagination to guide the process.  As Garner says, “A strong 
imagination makes characters do what they would do in real life” (118), rather than 
suiting the writer’s agenda. 
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Integrity, in the process of imaginative inquiry, insists on an honest drawing of 
the characters, events, and themes, which must speak to the realities and contingencies of 
the human condition, for “true art is moral” (105).   He does think that writers should 
“hold up models of decent behavior” and that they should as Tolstoy said, “make people 
be good by choice” (106).  More importantly, however, the authenticity of the writing is 
evinced in the writer’s own engagement with the text in which “the writer discovers” 
such truths as she then “communicates to the reader” (107).  He claims that this is done 
through what Aristotle has identified as mimesis: “a writer learns simply by imitation” 
(109).  Avoiding the ease of stereotypes, “he understands by sympathetic imitation what 
each character has done throughout and why…” (109).  The writer asks herself questions, 
probing the characters and listening to their habits thus far for answers.   “To learn about 
reality by mimicking it, needless to say, the writer must never cheat” (110).   
The writer of moral fiction is thus called upon to attend to the “right” words and 
movements of her imagination.  She may not, no matter how cleverly she writes, make 
characters do unnatural things if she wants the work to be taken seriously.  Even humor is 
serious.  It is work to create a well-executed and right-fitting humorous moment or 
phrase.  George Eliot and Charles Dickens, for example, often have humorous characters, 
either simple folk with superstitious ideas, or higher class folk with vanity or excessive 
decorum, but both authors allow many such characters to have complications that allow 
us to regard them compassionately, or to have genuine insights that the reader must 
acknowledge.  And bad characters, foolish ones, vicious ones must not be disingenuously 
drawn either, to support either a moralistic end, or what is merely cruel and ugly for its 
own sake (126).  Honesty in the writing requires honest renderings of character, then, but 
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also attentiveness to the implications of the words themselves.  The craft of good writing 
requires attentiveness to every aspect of the work—the words, metaphors and ideas.   
Words conjure emotionally charged images in the reader’s mind, and when the 
words are put together in the proper way, with proper rhythms—long and short 
sounds, smooth or ragged, tranquil or rambunctious—we have the queer 
experience of falling through the print on the page into something like a dream, an 
imaginary world so real and convincing that when we happen to be jerked out of 
it by a call from the kitchen or a knock at the door, we stare for an instant in 
befuddlement a the familiar room where we sat down, half an hour ago, with our 
book (113). 
 
Gardner here opens a window into the phenomenon of transportation.  This is 
what it feels like to be transported, and what often happens to us as we read.  He further 
shows why it matters for moral life.  Such transports allow reflection on lived experience:  
“In fiction, we stand back, weigh things as we do not have time to do in life; and the 
effect of great fiction is to temper real experience, modify prejudice, humanize” (114).  
The structure of a fiction is often itself a means for such reflection and discovery.  In his 
view, the device of suspense is what aids the reader in achieving new insights by making 
“the decision [of the character] philosophically significant” (115).  In Jane Austen’s 
Persuasion, for example, Captain Wentworth delays renewing his solicitations of Anne 
Eliot when they are again in company and he has made his fortune at sea (she had been 
persuaded by her godmother Lady Russell to break off her engagement when she was 19 
and he going to sea).  She perceives his manner of reserve as the product of a cooling of 
regard, but he later reveals that it was anger, resentment, and pride. He shares with her his 
regret that he nearly undermined his own happiness by giving in to such dejection.  This 
realization is much more satisfying and insightful later in the novel because, by his delay, 
we have been allowed to watch Anne’s unfolding self-understanding.  As she reflects on 
her past action in breaking their engagement, she finds that she does not regret following 
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the advice of Lady Russell, even as she would not advise anyone else likewise.  And 
Wentworth, we find, had to discover his own deep regard for her by almost missing his 
opportunity.  We more fully apprehend all that might have been missed because we have 
followed their winding paths back to mutual regard and declarations.  According to 
Gardner, the suspense written into the plot allows readers to participate in the discovery 
that the characters achieve (115). 
For the writer and the reader then, we are learning and thinking in the imaginative 
process of engagement.  “The writing of fiction is a mode of thought because by imitating 
we come to understand the thing we imitate.  Fiction is thus convincing and honest but 
unverifiable science (in the old sense of knowledge): unverifiable because it depends on 
the reader’s sensitivity and clear sense of how things are, a sense for which we have no 
tests” (116).  This honesty should not be confused with what Gardner regards as an 
excessive and misleading emphasis on whatever is the “cruelest and ugliest [as] the 
truest,” which seems to have gotten even more pronounced since Gardner’s day (126).  
Honest imitation does not celebrate brutality. 
His view of artistry accords with Martha Nussbaum’s in claiming that “working at 
art is a moral act” (126).  Nussbaum (1990) claims, “The author’s conduct is like moral 
conduct at its best…the artist’s task is a moral task” (163). The seriousness of the writer, 
which is not moralistic, demands of the reader a reciprocal engagement.  In order to be 
capable of learning the insights that the writer has painstakingly undergone, the reader 
must also put himself at stake in the work.  When he falls into it, he must give way and 
follow it out. 
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So, when we consider what kinds of stories to consume, we ought to consider 
questions of authenticity regarding the worlds in which we roam.  We must learn to 
detect a false from a true artist.  “A false artist is after power and the yawping flattery of 
his carnivore pack,” while the “soul of art is celebration and discovery through 
imitation,” according to Gardner (120).  “Edifying” is a term that has been applied to 
certain good books and films, but this may easily be confused with what Gardner calls 
mere sermonizing, and while sermons may be good in their way, they are not generally a 
means of imaginative simulation, transport, and refiguration, unless perhaps they engage 
in good storytelling.  Yet, if we reconsider what is edifying apart from sermonizing, 
certain qualities in the work will emerge, while others will leap out as the very opposite 
of edifying. 
Marshall Gregory shares Gardner’s concern for the moral import of fiction.  
Gregory’s book Shaped by Stories (2009) describes the many ways in which fiction plays 
a shaping role, not just for individuals, but for culture, as well.  “Dictators conquer, but 
stories infiltrate” (22).  This happens bit by bit.  Reader by reader, we are culturally 
influenced by the stories we share.  Stories like Pride and Prejudice and To Kill a 
Mockingbird affect the way we think and judge according to a certain regard for gentility 
and decorum.  Gregory claims that Elizabeth Bennet
39
 and Atticus Finch
40
 are two 
companions in his inner world, accompanying him and checking him when he is 
disinclined to be virtuous (82-83).  Gregory identifies the moral quality of fiction with 
regard to the values of promoting or obstructing appropriate respect for and treatment of 
others. 
                                                          
39
 The heroine from Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice. 
 
40
 The hero from Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird. 
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The power of stories is as ambivalent as lived experience.  They have a pernicious 
as well as a benevolent power.  The goal of ascertaining the moral worth of a story is not 
to suggest that we ought not to read those with lesser or no value, but that we need to be 
mindful of the work they are doing, because they are shaping us whether we notice it or 
not.  By paying attention, we can limit our indulgences just like we might limit our 
indulgences in potato chips or candy.  Binging on the HBO series Game of Thrones over 
a weekend might be entertaining watching, but might not be conducive to one’s 
consideration of coworkers Monday morning.  Gregory analyzes the moral merit of 
James Thurber’s The Catbird Seat, claiming that while it is wonderfully clever in its 
rhetoric and execution, it is ultimately morally bankrupted by its misogyny.  Gregory 
states that his ethical evaluation seeks to look at the “vexed question of how to apply 
ethical criteria to aesthetic choices.  I am particularly interested in how to assess formal 
brilliance in relation to ethical obtuseness” (138).  In the story, the sympathetic character 
is Mr. Erwin Martin, the fastidious and unobtrusive head of the filing department of 
FandS, and who is planning the destruction of Mrs. Barrows.  Mrs. Barrows is the newly 
appointed “special advisor to the president of the firm,” who apparently views Mr. 
Martin’s department as an unnecessary expense to the company (124).   
Martin constructs an elaborate ruse to lure Barrows to his apartment where Martin 
behaves in wild contradiction to his well-known, staid, milk-drinking character.  The 
reader believes he will kill her, but he actually wants to provoke her into exposing him at 
work where her credibility will be shattered because of the fastidiousness of his 
reputation: “Man is fallible, but Martin isn’t” (123).  Martin succeeds and Barrows is 
fired; the underdog wins, according to Thurber.  Gregory reveals the blatant misogyny in 
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Thurber’s tale however, pointing out how it merely re-entrenches cultural anxieties about 
working women, and promulgates ugly stereotypes—exactly what Gardner identifies as 
inauthentic and immoral authorship.  Thurber’s characterization of an “uppity” woman 
boss whom he names Mrs. Barrows (barrow is the name for a castrated pig) has gotten 
her comeuppance for being too confident in a man’s world.  This assassination of her 
character reveals a hidden machismo that seeks to keep women demure and subordinate, 
according to Gregory.  “[I]f Thurber makes me believe, or reinforces an uncritical 
prejudice I already hold, namely, that “unfeminine” women are contemptible both as 
women and as human beings, then he has foisted on me and reinforced for the rest of the 
world a belief that makes our world a worse place than it has to be, and that makes me a 
worse person than I should be” (139).   
Gregory’s point is not that fictional characters should all behave well, but that the 
author is responsible for his or her role in the ultimate message of the story.  Thurber’s 
1942 story does not responsibly deal with the 1940s problem of women in positions of 
power or authentically engage the challenges and anxieties that that poses for men.  
Instead he appeals to our schadenfreude by characterizing Barrows with animalistic and 
moralistically charged words that provoke antipathy: braying, quacking, obscene.  Such 
manipulations of our feelings are not supported by any actual errors in her character, only 
in her inadequacy to the male gaze of the 1940s.  Growth is not what is sought for the 
reader of this story.  Such manipulations violate the integrity of the art of writing and 
serve to pander to the lower appetites, affirming fear of change and antisocial attitudes 
and behaviors, whether racist, sexist, homophobic, or abuse of children.   
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Lack of moral integrity in narrative and narrative theory is a serious problem 
according to Martha Nussbaum (1990).  She claims that we have vitiated the power of 
narrative by attempting to divorce the aesthetic from the moral.  In her book, Love’s 
Knowledge, she mentions New Criticism and Deconstruction as guilty of promoting and 
provoking thinkers and critics who have “continued to be largely hostile to the idea of 
bringing a broad range of human concerns into connection with literary analysis” (21).  
She grants that the moralisms of the past have constrained the authentic voices of authors 
and their characters, and that, as such, they needed correction (22).  But, we have gone 
too far the other direction.  We have, in effect, robbed stories of their life’s blood.  “For 
[such an attitude] appears to take no account of the urgency of our engagements with 
works of literature, the intimacy of the relationships we form, the way in which we do, 
like David Copperfield, read “as if for life,” bringing to the text our hopes, fears, and 
confusions, and allowing the text to impart a certain structure to our hearts” (22).  When 
we narrow the role of art to exclusively aesthetic discussion, in an attempt to elevate the 
aesthetic in its own right, we show our ignorance of the way humans actually read and 
what reading (and any serious art) does to us.   
Aristotle, in his discussion of pursuit of the good life, characterizes such genuine 
pursuit as spoudaios.  Spoudaios is translated as seriousness; it is something worth taking 
seriously (Joe Sachs Traslation, 2002, 210).  It might also be translated as earnestness, 
honesty, resolve.  It means that one takes oneself and one’s character as desperately 
important to the quality of one’s life.  What we read matters and so does how we read.  
The theorists in this chapter are bringing to our attention the way in which reading, 
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watching films, engaging narratives is a matter of great importance for the accumulation 
of whom we shall become, both as individuals and as a community.   
It is that life’s blood that provides the transformative power which Lynn Hunt 
(2007) claims facilitated a number of developments in human rights, particularly for 
women.   The moral power of epistolary novels, like Pamela (1740), helped readers to 
appreciate the real plights that women (without social or political power) with no 
protectors could suffer.
41
  In like spirit, Gregory argues that stories have helped influence 
social attitudes and behavior in political history by civilizing us. He refers to the 80s-90s 
sitcom Roseanne to illustrate.  Dan says of the years of his marriage to Roseanne, “’You 
civilized me when I wasn’t lookin,’’” which Gregory claims is just what happens to us 
readers incrementally over time (29).  He claims that stories “swallow the world whole, 
and in fact the domain of stories may be the only form of human learning other than 
religion that makes the attempt to encompass the entirety of human life and experience” 
(31Italics mine).  Because of this scope and range of thinking, writing, and performing, 
narrative offers us a rich opportunity for ethical education, “education that helps shape 
our ethos whether that shaping power leads the learner to behave ‘properly’ or not” (31-
32).  I would add to his description of shaping our ethos, also understood as character, 
that this education is shaping our empathic moral perception. 
In so doing, we must ask how it is shaping us.  Is the story itself leaning toward 
expansion or contraction of empathic understanding and regard?   When we enter a 
narrative, we ought to be transported to real human lives that can teach us about 
                                                          
41
 See her book, Inventing Human Rights: A History, for her discussion of how the epistolary novel helped 
improve male understandings of women’s situations.  Novels like Pamela, depicting women’s private 
struggles in the face of the restrictions placed on them by a society that demanded virtuous behavior, while 
denying women any political autonomy, were instrumental in changing public thinking. 
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important aspects of the human condition, such as our vulnerability, interdependence, and 
our respective ways of striving.  Gregory’s other moral injunction is thus that we ought to 
read broadly to expand our perspective.  “In swallowing life whole, stories show us such 
features of existence as the operation of cause and effect, the surprises of coincidence, the 
motivations of passion and guilt and ambition and pride…the tranquility and turbulence 
of our inner emotional lives…” (33). The love of stories is as fruitful for the moral 
imagination as it is delicious. 
Engaged Reading: The Process of Refiguring 
The seriousness with which some narratives take the questions at issue for moral 
living invites readers to join the inquiry.  This invitation is an offer of experience outside 
of our own sphere, but which can elucidate features of our own experience, and may 
suggest new ways of seeing that we had missed, mired in our own worlds.  The moral 
value of narrative, according to Martha Nussbaum (1990), is to instruct us in the subtle 
art of moral perception and improvisation.  Aristotle’s idea of phronesis, generally 
translated as practical judgment, or practical wisdom/knowledge, is an aptitude for 
discerning the complexity of moral situations and improvising an apt response.  
Phronesis is, according to Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics, the ability to realize 
moral excellence (arête/virtue) with insight and keenness, such that one may respond “at 
the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right 
aim, and in the right way; [it] is what is appropriate and best, and this is the characteristic 
of excellence” (1106b. 21-23).   Moral perception or empathic moral perception, as I 
refer to it, is the key to developing from empathy to reciprocity. 
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Moral perception entails interpretation and judgment.  It is very difficult 
sometimes to ascertain what is needed in a situation and how we respond to that need.  
Skill in this area is acquired by honing and refining improving one’s ability to see, 
identifying and attending properly to salient features of the situation, and one’s ability to 
judge aptly, having a proper sense of balance and wisdom.  The saxophone player must 
know her piece well before she can improvise with her band.  When we are well-
practiced in a skill set, we are free then to improvise ways of performing that skill that are 
responsive both to the conventions that define it and to the dynamic shifting of the 
particular situation.  If, for example, one is a proficient cook, when one prepares a dish—
even if it is not a familiar recipe—one may have a sense of what one may substitute for 
particular ingredients and still retain the integrity of the dish.  Skillfulness allows you 
room to play in, as it were, because you know how to preserve what is essential to the 
situation.   Moral perception is the ability to read the recipe, as it were, and understand 
the implications of the various ingredients.  As moral perception develops greater felicity, 
it can improvise without sacrificing the moral integrity of the situation.  So it is that 
moral perception attends to the practices of moral action and the “recipes” one 
accumulates are knowledge, experience, insight, and wisdom.    
Narrative provides the arena in which we may practice moral perception, learning 
to see as the narrators and characters see, attending to what they point out.  By 
performing the dramatic rehearsal of the imagination, we develop and refine our 
perception.  In the work of engaging the story, we follow its characters, mimicking their 
successes and failures, being attracted and repulsed in turn.  In the end, we can see the 
result of the characters’ efforts whether for their good or not, and we may acquire new 
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insights by our experiment.  Whatever clumsiness we may have in the beginning of a 
moral practice will, through repetition, acquire finesse, which Nussbaum and John 
Dewey agree is an artistry.  Dewey (1922) says, “The artist is a masterful technician.  The 
technique or mechanism is fused with thought and feeling” (71).  Such artistry is possible 
only as a result of intelligent habits (72).  Good habits are undertaken in thoughtfulness 
for their ultimate outcomes and maintained with attentiveness and correction toward the 
relative fulfillment sought.  There is a resonance amongst these thinkers—Nussbaum, 
Dewey and Aristotle—regarding the dynamic responsivity in moral perception.  
Imaginative moral practices, like engaging narratives, and engaging reflective discourse 
on those narratives are the means of crafting an astute moral perceptiveness. 
There are those who are skeptical that narrative empathy will necessarily result in 
greater empathic regard for those whom we encounter in lived experience.  Literary 
theorist Suzanne Keen (2007) is not convinced that readers will take up the responsibility 
of empathy, and she wonders whether reading should even be weighted with that task.  In 
her book, Empathy and the Novel, Keen is suspicious of the idea that novels make us 
better people.  “I…doubt that novels alone can cure what ails us: can novel reading really 
restore to vitality nearly extinguished civic virtues in a culture like my own, in which 
torture and routine violations of international law and human rights are carried out daily 
on our behalf?” (167).  She questions whether we grow in empathic regard through 
reading, asserting rather that we likely had already achieved such development when we 
began reading a given novel, and worries that we overburden fiction with the work that 
ought to be going on in individual character work.  “Readers, which is to say living 
people, bring empathy to the novel, and they alone have the capacity to convert their 
223 
 
emotional fusion with the denizens of make-believe worlds into actions on behalf of real 
others.  That they rarely decide to do so should not be taken as a sign of fiction’s failings” 
(168).  Instead, she claims that fiction may have the role of mitigating our lack of 
concern.  “More modest expressions of hope invest fiction with the power to reverse the 
course of apathy and indifference to others” (167).   
Marshall Gregory’s view is that this modest hope is not an insignificant 
beginning.  He finds that while we may show disempathy or wrongly placed empathy in 
our early readings, perhaps based on the pathologies of our painful histories, reading also 
helps us to overcome these inclinations.  “The value of…narrative experience for me, and 
presumably, for others, lies not in its cementing of petty emotions, but in its ethical 
invitation to deepen my understanding of both my past and my present, and thus to 
acquire a different ethos from the person I would have been as merely the victim of the 
past” (146).  I am arguing that we can make incremental changes through successive 
engagements with narrative, a not unrealistic goal given my earlier discussions regarding 
our anthropology and our empathy.  And further, an important way for such growth is 
through narrative engagement.  Keen is correct in asserting that there are no guarantees 
that readers will grow empathically.  However, this is in part because there are no 
guarantees in living moral situations that we will let our empathy be moved to action 
either.  Further, Keen’s skepticism may be based on too limited a sample.  The 
incremental changes stimulated by reading and reflecting on good books (watching good 
films) will take years to accumulate into something like a fuller, more inclusive form of 
empathic regard.  That is why I am claiming that the value of this research on empathy, 
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narrative, and prosocial behavior is for a program of self-cultivation.  Rome was not built 
in a day. 
What Keen’s concerns suggest to me is that responsible reading, like responsible 
living, is a demanding task.  Frankly, we often fail to fulfill both.  I do not think, 
however, that our failure to fulfill the task warrants a slackening of resolve.  It is not 
necessarily fiction’s failing that we do not grow in empathy, but it may be the failure of 
some fictions.  And perhaps we readers/viewers are not earnest enough in our pursuit of 
narrative engagement or moral living to facilitate the growth of empathy.   It may also be 
that we are lacking in sufficient guidance.  If it is true, as Nussbaum, Gardener, and 
Gregory point out, that the ethical dimension of fiction has not been taken seriously for 
some decades, then we may need more theorists like them to help us readers on our way.  
Ignorance is an impediment to empathic prosocial action, as Preston and Hoeflich point 
out.  Ethics classes, texts, and reflections can aid us in considering ethical problems, but 
such reflections are often abstract and general.  Rarely do they give us the information 
that we need for our performance in a particular situation.  Stories do.   
As we have discussed empathy in previous chapters, we have seen that when we 
empathize with living others in their respective dilemmas, our mirror neurons are firing 
as if we ourselves were in the dilemma.  So it is when we empathize with characters in 
stories.  Bergen, Damasio, Mar and Oatley, as I previously discussed, show the ways in 
which our neurophysiology is moved and shaped by imaginative engagements.  The 
powerful activation induced by reading may actually be developing new neural 
pathways
42.  Antonio Damasio speaks of “embodied semantics” and Ben Bergen of 
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 See “Making Connections” Berns et al. According to Gregory Berns, et al.(2013), in their research on 
short and long-term effects of novel reading, found alterations in neurology as a result of reading were 
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“embodied simulation,” both of which affirm the possible neurophysiological 
underpinnings of such changes in feeling and character of the sort Gregory describes.  It 
seems reasonable to think that our reading, an embodied simulation of another world 
from the perspective of another point of view, is writing new ideas, feelings, and 
possibilities into our psyche.   
Keen is right to caution us that an untaught or insensitive empathy will not 
necessarily become more humane merely by reading some good books or watching some 
good films.  As a responsive and dynamic aspect of moral cognition, empathic moral 
perception can only be as sharp and effective as it is trained to be.  This training entails 
reading and reflection, which is why philosophy and moral theory, in particular, need to 
engage stories.  Nussbaum offers an analysis that can aid us in envisioning the process of 
a trained moral perception and improvisation. 
Sensitizing Empathic Moral Perception for Virtuosity 
Moral perception, as I have said, is the interpretive skill and judgment which 
discerns what is morally necessary.  Before going forward in discussing how we refine 
phronesis or practical wisdom/judgment, I want to explain it a bit further.  In her book 
Love’s Knowledge, Nussbaum (1990) elaborates on Aristotle’s use of phronesis as the 
moral skill which knows how to act in accord with virtue in a given situation.  She 
elucidates the nature of this responsive judgment by highlighting its attentiveness to 
particulars and subsequent apt responses.  Work on one’s moral character (i.e., the 
development of virtue) is necessary for phronesis, but the practice of phronesis will 
                                                                                                                                                                             
“detectable and significant”.  Further, these alterations endured through repeat testing, though their current 
work has not yet been over very long periods (598-599).  As the title suggests, reading novels makes 
connections in cognition. 
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improve one’s ability to perform one’s role in the scene with acumen (149-150).  If I 
work on growing moral courage by learning how to withstand difficulties that used to 
make me cower, I must also learn how to express that courage aptly.  As I learn to stand 
and face the other in admitting my error and accepting responsibility for my failure, I 
must also learn the proper manner of such acceptance.  A petulant tone will not do, but 
neither will an excessive contrition that forces the other to console me, when I ought to 
be consoling her for my error, assuring her that I will strive to do better.  Moral 
perception is the skill to discern such aptness in tone and measure. 
Moral perception thus is actively assessing the meaning and morality of action 
and deeming it this way or that.  Beyond praise or blame for our expression of virtues or 
values is the active response to be given: help, hindrance, or indifference.  
“[D]iscernment of the correct choice [in a specific situation] rests with something that 
[Aristotle] calls ‘perception.’  From the context it is evident that this is some sort of 
complex responsiveness to the salient features of one’s concrete situation,” according to 
Nussbaum (1990, 55).  Full morality, according to Nussbaum, requires reliance both on 
principles, informed by episteme, or knowledge about the world, and on phronesis which 
enables proper discernment and facilitates our dynamic responsivity or moral 
improvisational skills.  Refinement of those skills benefits from the particularity of 
narratives that paint the picture of moral life in all its rich complexity, to aid the 
imagination in discerning the right action for particular situations (54-55). 
Rules are not insignificant in this dynamic understanding of ethical action, 
however.  Moral perception is not in contrast to rules, according to Nussbaum.  Rather, 
moral perception is necessary to keep the rules from failing the particular complexity of a 
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given moral situation by blind obedience to general principles (157).  Rules are needed, 
however, to guide and ground moral perception, even as they may be adapted according 
to perception (157).  So much can go wrong in moral practice, no matter how 
thoughtfully designed our systems are.  Narratives can help us to refine the 
implementations of our values by teaching us to see what is morally salient in the 
choreographed steps of sociality found in the story, elucidating what we often miss when 
we are immersed in living.  
Nussbaum’s discussion of narrative’s influence on ethics shows that moral skill is 
achieved through perception, which is the “ethical ability…to discern, acutely and 
responsively, the salient features of one’s particular situation” (37).  The complexity of 
moral living requires a subtle skillfulness in noticing all the salient elements of a moral 
situation.  “The Aristotelian conception argues that this ability is at the core of what 
practical wisdom is, and that it is not only a tool toward achieving the correct action or 
statement, but an ethically valuable activity in its own right”…facilitating our becoming 
what Henry James calls “’finely aware and richly responsible’” (37).  Nussbaum’s 
perspective agrees with Ricoeur’s account of narrative and normativity.  “Once again, 
this commitment seems to be built into the very form of the novel as genre” (37).  And 
we as readers are refigured, returning to our particular lives carrying (or rather becoming) 
the refigurations which have occurred in us. 
Nussbaum (1990) turns to Henry James’ thought to further develop her analysis of 
moral perception because she views his work as relevant moral philosophy (148).   She 
examines the moral artistry of his characters Maggie and Adam in the novel The Golden 
Bowl.  Nussbaum’s discussion helps to clarify how moral urges in the form of empathy 
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can find their way to reciprocity, toward genuine regard for the other.  In order for our 
regard for the other to find moral expression, we must cultivate our moral sensibilities to 
a keen attentiveness to that which is of moral import, so that we are not guilty of being 
morally obtuse.  “Obtuseness and refusal of vision are our besetting vices.  Responsible 
lucidity can be wrested from that darkness only by painful, vigilant effort, the intense 
scrutiny of particulars.  Our highest and hardest task is to be people ‘on whom nothing is 
lost’”(148). 
Rules and precepts will always be necessary in moral life, but the facility to relate 
them to particular moral situations requires a dynamically responsive judgment in 
interpreting events accurately and acting one’s part aptly and justly.  Phronesis enables us 
to ascertain the right thing to do, in the right time and in the right measure.  It is 
comparable to discernment which is concerned with the particular application of a value.  
Aristotle says that what deserves praise and blame are not easy to determine, because 
“such things are in particulars, and the judgment is in the perceiving” (II.22-29, 1109b).  
Nussbaum claims that moral feeling and perception have degrees of acuity and 
refinement, the higher development of which can be used to more effectively and astutely 
respond to difficult moral situations and dilemmas.  Empathic moral perception can be 
refined through practice.  “Obtuseness is a moral failing; its opposite can be cultivated” 
(156).   
Unlike ethical discourses, stories are constrained to deal with particular 
individuals in particular situations, and as such are more suited to imaginative moral 
experience.  Yet, according to Nussbaum, the characters are not free to break the rules of 
their world without repercussions (155).  The verisimilitude of the story depends on 
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characters behaving within the rules of the novel’s world, according to John Gardner 
(1985, 111).  In this way, the character’s constraints mirror our constraints in our own 
lives, and as such, they provide an insightful theatre in which to observe their 
performance.   
Moral perception is constrained by the mores which the situation demands.  It is 
not free to roam wherever it will.  Nussbaum utilizes Henry James’ novel The Golden 
Bowl to show an example of exemplary moral improvisation.  The 19
th
 century heroine, 
Maggie, and her father, Adam, are in a dilemma, torn between love of each other and 
Maggie’s need to assume her adult role as wife.  Maggie has married Amerigo, who was 
previously in amorous relations with Charlotte.   Maggie (ignorant of the previous affair) 
has instigated Charlotte’s marrying Adam to console him for his loss of Maggie.  Maggie 
has just learned that her father’s dignity is being compromised by illicit meetings 
between Amerigo and Charlotte.   
Three things need to happen to rescue this situation from a family disaster, but 
they will not occur without pain.  First, Maggie needs to separate Amerigo and Charlotte 
without her father knowing why; she decides that Adam and Charlotte must move to 
America, while she and Amerigo remain in England.  Second, Adam needs to give up his 
fatherly claim on Maggie so as to be willing to move to the U.S.; she cannot fully enter 
her adult sexuality so long as she feels his need of her.  Third, she must make Amerigo 
see that she knows of his previous and resumed affair without overtly confronting him, as 
well as signal to him her sexual readiness to enter her life more fully as his wife (they’ve 
been married, but she has continued to prioritize her father).  All of this is achieved 
through Maggie and Adam’s moral perceptiveness and responsivity to each other’s 
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subjectivity and contingency.  Adam gives up his claim on his daughter, painfully, but 
willingly, in acknowledgement of and respect for her emerging womanhood.  Maggie 
relinquishes her hold on Adam, accepting that it is a kind of death for him, for both of 
them.  A necessary death.  The final act is achieved through Maggie dropping the crystal 
golden bowl which Charlotte had bought for Maggie as a wedding gift and which had had 
a crack in it.  When she holds the bowl before him and drops it, and it shatters, Amerigo 
understands symbolically the wrong he has committed (it is subtle, but he gets it), and 
which she naively facilitated.  He respects her method of subtly but surely standing 
before him with the truth.  It may be that he sees her for the first time.  He is drawn to her 
invitation for a real marriage and together they facilitate the move of Adam and 
Charlotte. 
Maggie instigates it all, but she elicits the cooperation of the other players by her 
subtle sensitivity to the feelings of everyone concerned.  She acts not out of jealousy for 
her own wounded fidelity, but out of a desire to preserve her father’s dignity and her own 
marriage.  She saves face for the other actors in the drama so that her father never learns 
of his betrayal.  Nussbaum is interested in the aesthetic and moral beauty of this moral 
improvisation as exemplified by Maggie.  As a moral actor, responsiveness to the role, to 
the drama, to the other actors, is essential to the skillfulness of the execution.  Nussbaum 
notes that such sensitivity to all of the nuances and implications of a moral situation 
requires a finely tuned perception, one that is capable of overcoming self-concern to 
attend fully to what needs to be done.   
If we think of [moral] perception as a created work of art, we must at the same 
time remember that artists, as James sees it, are not free simply to create anything 
they like.  Their obligation is to render reality precisely and faithfully; in this task 
they are very much assisted by general principles and by the habits and 
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attachments that are their internalization.  …If their sense of the occasion is, as 
often is in James, one of improvisation, if Maggie sees herself as an actress 
improvising her role, we must remember, too, that the actress who improvises 
well is not free to do anything at all.  She must at every moment—far more than 
one who goes by an external script—be responsively alive and committed to the 
other actors, to the evolving narrative, to the laws and constraints of the genre and 
its history (1990, 155).   
 
Moral improvisation is thus not less rigorous, but even more rigorous than 
following the rules of an ethical system.  Nussbaum (1990) uses the jazz musician as an 
analogy for moral improvisation, but claims that moral improvisation is more demanding 
because one cannot creatively abandon the rules like a musical artist might in evolving a 
new art form all together (156).  This is because, the  
perceiver who improvises is doubly responsible: responsible to the history of 
commitment and to the ongoing structures that go to constitute her context [i.e., 
the moral culture of one’s time]; and especially responsible to these in that her 
commitments are internalized, assimilated, perceived, rather than read off from an 
external script or score…Moral improvisation shows an even deeper role for 
obligation and rule than do these artistic cases” because those to whom the actor 
is obligated demand a moral accounting (155-156).   
 
Phronesis is internalized obligation; it is a part of us, rather than exterior, like a script.  
This explains why phronesis is a skill constantly being developed.  If our empathic moral 
perception must adapt agilely to all the nuances of social complexity, then we must 
exercise it well and often. 
Moral improvisation depends on the sort of artistry that Nussbaum thinks 
practical wisdom entails.  Utilizing our empathic moral perception to read a scene, intuit 
our possible roles, and dramatically rehearse their possible outcomes facilitates the 
possibility of the harmonization of our performance with the other actors.  This is the wu-
wei of moral skillfulness that I discussed earlier.  Wu-wei, the Chinese virtue of effortless 
action, is the result of hundreds or thousands of hours of practice in one’s action.  By 
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repeatedly entering the world of the other, learning to see as they see, feel how they feel, 
trying to help in this way and that with varying degrees of success, reflecting on those 
ways and adapting over and over, sometimes we will get it right
43
.  Perceiving the right 
action, in the right time and in the right measure, we can act skillfully.  Empathy and 
sympathy are clearly at work in moral skillfulness.  This is why it seems right to me to 
call it empathic moral perception.  Maggie’s love for her father and her compassion for 
his self-regard activate and inspire her skill with an intense energy to create a solution.  I 
will explore this moral sentiment more in the last chapter as it embodies the nature of 
Ricoeur’s solicitude, driving our personal and moral engagement with the world.   It is a 
matter of self-respect that we consider our growth and consider the ways of ensuring 
growth.  Further, we have a responsibility to consider the future and how best to pass this 
practice on to the generations that follow us. 
Passing on the Practice of Narrative Empathy 
As we saw earlier, Suzanne Keen (2007) has raised serious concerns questioning 
the power of stories to influence the direction and activation of empathy for prosocial 
action.  Her sampling of the lack of empathic outcomes is too limited, however, in my 
view.   And as I, in accord with Marshall Gregory and others, seek to inspire incremental 
changes in character through a practice of reading and reflecting, it will likely be many 
years before real changes in character are noteworthy.  Given the neuroscience that shows 
neurophysiological responses to immersed reading that mirror that of lived experience, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that such reading is doing real work on our characters.  Still, 
I think that Keen’s doubt is important to this project because it highlights the 
                                                          
43
 I suspect that this matter of “getting it right” is also a matter of perception as it is difficult to say when 
one really has done so. 
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responsibility of the reader/watcher to be responsive—to take up the task of reading with 
the same seriousness that one takes up her moral cultivation.  Keen’s doubt also 
stimulates me to think about how we pass on the skills of reading and reflection for 
narrative empathy, and the refinement of empathic moral perception.  Young and 
inexperienced readers need guidance in achieving meaningful engagements with stories.  
In childhood and youth, parents and teachers guide us.   As we come into our own as 
adults, we have a moral responsibility to the next generation to share the insights of our 
experience, and the wisdom that we have distilled from that experience.  We can guide 
them in what we have learned about living well, and in harmony with others, and to help 
us in that endeavor, we must facilitate their relationship with narratives.   
In Chapter IV, I discussed Martin Hoffman’s description of the way in which 
induction by parents is done to develop children’s empathy in social situations.  
Analogously we teach our children and students to take reading stories seriously by 
discussing the stories with them.  And because the moral potential of a story hinges on 
the moral receptivity of the reader, it helps to teach them openness and courage when the 
story is hard or painful.  We must also be good listeners, however.  Nussbaum (1990) 
claims that the legitimacy of moral insights depends on being subjected to the judgment 
of relevant others (270-274).    Children often see what is salient in moral life that we 
adults have become inured to.  Their fresh eyes may shed a different light on our 
empathic road. 
Stories promise much pleasure for children, which we mentors can enhance by 
our own emotionally engaged story-telling style, reading style, and practice. The power 
of story begins with us, the first readers that young minds hear.  If we help the stories to 
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achieve their affective power, we will find ample opportunity for what we call “teachable 
moments” to help bind empathic feelings and moral values.  Stories can help facilitate 
“hot” cognitions, a felt emotional urgency and motivation for moral action.  Martin 
Hoffman (2000) claims that moral cognition is hot when the invocation of the moral 
principle activates empathic affect (14-15).  Such a “hot” moral principle might be that 
it’s unfair to mistreat another out of mere prejudice.  Cooler cognitions like “all people 
deserve fair treatment regardless of gender, skin color, religious affiliation, sexual 
preferences, or mental or physical disability” might then follow.  When we mentors read 
about violation against such a value, we can draw attention to it.  Such lessons need not 
be obtrusive and often arise organically in morally charged moments in the text.  Parents 
who read to their children often already address the values of the books while reading.  
Children spontaneously reflect on the situations and parents only need to pick up on those 
reflections and join them to deepen the child’s understanding.   
My oldest son and I read a book called Out of My Mind by Sharon Draper, in 
which the protagonist, Melody, is an 11-year-old girl with severe Cerebral Palsy.  She is 
an extremely bright girl as the reader knows because we are inside her thoughts.  
However, Melody cannot speak or use her fingers well, so to the rest of the world, apart 
from her parents and an insightful caregiver, she is a mute, but noisy, disruptive, and 
severely physically disabled girl.  She is ravenous for learning and has an adolescent’s 
desires for acceptance and friends.  As we read about her frustrations at being in a 
kindergarten-style special education class, enraged by the incessant playing of an ABC 
album when she is capable of reading beyond her own level, we sympathized with her 
angry flailing and screaming.  My son and I talked about how hard it would be to have no 
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one be able to hear your inner thoughts, not know your mind, who you were or what you 
cared about.  When she receives a Medi-talker, a computerized voice with a keyboard, 
she can finger peck her words and is able to “speak” for the first time.  Those around her 
quickly learn how knowledgeable, bright, and funny she is.  She is integrated into a 5
th
 
grade classroom.  This does not, however, help her make real friends because those 
without disabilities respond to her with anxiety and prejudice.  Her real life challenges of 
complete dependence on others, and the prejudices of her classmates in the 5
th
 grade and 
even the teacher, gave both my son and me some ideas to chew on.  Months later, when 
my then 10-year-old son and I saw someone in a wheelchair with what looked like the 
disability of Cerebral Palsy, my son reflected, “I wonder if he’s frustrated.”  While I do 
not think that either my son or I have acquired a deep understanding or sufficient respect 
for the challenges of such disabilities from such limited experience, we both gained an 
insight into one corner of the human condition that we had not had before.   
Childish empathic inclinations depend on the help of adults to develop.  Without 
such guidance and inductions as Hoffman describes, young people can develop anti-
social attitudes and behaviors.  Educational interventions can help these children to 
strengthen their empathic understanding, however.  Through interventions that include 
narratives and empathic reflections, educators aid socially disadvantaged children in 
taking another’s point of view, and developing the ability to feel from that position.  
Researchers are seeing the value of these interventions on at-risk youth in cultivating 
empathy, hoping to mitigate the neglect or abuse that may have put them at risk for 
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antisocial behavior.
44
   Narrative empathy develops according to the stimulation that is 
provided and the guidance that highlights salient moral points.   
Suzanne Keen’s concerns about the power of narrative to shape empathy raise a 
further question regarding guidance in adult reading.  Martha Nussbaum (1990) has a 
point that I think responds to this, giving us insight into possibilities for adult reading 
practices.  Nussbaum claims that the merits of our moral insights must be tested against 
the views of other relevant moral thinkers (270).  Moral validity cannot be achieved in a 
vacuum.  When we read books and reflect on them in the privacy of our living rooms, 
bedrooms, and parks, we need to remember that we have only done part of the work of 
cultivation.  In the community of other readers and moral practitioners, to whom we 
subject our moral insights, we can further hone and refine them.  With the perspectives of 
other readers, we may learn how durable these insights are.  The recent history of book 
groups might be such a forum for sharing the moral wisdom that fictions purvey.   
In this way, the community becomes co-judge of my relative success or failure in 
moral cultivation.  This may be unnerving to those of us reared in a rigorously 
individualistic culture, but I believe it is a necessary consideration for the growth of 
empathy and the flourishing of subjects and their communities.  Subjection of the self to 
the other and its concomitant risks continue to be at the back of my project.  Empathy is a 
risking of self on behalf of the other; writing is a risk in anticipation of the responses of 
the reader; reading is a risk at the hands of the writer.  Such risks suggest the need for 
courage to continue reading, to continue the journey that puts my convenient thinking in 
jeopardy.  In the final chapter, I want to look at what facilitates our courage to be 
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 See PATHs curriculum and study: 
http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/doi/abs/10.1176/appi.ajp.2014.13060786?url_ver=Z39.88-
2003&rfr_id=ori%3Arid%3Acrossref.org&rfr_dat=cr_pub%3Dpubmed.  
237 
 
empathic in the face of suffering.  If we fear pain, we may avoid empathic encounters.  
How might our solicitude help our courage? 
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CHAPTER VII 
LOVE AND LETTING GO: 
A MOVEMENT OF FAITH 
When I suffer for the vulnerable, is it not for my own vulnerability that I really suffer? 
~Etty Hillesum 230 
 
Not inexperienced in suffering, I learn how to bring aid to the wretched. 
~Dido, The Aeneid 
From Empathy to Compassion in Narrative Engagement 
Whether solicitude, as the recognition of our deep dependence on one another, 
can be realized in prosocial action or not depends on a number contingencies, one of 
which is overcoming preoccupation with self-concern.  The self’s relation to the other has 
paradoxical qualities in its inclination for self-ascendency and its inability to realize self 
without the other.  Ricoeur has explained how even our realization of ourselves as selves 
depends on others.  Selfhood requires others with whom one can find belonging, 
meaning, and recognition of my value as a relationship partner, as a professional, as a 
member of the community.  So we are vulnerable to the community to enable our 
becoming, even as we have urges to ignore others in favor of self.   
Add to this that wisdom dictates that we comprehend and appreciate the reality 
that other people are selves also with equal claims to self-realization and belonging.  The 
other’s need for belonging may depend on me and I may be bound to respond for my own 
integrity.  Paul Ricoeur (1992) states, “Self-constancy is for each person that manner of 
conducting himself or herself so that others can count on that person.  Because someone 
is counting on me, I am accountable for my actions before another” (165).  Narrative 
identity is based on a dialogical relation between self and other in which alternations 
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occur in which the other becomes the self for whom I become the other.  My identity 
cannot be monological, because the self relies on the other for selfhood, which is why 
human life is shot through with response-ability. 
Our awareness of our vulnerability and our awareness of the similarity of our 
respective claims describes, are two very different realizations.   And while they are 
related, our recognition of the latter may be a long time coming.  The recognition that 
your projects, aims, and longings have as much right to be considered as mine do seems 
most often to be the understanding of a more mature development.  Recognition of how 
we are similar can support the growth of benevolence, a matured, general regard for 
human wellbeing. 
Childhood lessons like the inductions described by Hoffman can begin the work 
of such a recognition and instigate such feelings.  Such early moral practices of social 
engagement are what develop into our childish, youthful, and adult empathic responses to 
one another.  This development must be nourished by care, not the sentiments of regard 
only, but care as manifested in active help and support.  It is the love of the parents which 
drives such cultivation; as Aristotle (2002) has noted, parental care for one’s moral 
growth is necessary for adult moral aptitude.  “Hence it is necessary to be brought up in 
some way straight from childhood, as Plato says, so as to take delight and feel pain in 
those things in which one ought for this is the right education” (II.11-14, 1104b).   Moral 
luck in parental presence, maturity, love and a modicum of resources is a major 
contingency in the development of empathy and the recognition of solicitude.  If we have 
had the good fortune to have been cared for and nurtured enough to have a reasonably 
developed empathy and a fair regard for the rights of others, how do we then get 
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ourselves to continue to grow that understanding and develop its skill.  What is the 
insight, the impetus that gets us there?  Nussbaum’s description of the moral emotions of 
love and pity can help us to discern some part of the catalyst in what she describes as 
love’s knowledge. 
Love is a difficult word to utilize philosophically because of its many meanings 
and extensive historical and cultural baggage.  Nevertheless, the many forms of love can 
shed light on particular expressions of empathy helping us to uncover what motivates it to 
overcome excessive self-regard.  Max Scheler (1913/2008) characterizes the movement 
of love using the Greek term, Eros.  This should not be understood in our contemporary 
understanding as erotic love, but in the Platonic sense of the ecstatic movement out of the 
self toward the other (83).  This movement reaches out toward what it values, “The 
movement of love is always and everywhere towards the creation of values” (113).   
Aristotle shares Scheler’s deep regard for such relations, in the form of friendship, 
as essential to continued growth, claiming that parents and children have friendship, that 
the good life needs friends, that cities are held together by friendship, and that we praise 
those who are the “friends of humanity.”  Friendship is an essential good and yet it is 
much more.  “And friendship is not only necessary but also beautiful, for we praise those 
who love their friends, and an abundance of friends seems to be one of the beautiful 
things.  Moreover people believe that it is the same people who are good men and 
friends” (VIII,1155a).  The pleasure and joy in good friendship may explain how it is that 
we find it worthwhile to release self-concern in valuing the other. 
In love we reach beyond mere self-concern both in our regard, our esteem, and 
our active care.  Love values the other so much as to be drawn away from the self toward 
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the other.  Scheler (1913/2008) refers to this as a “spontaneous benevolence” toward 
others because of our shared humanity (98).  As empathy matures in the growth of love 
for others, self-concern is not as difficult to displace for other-concern.  “It is precisely in 
the act of fellow-feeling that self-love, self-centered choice, solipsism and egoism are 
first wholly overcome” (98).  So, loving relationships are an important experience for the 
development and growth of empathy.  What prompts us to act in spite of risks, though?  
Love is risky not just for lovers, but for parents, for friends, for anyone who stands to lose 
a beloved one.  Children can die and leave parents with wounds that never heal.  Friends 
can change or abandon us.  Loving makes us vulnerable.  Navigating the fear of that 
vulnerability is an important part of the maturation of the empathic moral perception and 
the motivation to act for the other. 
Returning to Love’s Knowledge, I want to look at Nussbaum’s description of what 
she calls learning to fall, because in it she shows how it is that one may come to take the 
chance that love invites, the chance to grow.  We previously looked at Nussbuam’s 
discussion of Henry James’ character Maggie who artfully executes a moral maneuver 
that rescues a situation from suffering on all sides.  I compared such a skillfulness to the 
refined, and self-forgetting virtue that the Chinese call of wu-wei.  In Confucianism, wu-
wei is achieved through thousands of hours of practice (usually of an art form like 
calligraphy or a ritual).  There is a problem, however, in the invocation of such artistry, 
and that is the possible misunderstanding that such rarified sorts of practices are the 
pinnacle of moral behavior, which is not the case.  What Maggie does in The Golden 
Bowl shows an exemplary skill, but the stakes were not dire.   
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Diving in front of a car to save a toddler may not require the perceptive 
sophistication or subtlety necessary for saving someone’s reputation and self-image, but 
most of us would agree that saving a life has more value and may require a greater 
sacrifice.  Expertise in social skills may not always translate to moral behavior, insofar as 
one may be artful in behaving with cunning to make others believe that there is genuine 
regard without any sincere feeling behind it.  This is something Jane Austen loves to 
bring to our attention in the forms of Mr. Wickham, Mr. Eliot, Mr. and Miss Crawford in 
her various novels who are congenial, respectable, and dishonest.  The focus of my work 
is motivating empathic regard and prosocial action in all the mundane and ordinary as 
well as the exceptional situations in which we find ourselves. 
Nevertheless, even mundane moral acts require something of us because we must 
cultivate the ability to discern and the willingness to offer.  Moreover, the fear of loss is 
an important impediment to overcome.  Nussbaum’s discussion looks at the relationship 
of risk and vulnerability by looking at Ann Beatie’s (1987) story Learning to Fall.  As we 
explore the relationship of the self and other as one of profound intersubjectivity and a 
necessary reciprocity, we need an appropriate appreciation of our anxiety about the risks 
in intersubjectivity.  In order to be receptive, we must accept a certain amount of risk.  
Even in the story, where we are physically safe from its events, we are not safe from the 
emotional import of the story—from the threat that it will change us.  What is needed, 
then, is a willingness to suffer, to undergo.  Nussbaum claims that a willingness to fall, to 
let go, is necessary to open ourselves to both fiction and life.  
In the pursuit of knowledge about love, for example whether we love, whom we 
ought to love, etc., we pursue insight in various ways.  One way Nussbaum describes 
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draws on Marcel Proust’s character Marcel who, in a flash of suffering, realizes that he 
loves Albertine when she has finally given up on him and left
45
.  Marcel believes he has 
obtained the truth through this suffering.  While Nussbaum does not disagree that 
suffering can reveal certain truths to us, she regards Marcel’s insight as dubious because 
it is a solipsistic achievement.  She quotes Marcel’s reflection, “’I understood that my 
love was less a love for her than a love in me…It is the misfortune of beings to be for us 
nothing else but useful showcases for the contents of our own minds’(III.568)” (271).  
Albertine hardly seems to matter to his insight or even his love, it is the suddenness and 
the pain that verify its truth (266).  According to Nussbaum, “love’s knowledge” must be 
verified by another relevant to the concern, but even then, it might more properly be 
called faith.  She contrasts her preferred method (learning to fall) against what she 
regards as a solipsistic private reflective insight into one’s relationship that no one else is 
called upon to verify and that one believes to be absolutely true.   
Nussbaum asks whether this form of knowledge is not a “form of flight—from 
openness to the other, from all those things in love for which there is in fact no certain 
criterion?” (270).   Because Marcel discovers this truth in a vacuum, which seems to have 
more of romance than of enduring love to it, Nussbaum is skeptical of the genuineness of 
its insight.  In contrast to this privately achieved ‘knowledge,’ she introduces a shared, 
reciprocal, and more malleable form of knowledge, love’s knowledge (277).   
The main character in Beatie’s story is unnamed, married, in love with another 
man named Ray whom she’s not seen for months, and she checks her watch incessantly.  
Her only real friend is a warm, soft woman named Ruth who is a single mother with a 
developmentally delayed son named Andrew.  Ruth teaches at a community college and 
                                                          
45
 From Remembrance of Lost Time. 
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takes dance lessons in the evening.  The woman takes Andrew into the city sometimes, 
giving Ruth some time on her own.  Ray lives in the city.  The woman has spent the day 
guiding Andrew around, somehow has missed her train, and calls Ray to see if he’d like 
to meet for coffee.  They go to a café and sit awkwardly in the booth not drinking their 
coffees,   
Andrew shifts in the booth, looks at me as if he wants to say something.  I lean 
my head toward him.  “What?” I say softly.  He starts a rush of whispering. 
“His mother is learning to fall.” I say. 
“What does that mean?” Ray says. 
“In her dance class,” Andrew says.  He looks at me again, shy.  “Tell him.” 
“I’ve never seen her do it,” I say.  “She told me about it—it’s an exercise or 
something.  She’s learning to fall.” 
Ray nods.  He looks like a professor being patient with a student who has just 
reached an obvious conclusion… 
“Does she just go plop?” he says to Andrew. 
“Not really,” Andrew says, more to me than to Ray.  “It’s kind of slow.” 
I imagine Ruth bringing her arms in front of her, head bent, an almost penitential 
position, and then a loosening in the knees, a slow folding downward. 
[Ray pulls her outside for a walk with Andrew.] 
I clutch the envelope.  Ray looks at me and smiles, it’s so obvious that I’m 
holding the envelope with both hands so I don’t have to hold his hand.  He moves in 
close and puts his hand around my shoulder.  No hand-swinging like children—the 
proper gentleman and the lady out for a stroll.  What Ruth has known all along: what will 
happen can’t be stopped.  Aim for grace. {pp. 13-14}. 
 
For Nussbaum, this scene exemplifies what is happening when we let ourselves 
go to love and be loved. “What this means is that she lets herself not stop it, she decides 
to stop stopping it…She discovers what will happen by letting it happen,” according to 
Nussbaum (1990, 278).  Nussbaum claims, like Scheler, that this experience is a 
combination of creation and yielding (279).  This eros movement seems to capture the 
paradoxical activity and passivity that Ricoeur describes in the acting and suffering self-
other relation.  For Nussbaum, this movement is essential in the good life.  In order to 
thrive, we must learn to fall.  The letting go is an active release of control to the 
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unfolding, an acceptance of sharing the control with another.  Empathic engagement 
requires the same release.  When we allow ourselves to care for the other in empathy, we 
unfold in relation to them.  
In the last chapter we looked at Ben Bergen’s work on embodied simulation as 
meaning.  Notice that in the passage above, there is a visual description of Ruth, the 
warm teacher dancer, learning to fall.  “I imagine Ruth bringing her arms in front of her, 
head bent, an almost penitential position, and then a loosening in the knees, a slow 
folding downward.”  The woman is simulating this image in her body-mind and Ray is 
hoping that she is catching on.   A few minutes later, he wraps his arm around her and her 
tightly held envelope.  The embrace assures her, and the reader, that he is an active 
participant.  He, too, is falling and they will hold each other—provided she doesn’t bail.  
He is offering himself and his care to the shared opportunity of acting and being acted 
upon.  “Aim for grace,” seems to be the woman’s thought, or the narrators advice.  It 
suggests that she is letting go. 
Ray’s risk is real; she could wound him deeply if her fears prevent her from 
holding him, also.  When we offer ourselves in an empathic encounter, we do not have 
guarantees that we will be received, or reciprocated.  We leap, as it were, in faith.  This 
movement expresses well what Ricoeur (1992) describes in the self-other relation.  We 
are never entirely active, since we require the response of the other to fulfill our action, 
nor are we entirely passive, since the other needs our attentiveness, perception, judgment, 
and response to complete his or her action.  One is both actor and sufferer.  Learning to 
fall is thus accepting this vulnerable and receptive role.  Taking it up is rather like faith, 
real faith, not certain knowledge.  “Faith is never beyond doubt; grace can never be 
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assured,” according to Nussbaum (1990, 279).  Even Ruth, who is normally a good judge 
of character, chose the wrong man to love.  Life is not under our control.  In the first three 
chapters, I discussed the ways in which we ourselves are not under our control: much of 
what we do and say is the product of automatic processing.  So, the better part of wisdom 
recommends acceptance and a mature bearing toward the world aims for grace.  
I particularly focus on Nussbaum’s discussion of learning to fall because it helps 
articulate the risks and the rewards of empathic engagement, both in narratives and in 
living ethical situations.  As my discussion on the ambivalent qualities of empathic 
distress shows, we are able to turn away from empathic encounters.  And while this may 
be the right thing to do in a given situation, it requires reflection and judgment to ensure 
that one is not in danger of being immoral by omission.  Part of what I see as necessary in 
this moral cultivation project is to cultivate the moral courage to face suffering, to endure 
suffering, and to aid it by offering balm and/or support.  Stories can cause us suffering 
which is why sometimes we avoid them.  I felt a painful anguish when I read The Color 
Purple.  I felt guilt and shame as a white woman of privilege.  But, I also felt joy for 
Celie, and more, I felt inspired by her.  She taught me what a person can overcome when 
she feels loved by another, even when that person is flawed.  Might it not be that as we 
learn to fall into stories whose characters undergo genuine challenges, including suffering 
the harder trials of the human condition, that we grow some of the courage that we need 
to face suffering in our lived experience? 
 Growing requires submitting to the difficulties of the lessons.  It means 
persevering in the struggle, and often, it means loss.  Anyone committed to an athletic or 
aesthetic skill knows that endurance and talent are built up from a great deal of practice 
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and many mistakes.  It takes faith to persevere into an open future.  Our ability to 
empathize or to feel with another means that we may actually feel their pain.  Perhaps it 
is the emotional pleasure of connection with the particular other, or the feeling of 
connection with humanity in general, that draws us to the other even when it means 
enduring pain.  Even though the threat of pain is real, the promise of meaningful 
connection is worth it? 
Two literary characters exemplify such a willingness to undergo challenges that 
unmake their self-conception and the confidence in their own perceptions of the world.  
They are made to grow, and do grow, and find meaningful connection in the end.  Jane 
Austen’s Pride and Prejudice is a well-known novel whose heroine Elizabeth Bennett 
and hero Mr. Fitzwilliam Darcy are famed lovers.  These two characters begin like 
Shakespeare’s Beatrice and Benedick with their witty repartee regarding decorum and 
virtues, but the pains that they endure through the story bring them to a new self-
understanding and a mutual respect, in addition to love.  George Butte, Marshall Gregory 
and Richard Eldridge each devote particular attention to Austen’s work because her focus 
on the inner world of her heroine’s sheds light on our own inner worlds.  Austen attunes 
readers to the feelings of her characters and to their perception of the cues of other 
characters.  When Elizabeth self-complacently has settled on hating Mr. Darcy, she is 
shocked to receive a marriage proposal from him.  Given in a most “ungentlemanlike 
manner,” she is relieved of the guilt of rejecting it.  When he interrogates her on her 
grounds for rejection, she accuses him of separating her sister and his friend Bingley 
from marrying, as well as his mistreatment of her favorite officer Mr. Wickham.  That 
night, Darcy writes her a letter justifying himself, and Elizabeth learns how seriously she 
248 
 
had misjudged appearances and is mortified by the foolishness of her own vanity.  This 
self-revelation, based on a description of events from his perspective, provokes shock and 
pain at her misunderstandings and blindness to the real improprieties of both Mr. 
Wickham and even her own family.  Elizabeth, the brightest of the Bennett sisters is not 
only witty and intelligent, but also generally prudent and insightful, so the revelation of 
her mistakes in judgment jar her into humility. 
She grew absolutely ashamed of herself. –Of neither  Darcy nor Wickham could 
she think, without feeling that she had been blind, partial, prejudiced, absurd. 
‘How despicably have I acted!’ she cried. —I, who have prided myself on my 
discernment! —I, who have valued myself on my abilities! Who have often disdained the 
generous candour of my sister, and gratified my vanity, in useless or blameable 
distrust.—How humiliating is this discovery! –Yet, how just a humiliation! –Had I been 
in love, I could not have been more wretchedly blind.  But vanity, not love, has been my 
folly.  –Pleased with the preference of one and offended by the neglect of the other, on 
the very beginning of our acquaintance, I have courted prepossession and ignorance, and 
driven reason away, where either were concerned.  Till this moment, I never knew 
myself.’ 
…When she came to that part of the letter in which her family were mentioned, in 
terms of such mortifying, yet merited reproach, her sense of shame was severe.  The 
justice of the charge struck her too forcibly for denial…(236). 
This impassioned self-reflection is not the kind of experience of the other’s inner 
world that we are often privileged to participate in.  Sometimes our closest loved ones 
will share such painful discoveries, but here in Elizabeth’s 19th century narrative world, 
we experience for ourselves her demoralizing feelings.  Elizabeth is charming and an 
easy character to care for and feel with.  And because we see her judge much else in the 
scenes justly, first-time readers cannot help but share her feelings of dislike for Darcy and 
liking for Wickham.  The narrator does hint to us from time to time of the feelings of 
Darcy which contradict Elizabeth’s perception however, so we understand that there is 
more to Mr. Darcy than Elizabeth knows.   
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Elizabeth suffers these insights into her failures of judgment, but her lessons in 
suffering are not yet complete.  For that, her sister Lydia must elope with the misjudged 
Wickham who is so despicable as to have no intention of marrying Lydia.  Such a 
devastating loss of family honor in 19
th
 century England means that Elizabeth will never 
be able to marry—a problem as much financial as emotional.  We readers suffer with her 
as she breaks down crying in humiliation and fear in front of Mr. Darcy (294).  Readers 
feel that she was wrong in her prejudices, but she does not deserve such desolation.  
Elizabeth does not know (nor does the reader) that Darcy’s feelings and convictions at 
this moment are compassionate, genuine, and attentive.  He pities Elizabeth in 
compassion for what has come down upon her, but he also feels his own sense of 
obligation and resolve to repair the situation if he can.  It is the tragedy of public shame 
that finally brings Elizabeth from gratitude to love and Darcy from love to respect.  Darcy 
pays Wickham’s extensive debts and orchestrates the marriage between Wickham and 
Lydia, saving her honor, the family’s name and Elizabeth’s possibility of an honorable 
mate. 
Richard Eldridge claims that Darcy and Elizabeth have grown to a serious and 
profound recognition of one another’s subjectivity.  “If we are to honor the marriage of 
Elizabeth and Darcy, and accept it as an accomplishment, then these developing 
Bindungsqualitaten (attachment qualities ) that lead to it must be both the ground and the 
consequence of their relations” (169, translation added).  It is what they have been 
through, their experience which has taught them humility and understanding to replace 
their pride and prejudices.  Both have suffered from their follies and from the vices of 
others and they see in each other the consolation of genuine sympathy and understanding.  
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Shared judgment, shared wisdom, shared action, and shared humility have deepened their 
regard for one another.  Darcy’s pity of her plight, and his right action on her and her 
family’s behalf facilitates this wisdom and love.  Having followed their respective growth 
journeys and participated in their hopes and their choices, we have played the parts of 
vain judgments and pride, and eventually humility, justice, and wisdom. 
Both Elizabeth and Darcy are characters who were loved by at least one parent 
and who have tender relations with a sibling and a good friend.  This is no accident on 
Austen’s part, I think.  She shows over and over in her novels how our loved ones and 
friends can help and/or hinder us.  In Mansfield Park, Sir Thomas Bertram laments at the 
end of the novel when three of his four children have gone astray morally that he did not 
sufficiently attend to their character development in their rearing.  “…[A]nguish arising 
[in Sir Thomas] from the conviction of his own errors in the education of his daughters, 
was never to be done away.  Too late he became aware how unfavorable to the character 
of any young people, must be the totally opposite treatment which Maria and Julia had 
been always experiencing at home, where the excessive indulgence and flattery of their 
aunt [Mrs. Norris] had been continually contrasted with his own severity….Here had 
been grievous mismanagement…”  They “had never been properly taught to govern their 
inclinations and tempers, by that sense of duty which can alone suffice.”  They had not 
been taught to bring principle “into daily practice” (476-477). 
This might be Elizabeth Bennet’s lament regarding her own parents’ childrearing 
of her three younger sisters.  Austen shows us the contrast of character of a person cared 
for in childhood and beloved by some family and friends.  Such love nourishes the moral 
imagination and capacity, it seems.  Might it help mitigate the risks of caring for others?  
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Fortunately for Lizzy, she was blessed with such care and cultivation, and we see the fruit 
of it in her ability to care for the worries and challenges that others face.  We readers see 
that she is capable of genuine pity in her deep concern for her sister Jane’s silent 
suffering from the loss of Mr. Bingley.   
We do not much like the term pity in our culture, but Nussbaum (2001) claims 
that for empathy to make the movement to compassion, it requires the addition of moral 
emotions like pity.  Pity is a useful term in that it seems to get at the larger picture of the 
human condition more than compassion might.  When we feel pity, while it does contain 
the taint of self-satisfaction, it can also be understood as a fearful recognition of what 
John Gardner (1994) calls our shared victimicy, and Ricoeur (1992) refers to as suffering.  
Nussbaum aids our understanding of this role of enduring the winds of fate by turning to 
the Greek term as employed by the Greeks regarding tragedy.  Eleos, which we translate 
as “pity,” expresses the sentiment of suffering for the sufferer (301-303).  Nussbaum 
(2001) prefers the Greek term to the English because of the latter’s condescending 
connotation.  Eleos is what one feels for Oedipus, who is an unwitting victim of fate, 
conveying a recognition of moral luck, to which we are all subject.  Eleos shows an 
understanding and perhaps even an awe before the tragic in recognition of certain events 
as utterly beyond our control.    
Yet, pity might still be able to remain at stoic distance.  The further addition of 
love pulls us into the sufferer’s world.  Nussbaum describes various religious ideas like 
the Christian god’s suffering on behalf of its beloved humans and the bodhisattva who 
“experiences the ills that he pities, even if by now he no longer expects to do so.  
Furthermore, the attachment to the concerns of the suffering person is itself a form of 
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vulnerability: so a god, in allowing himself to be so attached, renders himself to a degree 
needy and non-self-sufficient, and thus similar to mortals” (318 emphasis mine).  Such 
compassion is inculcated by the myths, rituals, and practices of many religious traditions, 
practices that engage the imagination and move the feelings. 
Courage in Suffering, Courage for Suffering 
Nussbaum (2001) then claims that we must feel ourselves to be at stake in the 
other’s wellbeing.  We cannot find relief from suffering until they do.  Recall from my 
discussions of empathy how Hoffman claims that we feel personal distress and other 
distress mixed up together and that when the other’s distress is relieved, then ours is also.  
Nussbaum describes this experience as compassion (for her, empathy lacks the emotional 
depth), but the description accords well with Hoffman’s.  The empathizer “must consider 
the suffering of another as a significant part of his or her own scheme of goals and ends.  
She must take that person’s ill as affecting her own flourishing.  In effect, she must make 
herself vulnerable to the person of another.  “It is this eudaimonistic judgment, not the 
judgment of similar possibilities, that seems to be a necessary constituent of 
compassion…The recognition of one’s own related vulnerability is then, an important 
and frequently an indispensable epistemological requirement for compassion in human 
beings,” according to Nussbaum (319).  Solicitude as Ricoeur describes it is bound up 
with this recognition.   
A deep understanding, however explicitly philosophical or commonsensical, of 
our vulnerability to chance, to material and emotional want, to death, are necessary 
assistants to our grasping our primordial dependence on one another.  If we understand 
the vulnerability of our very existence, as our actual human condition every minute of 
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every day, then we may better understand that the rewards of connection to others far 
outweigh the risks.  Love relationships as experienced in living and in imaginative stories 
may be the best teachers of such truths. 
Narratives of suffering, like The Color Purple, show us how the love of someone 
like Shug can help someone like Celie find and develop her voice, listen to herself, and 
stand together with those who love her.  In such stories we can see that there is reprieve 
from suffering, especially if we hold on to each other.  Such narratives show us the darker 
side of life and in this way, it does seem that they teach us to be a little braver in the face 
of suffering, whether our own or someone else’s.   
Eleos,or pity infused with the recognition of our shared vulnerability, is a 
penetrating sentiment, evoked at times when the horrors of how we treat each other as 
humans is more than we can comprehend.  When we cannot understand the magnitude of 
the tragedy, we feel its weight and pity the sufferers.  Particular stories of particular 
people help take us inside the horrors of such events and teach us what it means to be 
human in those barbarous worlds.  While benevolence or humaneness might seem like an 
overly idealistic virtue to pursue, it may be that our inability to appreciate it is due to our 
own lack of imagination or our inexperience in making meaning out of our suffering.  I 
want to look at the account of Victor Frankl (1959/2006) and the diary of Etty Hillesum 
(1983) to deepen our understanding of how the cultivation of narrative empathy might 
help build up one’s inner life.  Adding to this the cultivation of an appreciation of our 
vulnerability and the meaning of pity may strengthen one’s courage to face profound 
hardship and still maintain one’s humanity. 
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Victor Frankl (1959), a clinical psychologist, philosopher, and a Jew who 
survived the concentration camps of WWII, claims that it is the ability to make meaning 
that transforms even the worst of suffering.  In his book, Man’s Search for Meaning, he 
describes his experience in the concentration camp as a “soul-destroying mental conflict” 
of not wanting to be reduced to mere animal thoughts of food and material comforts (31).  
He makes the observation that contrary to what one expects, it was not the hale and 
hearty who fared well in the camps, but those with a rich inner life.  “Sensitive people 
who were used to a rich intellectual life may have suffered much pain…but the damage 
to their inner selves was less.  They were able to retreat from their terrible surroundings 
to a life of inner riches and spiritual freedom” (36).  Those whose imaginative worlds 
were full of the love of people, music, history, religion, god, philosophy, art, and science 
found an inner resource for enduring suffering and more, for sustaining their humanity.  
Love is a vital moral emotion for such endurance, according to Frankl.   
Frankl describes how images of his wife nourished him and taught him the 
necessity of love, even in the imagination.  “The salvation of man is through love and in 
love.  I understood how a man who has nothing left in this world still may know bliss, be 
it only for  brief moment, in the contemplation of his beloved” (37).  Frankl describes a 
few experiences of sharing his bread ration, or, though totally exhausted, managing to 
console fellow prisoners with gentle words, drawing on the resources of his training and 
his own feelings in their shared suffering.  In such actions, he felt himself connected with 
the others in a way that gave him a dull courage to continue to struggle in spite of 
starvation and exhaustion.  Shocking to us readers in the comfort of our security, Frankl 
states that he found beauty in the camp.  “As the inner life of the prisoner tended to 
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become more intense, he also experienced the beauty of art and nature as never before” 
(39).  One evening a fellow prisoner pointed to the sky, “Standing outside we saw sinister 
clouds glowing in the west and the whole sky alive with clouds of ever-changing shapes 
and colors, from steel blue to blood red…Then, after minutes of moving silence, one 
prisoner said to another, ‘How beautiful the world could be!’” (40).  The hunger for 
beauty might even usurp the hunger for the little food they received. Prisoners would 
sometimes miss their food ration in order to hear musical performances (41). 
The rich world of the imagination can continue to nourish our hearts and minds 
when we are famished for physical nourishment and emotional intimacy.  Stories (like 
music and other aesthetic engagements) provide the furniture and feelings that facilitate 
our imagination’s power to face moral challenges.  Charles Dickens’ character David 
Copperfield speaks of his many books as the friends who comforted his solitude after the 
marriage of his loving mother to the cruel Mr. Murdstone.  Imaginary friends can move 
us and support us when our living ones cannot.  The life of the mind then, rather than 
being a flight from the living world of challenges and hardships, is often the means of 
growing the skills and the courage to face that world.  
Etty Hillesum, a young Danish Jew who died at Auschwitz, refused to give in to 
hate.  I share this summary of her experience before her death as evidence of the work 
that the imaginative life can do in our moral responses to lived experience.  Her diary, 
published as An Interrupted Life (1983), describes a vibrant, strong, curious woman with 
a passion for life and romance.  She is a mystic and an intellectual who draws on 
Judaism, Christianity, and European thought and literature to develop her inner world.  
As the occupation and deportations close in, she shrinks her needs ever smaller, but her 
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inner life expands.  She wants to understand the “relationship of literature to life” (64).  
Her life is as active as it is reflective, but she grows in the realization of the exigencies of 
life and death. 
I have looked our destruction, our miserable end, which has already begun 
in so many small ways in our daily life, straight in the eye and accepted it into my 
life, and my love of life has not been diminished.  I am not bitter or rebellious, or 
in any way discouraged.  I continue to grow from day to day, even with the 
likelihood of destruction staring me in the face…I have come to terms with life, 
nothing can happen to me, and after all my personal fate is not the issue; it doesn’t 
really matter if it is I who perish or another.  What matters is that we are all 
marked me. 
By coming to terms with life I mean the reality of death has become a 
definite part of my life; my life has, so to speak, been extended by death, by my 
looking death in the eye and accepting it…It sounds paradoxical; by excluding 
death from our life we cannot live a full life, and by admitting death into our life 
we enlarge and enrich it (155). 
 
Before she voluntarily goes away to Westerbork where she works helping and 
nursing other Jews, she is growing her resolve.  “There is a difference between hardy and 
hard…I believe I get hardier every day, except for the recalcitrant blister of mine, but I 
shall never grow hard” (195).  Over and over she reflects on the need to love her 
neighbor.  After working at Westerbork for two months, she is allowed to return home for 
a short time to recover her health which has severely weakened.  Writing in her diary to 
God, she says, “And talking to You, God.  Is that all right?  With the passing of people, I 
feel a growing need to speak to You alone.  I love people so terribly, because in every 
human being I love something of You.  And I seek You everywhere in them and often do 
find something of you” (198).  She is too tired to reach out for her Dostoyevsky, 
Shakespeare, or Kierkegaard, but she reaches inward to what she calls Rilke’s “’cosmic 
interior’” (199).   
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Of Westerbork she says, “Those two months behind barbed wire have been the 
two richest and most intense months of my life, in which my highest values were so 
deeply confirmed.  I have learned to love Westerbork” (205).  She describes the people 
whom she was touched by with lines of remembrance like, “I am suddenly reminded of 
that woman with the snow-white hair and the fine oval face.  She carried a packet of toast 
in her knapsack, all she had for the long journey to Poland…She was so incredibly lovely 
and so serene with her tall girlish figure” (206).  At the end of September, she receives a 
note saying that she is “exempted” from returning to Westerbork.  She does not want it.  
The meaning that she has found in “being a balm for all wounds” is more important to 
her than mere survival.  On her final postcard thrown from the train bound for Auschwitz 
with her parents and brother she writes,  
Christine, Opening the Bible at random, I find this: ‘The Lord is my high 
tower.’…We left camp singing, Father and Mother firmly and calmly, Mischa, 
too.  We shall be traveling for three days.  Thank you for all your kindness and 
care.  Friends left behind will still be writing to Amsterdam; perhaps you will hear 
something from them.  Or from my last letter from [Westerbork] camp.   
~Good-bye for now from the four of us.  Etty (360). 
 
I feel like Kierkegaard’s Johannes de Silentio in saying that her story stupefies 
me.  Etty Hillesum’s well-furnished imagination draws on her religious, literary, and 
practical experience to come up with a way of being that aided her in transcending her 
self-concern, even for her own survival.  She is a marvel to me, refusing to “give in to 
hate.” At the end of Hillesum’s diary, she says, “I have broken my body like bread and 
shared it out among men.  And why not, they were hungry and had gone without food for 
so long” (230).  Hillesum’s resolve to cultivate love rather than hate in a context in which 
most would consider her justified in hating, indicates the power and potential of empathic 
regard.   While there are many contingencies in the development of empathy and 
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impediments to its expression, what these snippets of Etty Hillesum’s life suggest is the 
possible fruit from cultivating empathy.   
 
Conclusion: Cultivating Empathy, the Way to Flourishing  
The title of this work is “The Enchantment of Ethics,” but it would be more 
accurate to say the enchantment of ethical subjects for ethics.  Stories enchant us, entice 
us to follow the rabbit.  And because stories are inherently normative, our ethical 
intuitions are engaged.  We fall into the hearts, minds and lives of others, and from inside 
their longings and in their world, we emerge again into our own world with the flavor of 
them still on our palette.  The enchantment of the story provokes self-transcendence, and 
if it is a good story, it can promote our regard for the other.  The spell of a story requires, 
as Nussbaum points out, that we learn how to fall.  It is risky and dangerous, but it is the 
means to a fuller self.  It is an invitation.  One may become a self-aware of her need of 
the other and the other’s need of her:  A self with other selves. 
Aristotle compares happiness, flourishing, thriving (eudaimonia) to health.  He 
chooses this metaphor because of its dynamic quality.  To be in health is an effort on the 
part of the patient.  Similarly moral health requires a striving after virtue and the 
development of phronesis (VI.35ff, 1144a).  We require good parenting, friendship, and 
love to help us with this work that never ends.  Ricoeur’s solicitude teaches us how much 
we need these relationships and how we, in turn, are needed.  We need others in order to 
realize our projects and even just to be properly human.  Empathy is the means of 
acknowledging and fulfilling this need, so the cultivation of the empathic moral 
perception is essential to helping us judge and act with a proper appreciation of our dual 
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need of self-realization and relations with others such that we may respond toward 
growth for ourselves and our relations.   Turning to narrative engagements, our 
neurophysiological structures are enabled to envision the moral behaviors of the 
characters and learn how one might act in particular situations.   
This project was inspired by the desire to understand what motivates us to be 
ethical and how to put such understanding into a meaningful project of moral self-
cultivation.  I began with the claims and supporting evidence that because 1) we are not 
autonomous individualists but instead are ultrasocial storytelling animals and because 2) 
we are not rational deciders and are instead moral intuitionists, we need ethical 
cultivation programs and practices that suit our anthropological aptitudes and 
inclinations, shaping them in the present for a future character that automatically tends 
toward the behavior we prefer.  That means cultivating empathy in accord with those 
behaviors.  Our maxims, values, and principles are helpful to our reflective engagements 
that can help select the aspects of our moral cultivation projects, but maxims alone cannot 
give us enough knowledge to support us in the myriad moral dilemmas that face us in 
life.   
We need the insight of narratives like those of Celie and Eliza Bennett that focus 
on particular moral problems with particular people and particular stakes to give us 
opportunity to imaginatively practice our values, shaping empathy to be aptly attentive to 
others in lived experience.  We also need their stories to take us into the particular 
histories of human history to learn meanings of the historical realities that the nonfiction 
narratives may not offer.  Moral living is a science in that we need seek understanding of 
ourselves as biological, psychological animals so that we may better form the art of our 
260 
 
moral life as an expression particular and beautiful.   If we are wise, we will read broadly, 
learning to understand, appreciate, and support the plurality of ways of being human.  
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